vara bungas: SE atvaļinātā ģenerāļa Kārļa Neretnieka raksts mašīntulkojumā. Pēc drastiska SE militārā budžeta palielināšanas – uzreiz par 40%, tas joprojām paliek 1,5 % robežās no SE IKP , kas neitrālai valstij ar vienu līgumisko sabiedroto (FI) ir daudz par maz.
Kā norāda Neretnieks, pateicoties budžeta pieaugumam SE sauszemes spēki palielināsies līdz nepilnām četrām kājnieku brigādēm, trīskāršosies artilērijas bataljonu skaits (būs seši), klāt nāks pieci teritoriālās aizsardzības bataljoni. Tomēr budžeta palielinājums neatrisina iesīkstējušas problēmas : kājnieku kaujas mašīnu trūkumu un esošo KKM vecumu, SE sauszemes spēku deficītu un izvietojumu, kas neļauj vienlaicīgi organizēt pietiekamu aizsardzību valsts ziemeļos un dienvidos (līdzīgi kā SE jūras spēkiem trūkst spēju vienlaicīgi nodrošināt Atlantijas okeāna un Baltijas jūras kuģošanas virzienus), tāpat pašreizējais budžeta palielinājums neko nerisina attiecībā uz nākotnes kaujas lauka tehnoloģiju ieviešanu. Ģenerālis secina, ka SE aizsardzības budžeta palielināšana ir solis pareizā virzienā, tomēr nepietiekami plats.
Mani šajā rakstā uzrunāja aicinājums ne tikai skaitīt ORBAT “kastītes”, bet arī ielūkoties to saturā. VB sen aicina to darīt, jo īpaši attiecība uz mūsu “teritoriālās aizsardzības spēkiem”.
Visi izcēlumi mani.
This post was previously published by me on the People and Defense website on November 23rd.
The army is growing. Roughly speaking, the proposals in the bill mean that the Army will double in size. Two incomplete brigades will be three and a half. Two artillery battalions will be six. Five local defense battalions will be set up. The logistics function must be strengthened, etc. The proposed measures mean a clear strengthening of the army. But before the jubilation, or criticism, takes on too high a tone, there may be reason to take a closer look at what this means linked to tasks and real ability.
The first and perhaps most important finding is that what we see is part of a process to transform an organization, which previously had the task of being able to have 2,000 people serving abroad, into an army that will primarily contribute to the defense of Sweden. Union structures, training, logistics and management were designed against what was required to solve international tasks. Admittedly, the defense decision in 2015 was a lip service to the Armed Forces’ decision that the Armed Forces should be refocused on national defense, but the funds allocated did not go far enough. It is only now that we can expect more comprehensive changes.
But what does it mean in increased defensive effect? Here it is important not to be tempted to just look at the number of organizational blocks of one kind or another, but also to take into account their content. Nor is the number of soldiers, who will be significantly more, a measure of efficiency. Few would assess the Navy’s ability by counting the number of sailors. Today, the army has 120 tanks and about 500 combat vehicles 90 in different versions. Now that there will be two more mechanized brigades, this does not mean that the number of combat vehicles of various kinds will increase by fifty percent. What will happen is that existing vehicles will be redistributed within the organization. The brigades will be more, but weaker. In addition, the vehicles will be approximately forty years old by 2030, when the units proposed in the bill will be fully organized. The army will be stronger, but perhaps not as much as many would like to believe.
It is quite obvious that the planned expansion of the army’s organization, and the need to solve new operational tasks, require an expansion of the peace organization. To have two brigades in southern Sweden, but maintain all artillery training in Boden would be unreasonable. This is for both training and emergency preparedness reasons. A new artillery garrison in Kristinehamn is therefore justified. However, the establishment of two garrisons, one in Falun and one in Middle Norrland, to train two local defense battalions at each location seems more dubious. The operational reason, to protect relations with Norway, is justified, but is characterized to an excessive extent by a “static” thinking. With the design the units will have, local defense battalions, they will have trouble dealing with a modern attacker. Nor will they be suitable for intervening in any area other than where they are initially grouped. Here, in my opinion, it would have been wiser to choose only one of the places and there train and organize a larger and more qualified unit, a brigade. It would have given greater freedom of action to meet an attacker in more places than just where you are in place from the beginning, and also increased the probability of achieving success where the unit is deployed. In addition, the opportunities to use the unit in other parts of the country had increased. The education could then also have been made more rational and versatile. In addition, as it is proposed, dividing the education in Middle Norrland on two platforms, Östersund and Sollefteå, seems more than strange.
Provided that the Army develops as proposed in the bill; is it an acceptable volume ? The answer is simple – no. The army will face a dilemma very similar to the Navy’s. The number of vessels is only sufficient to either conduct operations on the West Coast, then to protect the shipping required for the country’s supply and to receive any foreign aid, or to conduct operations in the Baltic Sea. In the latter case, make an attack on the sea more difficult, but also protect Swedish (and Finnish) shipping.
The army’s west-east coast dilemma is southern or northern Sweden. If the entire Army could gather strength to either end of the country, the threshold for an attack, in the part of the country where the Army is initially grouped, would be high. However, none of the ends of the country can be left “troop empty” as this would mean that the area could in that case be taken with a minimal effort by the attacker. The small volume of ground combat units means that we have, and will have, insufficient combat forces in both the north and the south. To believe that, if necessary, it would be possible to move larger units between northern and southern Sweden is unrealistic. Between Stockholm and Boden there are ten larger rivers, with a few bridges over each. Using today’s long – range precision weapons to knock out one of the river lines, and thereby prevent major movements between northern and southern Sweden, is probably one of the smaller challenges an attacker faces.
Yes, it is important to recreate a reasonable volume. There, the bill means a large, albeit insufficient, step in the right direction. But what about quality? It is not without that both the Defense Committee’s report from May 2019 and the Defense Bill give a bit of a déjà vu feeling, you recognize most of how it was before. Where is the future? Where are the long-range indirect control systems, where are the countermeasures against an attacker’s drone, where do we take height for tomorrow’s attackers? The situation for the other branches of defense, the Navy and the Air Force, is similar. The answer to this concluding question is not that funds for one or the other should be redistributed, then the already insufficient number of platforms to be added to modern technology would be even fewer. Rather, it is a clear illustration of the fact that 1.5% of GDP is not enough to create a credible, future-oriented defense.