Boids nu jau ir vakardiena (papildināts)

[..] Network-centric warfare, and the technologies that enable it, have tremendous potential to reduce friction, lift the veil of the fog of war, and increase the tempo of US forces to breakneck speeds. All of these benefits can only be realized if we educate and train future leaders how to equate the information created by the system into a shared awareness. We can’t rely on technology to interpret data into a common operational picture, we must change the way we train leaders to seek, prioritize and analyze the most important data out of the vast quantities of data available. Just as we have trained generations of military leaders to use Boyd’s cycle to create tempo, and to embrace the concept that, “when skating over thin ice, speed is our security,” so now we must train leaders to see the forest for the trees. We must train and exercise analytical techniques the same way we do tactics. A leader’s intuition becomes increasingly valuable because there is so much data, but we must teach and train our leaders in a manner that develops this brand of intuition.[..]

vara bungas: Garlaicīga lasāmviela, ja neesi virsnieks.

PS vēl par pulkvedi Džonu Boidu.

UPD 1 te būs svaigi atjauninātā US armijas operacionālā doktrīna, ko būtu jāstudē, lai izprastu pret ko tad NATO būs jābūt gataviem karot un galvenais, kā to darīs mūsu sabiedrotie. Doktrīna nav žurnāla raksts, ja jau te ATKLĀTĀ TEKSTĀ ir pateikts, ka  “RU advance its interests in former Soviet states. Without a viable land force capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, such adventurism is likely to continue undeterred.”, tad turpināt gatavoties  “dziesmu kariem” ir stulbi vai noziedzīgi.

[..]Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional andunconventional land forces in Ukraine suggest that Russia is determined to expand its territory and assert its power on the Eurasian landmass. Russia deployed and integrated a range of diplomatic, information,military, and economic means to conduct what some analysts havedescribed as “non linear” operations. Russia conducted operations to pursue its war aims below the threshold that would elicit a concerted North Atlantic Treaty Organization response. In addition, Russia used cyberspace capabilities and social media to influence perceptions at home and abroad and provide cover for large-scale military operations. While the long- term results of the incursion into Ukraine are not yet certain, Russia demonstrated the centrality of land forces in its effort to assert power and advance its interests in former Soviet states. Without a viable land force capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, such adventurism is likely to continue undeterred. Russia’s actions highlight the value of land forces to deter conflict as well as special operations and conventional force capability to project national power and exert influence in political contests.[..]

video skaidrojums