Dienas grauds

vara bungas: Izvilkums no SE ģenerālmajora Kārļa Neretnieka pārdomām par SE lomu 3B aizsardzībā pēc SE pievienošanās NATO. Īsumā: SE pat viena bataljona rotācijas uzturēšana LV nav viegls, bet ļoti nepieciešams uzdevums, jo okupētās terirorijas atgūšana prasītu pārāk lielu piepūli no sabiedrotajiem. SE kā NATO paipldspēku habs ir efektīvāks risinājums nekā mehanizēto kolonnu virzīšana cauri Suvalku koridoram, bet šim jūras/gaisa “tiltam” absolūti kritiski nepieciešama Gotlandes aizsardzibas pastiprināšana,t.sk. ar Patriot sistēmām, jo sala var kļūt par RU uzbrukuma pirmo mērki tieši dēļ tā, ka ir “smaguma centrs” NATO plānos.

VB: Diezgan acīmredzamas tēzes, bet to paturēšana prātā ļaus novērtēt NATO 3B aizsardzības plānu nopietnību – vienlaicīgi ar sabiedroto klātbūtnes palielināšanu LV jānotiek kvalitatīvai nevis tikai formālai Gotlandes aizsardzības pastiprināšanai. Bez tās viss 3B aizstāvēšanas pasākums karāsies Suvalku koridora mata galā.

[..] If we look at all the brigades, we would then get a picture where the newly formed Northland Brigade and the brigade from I19 in Boden would be earmarked for operations in the Nordkalotten, while the brigades set up by P4 in Skövde and P7 at Revinge are aimed at operations in the Baltics. Also: the current planning that in peacetime, on a rotational basis, we shall have a battalion stationed in Latvia will probably be very difficult to realize if only the P7 brigade is to be responsible for that task. It also suggests that the two southern mechanized brigades should focus on the Baltics and handle that task both in peace and war. [..]

[..] In the event of war, fighting through the only 60 kilometer wide Suwalki Gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which Russia will do its best to close as a first measure in the event of a war in the Baltic Sea area, will probably be a time- and resource-consuming affair. Probably a significantly longer operation than the time it takes to bring reinforcements across the Baltic Sea, by air and by sea. [..]

[..] In addition to the urgency to carry out the organization of the battle group on Gotland – it can hardly wait until 2030 – there are reasons to review the envisaged unit structure. A reduced mechanized battalion, plus a smaller anti-aircraft unit and an artillery company is not much. Russia’s clearly stated ambition to incorporate former parts of its empire poses a very tangible threat to the Baltics. The need for the alliance to be able to strengthen the Baltics has thus become even more obvious. From there, Russia would be able to protect military operations against the Baltics with long-range weapon systems, mainly by making it difficult for NATO reinforcements to reach the Baltics. The island has become a sugar cube for Russia. Because an attack on the island would very likely be the first (plus block the Suwalkigapet) that takes place in connection with a Russian military operation in the Baltics, there will not be much warning that we ourselves, or allies, will have time to bring reinforcements there. [..]

[..] As crass as it sounds: it is considerably more important to defend Gotland than to protect any facility or place on the mainland. In one case, it may mean that the alliance fails to defend one or more of its members, while the other case does mean that important Swedish infrastructure or material on the mainland may be destroyed. It would be boring, but probably a very moderate problem compared to NATO having to try to recapture all or parts of the Baltics. Or in the worst case state that the alliance lacked the ability to protect its members, with incalculable consequences for the alliance’s credibility and cohesion.[..]

avots