Dienas grauds

vara bungas: Labā ziņa no The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR):

[..] Europe’s NATO members (including Estonia’s neighbours) are also in a stronger position to assist Estonia against Russian aggression. Estonia itself has developed a three-pronged defence concept based on traditional artillery, air defence and a well-drilled societal response.

It will take Russia some 5-10 years after the end of the war in Ukraine to refit and rearm for such an attack. To ensure Estonia’s security, the country and its allies need to continue developing their defence capability now and in the coming years—even if they have minimal assistance from the US.[..]

sliktā ziņa: Argumenti, kas pamato šo labo ziņu nepārliecina, jo balstās uz “pustukšajām kazarmām Pleskavā” . Turklāt prognozes autori piekrīt, ka ar US kinētisko palīdzību nevar rēķināties. Tas ir īpaši interesanti, jo analīze sniedzas tālāk par 2028.gadu. VB paliek pie pārliecības, ka “after the end of the war in Ukraine” RU karaspēks atgriezīsies Ļeņingradas kara apgabala bāzēs un tad ECFR prognoze par 5-10 gadiem miera kļūs nerelevanta.

avots

Loti ticams ir otrais scenārijs, bet tas var īstenoties “jau rīt” nevis pēc 5-10 gadiem.

[..] Far more plausible than Russia’s direct invasion of Estonia is a hybrid attack: a rapid, deniable operation blending local proxies, cyber sabotage and limited Russian incursions. The goal would be political shock, not territorial gain: to create confusion, delay NATO’s decision-making and demonstrate Western impotence and disunity.

A hybrid campaign, following the model in Crimea 2014, would begin with information and cyber shaping. Russian disinformation networks would amplify grievances in Ida-Viru County, alleging discrimination against Russian speakers. Cyberattacks could disable local power grids or municipal services, creating confusion. Small pro-Russian groups—real or fabricated—might stage protests or riots in the border city of Narva. At a pre-chosen moment, these disturbances would coincide with armed action.

Local cells, coordinated by GRU handlers, could try to seize municipal buildings, police stations or bridges. Within hours, masked men in unmarked uniforms—Spetsnaz or VDV detachments—might cross from Ivangorod under the pretext of “protecting Russian citizens”. A single company-sized force (150-300 troops) could attempt to secure key sites (the Narva bridge, a substation or an airstrip) backed by artillery fire from across the border and drone reconnaissance overhead.[..]

avots

Autori piekrīt, ka ar šādu scenāriju 3B jāspēj tikt galā pašiem. Gluži kā mēs te kalkulējam jau gadiem ilgi.

[..] To counter this risk, some kind of rapid NATO response would be important, even just for signalling purposes. Estonia could likely suppress a grey zone-type campaign on its own, but a quick reaction from NATO aircraft, mobilisation of at least infantry forces in nearby states, and US intelligence, cyber and command and control support would reinforce the alliance’s unity. If truly necessary, NATO forces stationed in the Baltic states as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence mission could be moved into Estonia to offer additional reinforcement.[..]

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