Visi grib Gotlandi

[..] Due to its geographical position, Sweden (particularly its southern and central part and the island of Gotland) is important for planning and conducting of military operations both for NATO and Russia in the Baltic Sea region. Sweden may allow or deny access to its airspace and territorial waters for the conduct of NATO operations, which may decide on the outcome of possible Russian military actions against the Baltic countries, and whether (or not) NATO would be able to meet its commitments on collective defence. Thus, a sort of a game is underway in the region with the aim of influencing Sweden’s security and defence policy.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, who are aware of the importance of Sweden to their own security, are the countries that have been lobbying loudest for the membership of Sweden (and Finland) in NATO. For its part, Sweden has begun once again (after the Cold War period) to gradually become aware of its geostrategic importance for the security of the entire region. At the same time, for domestic political, historical and social reasons, the Swedish political class does not want to break the public’s resistance to changing the country’s non-aligned status or run the riskof raising tensions between Stockholm and Moscow.[..]

[..] Russia’s aim is, on the other hand, the political and military ‘neutralisation’ of Sweden. This is not only a matter of Sweden’s potential NATO membership: Sweden’s previous conservative government did not apply to join, and the current Social-Democratic/Green coalition has officially ruled out the possibility. Russia’s multi-dimensional actions – political, economic, military, propaganda – both now and in the future are intended to ensure that Sweden refrains from far-reaching co-operation with NATO (for example, by implementing the HNS agreement). Moreover, in the event of crises or conflicts in the Baltic Sea region, Russia wants Sweden to refrain from approving the movement and stationing of NATO forces in Sweden.

However, the main goal of Russia is not to bring about the worst-case scenario – which in the case of an armed attack on the Baltic states would most likely also include: sabotage or attack on Swedish air and sea bases that might be used by NATO during the conflict; taking control of the shipping lanes near Sweden; and taking over key points on Swedish territory, such as the island of Gotland. Such a scenario should not be fully excluded;

However Russia’s main goal is to convince the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland and NATO that it is able to execute such a plan and has the military capabilities to do so. This, in turn, is intended to act as a deterrent to NATO and the countries of the region, and translate into a reluctance to meet the Alliance’s obligations. As a result, this would lead to a weakening of faith in NATO’s Article 5 and thus undermine the credibility of the Alliance, which is the overarching goal of Russian foreign and security policy. The Russian military activity against Sweden and throughout the region is therefore today mainly an element of psychological warfare. It is being used to demonstrate its superior military potential and to highlight the glaring gaps in Sweden’s defence system, and thus intimidating the public and influencing decision-makers in Sweden and the Baltic countries.[..]

vara bungas: Iegaumēsim raksta autores vārdu – Justīne Gotkovska. Dāma formulē perfekti un lakoniski, tā it kā visu mūžu būtu brīfējusi HQ. Raksta galvenā doma: RU demonstrē savu militāro varēšanu Baltijas reģionā, lai: a) atturētu SE no pasīva atbalsta NATO spēkiem (teritorija, infrastruktūra) gadījumā, ja notiks  agresija pret Baltijas valstīm b) liktu šaubīties par Vašingtonas līguma 5.panta praktiskās  īstenošanas iespējām Baltijas reģionā.  Ja to saprot PL analītiķi, to saprot arī viņu  SE un LV  kolēģi, līdz ar to valdībām laiks rīkoties un investēt  aizsardzībā, jo tikai tā var izjaukt augstākminētos a) un b) punktus, no savas puses demonstrējot, ka RU spējām arī ir robežas. Protams, var nedarīt un netērēt  ar atrunu  “ko nu mēs”, bet tad RU psiholoģisko operāciju mērķis tiks sasniegts. Labi un lēti.

SE jau sākusi rīkoties un palielina gan kopējo aizsardzības budžetu, gan investē gaisa telpas aizsardzībā un kontrolē.

LV tikko apstiprinātās valdības deklarācijā teikts: “177. Stiprināsim Nacionālo bruņoto spēku kaujas gatavību un reaģēšanas spējas, paaugstinot personāla sagatavotību un palielinot profesionālā dienesta karavīru skaitu Nacionālajos bruņotajos spēkos, attīstīsim spējas, kas uzlabo Nacionālo bruņoto spēku mobilitāti, reaģēšanu un labāku situācijas izpratni gar Latvijas robežām“. Vai ar labāku situācijas izpratni “gar Latvijas robežām” būs pietiekami, lai novērstu “anti acess/area denial” (A2/AD) operācijas draudus, rādīs laiks un pretinieks.

vēl  un vēl  ieraksti  no VB arhīva