“On the morning of April 7th, a U.S. RC-135U flying a routine route in international airspace was intercepted by a Russian Su-27 Flanker in an unsafe and unprofessional manner,” said Pentagon spokeswoman Eileen M. Lainez.“The United States is raising this incident with Russia in the appropriate diplomatic and official channels,” she said in a statement.
vara bungas: 20 pēdas = 6 m . Nav pirmā reize.
vara bungas 
Brīnišķīgi komentāri youtūbā zem video.
Nedomāju, ka krievu iznīcinātāja satriekšanās ar ASV lidmašīnu būtu 3. pasaules kara sākums. Norakstītu kā nelaimes gadījumu vai ko tādu. Atcerēsimies, ka 1960. gadā PSRS notrieca virs savas teritorijas amerikāņu U-2, nekāds karš tāpēc nesākās.
Citi laiki un pavisam citi apstākļi, RC-135 būtu vairāk cietušo, turklāt U-2 notrieca apbsolūti pamatoti. Par 3.PK piekrītu – pārspīlējums.
U-2 nebija labākais piemērs. Šis gan visai līdzīgs.
Šis būs precizāks atstāsts:
avots
On 8 April 1950, a VP-26 PB4Y-2 (BuNo 59645) and its ten-man crew were lost in the Western Baltic Sea, apparently after being attacked by Soviet aircraft approximately 80 nm southeast of Gotland Island. Earlier in April the Privateer had deployed from Port Lyautey to the U.S. Air Force Base at Wiesbaden, Germany. Leaving one crewman on the ground, Aviation Electronic Technician- Stephen Zakian, the patrol bomber took off at 1031 Saturday, 8 April on a classified mission.
PB4 Y-2 BuNo 59645, seen here at Gibraltar 9 Nov /949, was shot down 8 Apr 1950 over the Baltic by Soviet fighters to became the first victim of the “Cold War.” The fate of its ten-man crew was never confirmed, but it is suspected they were imprisoned in Russia.
At 1330 the aircraft reported it was flying over Bremerhaven, Germany, and at 1440 made its last radio report. At 2330 VP-26 headquarters at Port Lyautey received a dispatch from the commanding officer of the U.S. Naval Base in Bremerhaven Stating PB4Y-2 bureau number 59645 was declared overdue by USAF Flight Service in Frankfurt. According to a later Soviet report, the Navy aircraft was sighted at 1739 on 8 April over Leyaya, Soviet Latvia, and mistakenly identified as a B-29 bomber. It was then intercepted and ordered to land, whereupon it reportedly exchanged fire with the Russian fighters and headed out to sea. The credibility of the Soviet report was seriously weakened by the fact that the Privateer’s only armament was a .45 cal. pistol carried by one of the officer crewmen.
According to subsequently declassified VP-26 reports, by 0400 on 9 April three PB4Y-2s were ordered from Port Lyautey to Wiesbaden to conduct a search for BuNo 59645. VP-26 Privateers piloted by LT Rice, LTJG Linker and a third by LT Cobb, with the squadron executive officer on board, were launched in quick order. After a short stay in Wiesbaden, the aircraft moved on to Copenhagen, Denmark, and initiated search operations by the 10th. Before the search concluded, a fourth VP-26 Privateer and approximately 25 USAF aircraft would scour the Baltic for ten days.
A life raft, identified as VP-26 property, was picked up by a Swedish fishing vessel a few days 5fter the search was suspended. Similarly, the British freighter Beechland pulled an empty aircraft life raft from the Baltic Sea 45 miles southeast of Stockholm. The raft was positively identified by the serial and contract numbers as having been issued to a PB4Y-2. After the incident a stiff note of protest and a rebuttal of the Soviet report was sent to the Russian government by the U.S. State Department.
Numerous Soviet naval and air contacts were reported by U.S. search aircraft, and in the VP-26 squadron report, at least two PB4Y-2 APS-15 radar operators reported noise- modulated radar jamming. The jamming obliterated the APS-15 scopes in up to 30-degree sectors for as long as three hours. The reports varied as to the origin of the jamming, but it was believed to have originated from a Soviet submarine or from ashore in Latvia.
No trace of the ten-man crew was ever found and eventually they were presumed dead. The crewmembers were: LTs John H. Fette and Howard W. Skeschaf; LTJG Robert D. Reynolds; ENS Tommy L. Burgess; AD1s Joe H. Danens Jr. and Jack W. Thomas; AT1 Frank L. Beckman; CT3 Edward J. Purcell; AL3 Joseph J. Bourassa; and AT3 Joseph N. Rinnier Jr.
In January 1955, two Americans were repatriated from Russian prison camps where they had been held since the end of WWII. They reported hearing of American prisoners who had been shot down over the Baltic Sea. Actual sighting of the Americans was reported by a third repatriate, a Yugoslav, who had served time in the infamous Soviet prison coal mine of Vorkuta, above the Arctic Circle. He alleged that one of his fellow prisoners had been a U.S. Navy officer from the lost Privateer. However, this claim was never confirmed.
A series of investigations by Naval Intelligence and demands to the Soviets by the State Department were to no avail. The fate of the VP-26 crew was never determined positively.
Leyaya laikam ir drukas kļūda šiem ieviesusies, taču Liepāja, ne?
Par to ļoteni pirms gada vai diviem laikam bija sižets vienā no Discovery/National Geographic kanāliem.
Vai tik tur nebija runa par to, ka atrasta lidmašīna, bet vai lidotāju mirstīgās atliekas atrada, negribu sameloties?
jebkurā gadījumā izskatās, ka tā notriekta virs teritoriāliem ūdeņiem. Tātad tas pats U-2 stāsts sanāk.
Nu tas jau arī būtu nelaimes gadījums – varētu padomāt, ka visi Krievijas lidotāji karavīri tā vien alkst iet bojā kamikadzes nāvē. Jo īpaši miera laikā…
no šāda augstuma iznīcinātāja pilots veiksmīgi katapultējas, RC komanda nē.
Nu, katapultēties virs Baltijas jūras arī satur visai lielu risku, ka Tevi var nepaspēt atrast un izglābt.
Risks ir, nolemtības nav. Es nedomāju, ka RU pilots apzināti taranētu “lidmašīnu, kas lido robežas virzienā”, bet meistarības varēja pietrūkt. Vidējās pilota gadā nolidotās stundas RU = 100-120 vs US = 300.
avots: Military Balance 2013
1. Nu atkarīgs, kā uz to skatās. Teorētiski, protams, pastāv variants, ka tā ir iespēja aizvākt, vismaz uz laiku, pretinieku no neitrālās teritorijas, upurējot tam savu lidaparātu un varbūt arī pilotu (kaut gan pēdējo teorētiski var apgādāt ar radiobāciņu un pacensties `incidentu` noorganizēt tuvumā savējiem karakuģiem, kuru rīcībā ir klāja helikopteri). Tomēr man liekas, ka ieguvums no šādas akcijas ir ārkārtīgi minimāls, jo īpaši attiecībā pret zaudējumiem – gan attiecībā uz hārdvāri (sava lidmašīna), gan arī tīri prestiža ziņā, kārtējot reizi radot pamatu zvaigām par to, ka `jums jau piloti vispār lidot nemāk`. Tā ka apzinātu versiju praktiski var norakstīt kā nepamototu – un līdz ar to visu pārējās vaimanas par to, ka ai ai ai, tūlīt sāksies karš. Vismaz attiecībā uz šo incidentu pilnīgi noteikti.
2. Par naļota atšķirībām esmu dzirdējis un droši vien tā arī ir, tomēr domāju, ka šāda pietuvošanās visdrīzāk neprasa baigāko meistarību. Reāli šī naļota atšķirības varēs redzēt visdrīzāk tad, kad abu pušu piloti sastapsies gaisa kaujā, vai arī citādos apstākļos, kuros, piemēram, nāksies izvairīties no jau palaistas raķetes. Domāju, ka tieši tas būs elements, kurā šis naļots var nospēlēt izšķirošo lomu.
par 2.punktu pagugļo троянов Литва 😀
Cik ātrumā atradu, tur bija ne tikai pilota vaina, bet arī navigācijas tehnikas failure. Kas protams nenoņem atbildību no pilota.
ha ha vizuālo navigāciju pēc orientieriem (jūras krasts) dienas laikā pazaudēt var tikai speciāli.
Nu vai arī apmācies un lejā neko neredz, bet zemāk laisties vizuālai orientācijai neļauj. Tiesa, nav skaidrs, vai tiešām nevarēja virzienu kaut aptuveni noteikt pēc Saules, lidotājam taču jābūt pulkstenim…
Labāk pieņemsim ka pildīja x zina kādu uzdevumu. Citādi sviesc.
Vecim intervijā prasa, kas par lietu, kamdēļ atpaliki no pārējām lidmašīnām, kas notika, bet šis tik atsaka, ka jāgaida komisijas atzinums.
Vai nu tiešām mērinstrumenti atņirdzās, vai arī pārbaudīja LT un NATO reakciju, nometot nojātu miskasti uz leišu zemes?
Bet tā rinda par to, ka čalim 150 lidojuma stundu vietā ir tikai 30, tas gan pamaz.
2005. gads. pieņemu, ka atsevišķas krievu vienības tagad nolido arī visas 300h.