Pirmais

Patīkama ziņa visiem  tiem, kas jau agrāk norādīja uz nepieciešamību NBS rēķināties ar jaunās  paaudzes kaujas darbības realitātēm (mēs VB pieturamies pie apzīmējuma -4GW, pastāv arī citi paaudžu atskaites punkti, bet lietas būtību tas nemaina). Mūsu Nacionālā Aizsardzības akadēmija laidusi klajā J.Bērziņa pētījumu “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy“, ko var uzskatīt par pirmo doktrīnas dokumentu, kas balstīts uz jaunāko datu un kaujas pieredzes analīzi. Apsveicama operativitāte un, cerams, pavērsiens domāšanā. Dažas pētījuma tēzes var uzskatīt  par revolucionārām, lai gan virsnieku aprindās šāda izpratne ir jau sen (tikai, kurš gan viņos ieklausās). Piemēram:

“[…]The idea that the Armed Forces’ role should be limited to a (suicide) battalion ready to die, with the objective of making a foreign attack “official”, as discussed in the media, is the first step to defeat.[…]”

Nelielu neizpratni rada fakts, ka pētījums ir pieejams tikai angļu valodā, bet gan jau NAA atradīsies kāds, kas kvalitatīvi pārtulkos  ārrindas zemessargiem vismaz  šo:

[…] As a result, it follows that the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:  
i. From direct destruction to direct influence;
ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;  
iv. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;
v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;
vi. from direct clash to contactless war;
vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s internal side and base;
viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyber-space;
ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, infor-mation, technological, and ecological campaigns;  
x. From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.
Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and  psychological  warfare,  in  order  to  achieve  superiority  in  troops  and  weapons  control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. […]