Zviedru gaumē

…In late July this year, I wrote that Ukraine had just begun “a long, complex and difficult operation to retake Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian tactic of focusing on materiel rather than terrain may seem frustrating on the surface. It is slow but it is methodical and Russian materiel and manpower are being systematically combated.”[1] For Ukraine’s international partners, Jack Watling wrote in RUSI, the summer would be “…deeply uncomfortable. Losses will increase and successes will take time.”[2]

In the article, I recalled that the Ukrainian offensive in Kherson took two months, and that the (then) nascent offensive faced a significantly more complex situation in southern Ukraine than the one in Kherson. It was important for Ukraine that the West continue to support the country.

Two months after I wrote this, it is now possible to some extent to evaluate what the Ukrainian offensive has achieved and what we can expect Ukraine to achieve in the autumn and winter.

Gradual successes

As early as November 2022, I wrote that “things are not going well for Russia.”[3] Russian forces had been unable to carry out any major offensive operations since earlier in the fall, and despite months of attempts to capture Bakhmut, they had not succeeded. The city, seemingly strategically insignificant, fell to Russian forces only around May 2023.[4] Today, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimates that Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive as early as June and have since then tied up two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the four separate brigades.[5] In mid-September, the 72nd Motorized Brigade is said to have been “completely destroyed” in battles with the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade in battles around Andriivka, a small village south of Bakhmut. Russian losses are estimated to be over a thousand men.[6]

By keeping the pressure up around a city that lacks clear strategic value in itself, Ukraine has partially succeeded in tying up Russian troops that could otherwise have participated in the defense of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblast. ISW describes how Ukraine, by carrying out several different operations in several directions at the same time, has forced the Russian military to “prioritize certain sectors of the front and make lateral movements that have created opportunities that Ukraine can exploit.”[7]

Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, has described Ukraine’s counteroffensive as “the trend is in a positive direction… Russia has constructed a defense in depth in southern Ukraine but has spent most of the counteroffensive not using it.”[8]

According to Viktor Kivliuk, a retired Ukrainian colonel and now at the think tank Center for Defense Strategies, the Russian tactics have not utilized the defensive lines that were dug at the so-called Surovikin line. Instead, they have repeatedly tried to take back territory that Ukraine has retaken through immediate counterattacks. The Russian tactics have involved sacrificing manpower and equipment in an effort to slow the Ukrainian advance.[9]

Ironically, this may have been a tactic that has suited Ukraine well, as they have primarily focused on:

• Fighting Russian logistics, command posts, reconnaissance, and artillery systems.
• Forcing Russia to use its reserves, to be able to identify weak points in the Russian lines.
• Initially attacking on as wide a front as possible to increase flexibility where the main force is to be deployed, as well as to get the Russian troops to spread out and ensure that they cannot defend in depth.[10]

This is evident, among other things, in how Ukraine has continued to fight Russian artillery. On July 8, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated that it had knocked out 4,346 different Russian artillery pieces,[11] and on September 29, they stated that the number was 6,409.[12]

The result of the Russian tactics was that the first defensive line was difficult to break through and has made it difficult for Ukraine to build momentum. But according to Michael Kofman, it has been a “costly strategy” and Ukrainian commanders have said they expect fewer minefields as they continue to advance south.[13]

It is perhaps not surprising that the British Ministry of Defense in mid-September was able to report that Russia had begun to reinforce its defenses around the city of Tokmak. After the Ukrainian (local) breakthrough at Robotyne on the southern front, fighting is now continuing just north of Tokmak. The city is important for the Russian occupation as it is used as a railway junction and is a logical objective for Ukraine. In an interview with CNN on September 23, Ukrainian General Oleksandr Tarnavsky, responsible for the counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, said that they had achieved a breakthrough around Verbove in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Despite not advancing as quickly as they had hoped, he assessed that the “major breakthrough” could come after Ukrainian troops capture Tokmak.[14] In the same interview, Tarnavsky stated that the minimum goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is to capture the city, even though the goal is to liberate all occupied territory.[15]

On September 17, the British Ministry of Defense wrote in an update on X (formerly Twitter) that Tokmak was being prepared to become the cornerstone of the Russian second defensive line, which would indicate concern over Ukrainian tactical successes.[16]

Nearly nine days later, on September 26, ISW assessed that the situation around Verbove was unclear, but Russian sources with ties to the Russian VDV claimed that Ukrainian troops controlled half of the city. Verbove is located about four miles northeast of Tokmak. In the same report, ISW was able to report that Russian military bloggers (who generally tend to be better truth-tellers than the Kremlin) wrote that Ukrainian troops were in the northern parts of Novoprokopivka, about two miles north of Tokmak.[17] The distance corresponds to what CNN previously reported on September 21.[18]

If Ukrainian forces succeed in reaching Tokmak, they can cut off the railway hub and strangle Russian logistics, which is largely dependent on railways. Russia has invested heavily in building defensive positions around Tokmak for this very reason, and taking or cutting off the city will be a difficult task. But if Ukraine succeeds, they are only just over six miles from Melitopol. This is within range of HIMARS.[19] If Melitopol can be reached, Ukraine could threaten to cut off the occupied southwestern parts of the country and the Crimean Peninsula from Russian logistics.[20] It is worth remembering here that Crimea lacks its own water supply.

Continued offensive objectives

A central objective of the Ukrainian offensive is to cut off Crimea from the rest of the occupied areas in southern Ukraine. Retired American General Ben Hodges has said that it is “obvious” that this is the goal of the offensive.

In his explanation of the Ukrainian objectives to Newsweek in late August, Hodges said that “it is about decisive terrain. It is about isolating Crimea and then moving forward with enough long-range weapons to make the situation on Crimea untenable for the Russian fleet and air force.”

Jan Kallberg, Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, pointed out in early September that Ukraine does not need to reach all the way to the Sea of Azov to cut off Russian communication lines. Before Ukrainian forces reach Melitopol, the Russian options will have been “significantly affected” and Ukrainian troops will not need to reach the Sea of Azov before “logistics begins to fall apart on the Russian side.”

Thus, the Ukrainian struggle is no longer about simply defending itself, or tying up Russian forces around Bakhmut, for example. The goal is to liberate all the occupied parts of the country. Ironically, the full-scale invasion has given Ukraine the best chance to liberate Crimea since the occupation in 2014. “It started with Crimea, and it will end with Crimea,” was the message from Ukrainian President Zelensky already in the summer of 2022.

Hodges agrees. In his comments to Newsweek, he lists a number of reasons why Crimea is crucial for Ukraine – and Russia. If Crimea remains occupied, the area can be used by the Russian fleet or air force to attack Ukrainian ports. The Ukrainian economy will be dependent on the Russian goodwill as they can quickly strike against Odesa, Kherson or Mykolaiv. Even if Berdiansk or Mariupol are liberated, Russia can control the Sea of Azov if they continue to occupy Crimea.

As part of the larger operation to liberate the occupied areas in southern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have deliberately attacked military targets and installations around Crimea using patrol robots, kamikaze drones, British Storm Shadows and French SCALP-EG.

Ukraine has also developed its own robots, and in at least one case a modified R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile is said to have been used to knock out a Russian S-400 system on Crimea.

Since the counteroffensive began, attacks on targets on Crimea have become increasingly frequent. In mid-September, Sevastopol’s port was attacked, where a large landing ship of the Ropucha class, Minsk, and the submarine Rostov-on-Don, an attack submarine of the Kilo class, were reportedly sunk.

Even the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was attacked with British Storm Shadows, in an attack where Ukraine tried to take out the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. At the time of writing, the outcome was unclear.

According to The New York Times, the goal of the attacks is part of Ukraine’s campaign “to strike deep behind Russian lines in order to cut off Moscow’s supply lines and undermine Russia’s ability to strike Ukrainian territory.”

What Ukraine needs

In August 2022, I wrote that Ukraine “with the right equipment and support from the West, can win the war against Russia. It is now up to us in Europe, together with the United States, to prove that Western democracy, the European security order, and Ukraine’s independence are worth defending.”

Retaking Crimea “will be difficult, but possible,” according to Dr. Scott Savitz of the American RAND Corporation.

By continuously attacking targets on the peninsula, it will become militarily unsustainable for Russia to remain. One of the keys to liberating Crimea is that Western support continues. American ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) and German TAURUS (long-range cruise missiles) are at the top of the list of desired capabilities.

Phillips O’Brien, professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St Andrews, wrote as early as March that long-range weapons needed to be a priority to “destroy Russian logistics, command, naval and air power…” instead of preparing Ukraine for a mechanized attack.

Therefore, it is gratifying that the United States decided in late September to send ATACMS to Ukraine. With a range of up to 300 kilometers, they will be a much-needed addition to be able to combat Russian positions in the occupied areas.

Ukraine, which is currently conducting a war of attrition against the Russian military, is still in need of support from the West. The attrition tactic, which “reflects a deliberate attempt to preserve Ukrainian forces and wear down Russian forces and materiel at the expense of territorial gains,” takes time.

At the same time, Ukraine is using combined weapons at a lower tactical level linked to individual platoons that cooperate with artillery. By attacking on several fronts at the same time, they try to surprise the Russian forces and smaller groups of infantry advance supported by tanks and armored vehicles.

According to Major Robert Rose, Ukraine should see the offensive and attrition campaign as a larger part of an exhaustion strategy where Russia loses in the long run on a military, political, and economic level, as there is no “perfect alternative.”

This type of warfare is not something that the West is accustomed to. Regular strategic exhaustion and military attrition as a war-winning method has not been used since World War I. And despite the fact that it can sometimes seem frustrating for the West, it has been successful. Ukraine has the initiative, they have adapted their warfare, been supplied with new equipment, and are moving south.

It is therefore time for the West and Ukraine’s partners to, as Nataliya Bugayova at ISW writes, reinforce their military and diplomatic efforts and ensure that Ukraine can maintain its momentum.[39] In what could be seen as a step in this direction, the United Kingdom recently confirmed its intention to send soldiers and officers to train Ukrainian forces in Ukraine[40] and Ukraine is preparing for a long, brutal war.[41]

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