Sēdēja, klausījās


Vakar Vašingtonā ASV Kongresa Apakšpalātā notika ekspertu uzklausīšana par tēmu

“Pretdarbībā Krievijas informācijas militarizācijai”

 manuprāt vērīgākie ieteikumi šeit:

Mr. Peter Pomerantsev
Senior Fellow, The Legatum Institute

[..]But we are not powerless, and we can fight back. If the United States and its allies finally agree to focus on this problem, to treat it with the seriousness it deserves, then there are many options. I hope in today’s discussion to elaborate further, but here are some thoughts to begin with.
1. Defend our information space: the Kremlin’s strategy is not so much an information war as a ‘war on information’. During the Ukraine we have seen the importance of NGOs such as Stop Fake in Ukraine, the Interpreter in the US and Belingcat in the UK who expose Kremlin disinformation and launch open-source investigations into such events as the downing of flight MH17. These should be supported, and can
coordinate with each other to form international networks of critical inquiry.
2. Develop media literacy: You can’t stop disinformation but you can teach people to be more critically aware of how they are being manipulated. Media literacy should be prioritized in education, in the West and beyond.
3. Anti-corruption networks: The Kremlin’s information-psychological operations often rely on murky funding and corruption to co-opt foreign actors. Journalists and activists should be trained and funded to investigate this world. Currently there are brave groups working independently in various countries, but little coordination. Those investigating corruption need to be protected by a legal fund so they are not intimidated by threats of libel, and need to have the ability to launch their own political lobbying and legal campaigns against the perpetrators. Research isn’t enough: action needs to be enabled, a cross of investigative journalism, activism and legal work.
4. Support quality journalism in Central and Eastern Europe: The West pulled out of media development in Eastern Europe too early. In countries such as Moldova or Ukraine there is no strong quality journalism: media is controlled and manipulated by politicians and oligarchs. In the absence of a beacon of quality journalism, the national conversation disintegrates and a foreign state like Russia can easily spread information chaos. We should support the building up of public broadcasting in the region, rigorously independent of both state and oligarchical influence.
5. Support independent Russian media through production companies that create new content the Kremlin avoids: The Kremlin’s media operations are impressive but have an Achilles heel. Russia news media virtually ignores ‘local news’: preferring to distract viewers with the war in Ukraine. This leaves a gap. For local news, and for shows akin to PBS’ ‘This American Life’ or investigations like ‘Serial’, engaging the Russian language viewer by seeing the world through their eyes. This is a deeper way of projecting democratic values than superficial ‘re-branding’ of the US or ‘the West’. The Kremlin wants a PR war. What it is bad at is media that deals with reality.
6. Help Russians with an alternative vision for their country:
The Kremlin defines Russia as at war with the rest of the world. But many Russians have an alternative vision of their country integrated into the international community. Creating a world class Russian university abroad that could foster these values is a way to nurture this vision. One of the many weaknesses of the Kremlin is its failure to support Russian education- putting the lie to its ‘great power’ propaganda drive.
Most important, it is important for the USG to realize that the 21st century will be defined by new forms of information conflict. A comprehensive approach is urgently needed to deal with this- the West, including the US, is behind the curve.[..]

Ms. Helle C. Dale
Senior Fellow for Public Diplomacy, The Heritage Foundation

  • [..] Use public diplomacy to counter anti-American and pro-Russian propaganda by the Russian government. U.S. efforts should include international broadcasting, a new Russian satellite channel, the Internet, social networking, print media, and revamped academic, student, and business exchange programs.
  • Respond publicly and vigorously to high-profile Russian falsehoods, while regularly emphasizing the regime’s suppression of independent media in Russia.
  • Launch a comprehensive audit, led by U.S. intelligence agencies and the State Department’s International Information Programs office, of Russian information operations in the United States and its allies, to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of these campaigns and understand their strategic implications.
  • Publicize overt and – as compatible with the security of intelligence sources – covert Russian support for Western media outlets to deprive them of credibility.
  • Give the same visa treatment to personnel working for Russian state-controlled media that Russia gives to journalists from U.S. and allied nations.
  • Recognize that nations such as Georgia, and U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe, are particularly vulnerable to Russian propaganda, and focus U.S. support for independent media and journalists on these nations, while, at the strategic level, continuing to back NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia.
  • Launch more education programs for Ukrainian journalists particularly those who are involved in covering the situation on the ground in battle zone in Eastern Ukraine. Ninety percent of Ukrainian journalists who cover the conflict don’t have any military experience. Many of them lack the necessary equipment like helmets or body armors to work in a battle zone. [..]

 

 

PS starp citu:

[..] A potentially promising development is the opening of a new NATO Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia, a country with a large Russian speaking population. One of the Center’s primary tasks will be to counter Russian propaganda, which used to target Latvia’s population specifically, but now is a problem throughout Russia’s border states and indeed Europe. The Center was only stood up in October, will function as a type of NATO think tank. The United States is still negotiating its contribution, but is expected to conclude an arrangement by June. The Center’s new offices will officially open in September.[..]

14 domas par “Sēdēja, klausījās

  1. “Support independent Russian media” – šis ir noteikti svarīgāk, nekā investēt jaunu mediju izveidē, kuri varbūt kaut kad iegūs iegūs auditorijas atzinību. Daudz efektīvāk ir jau tagad atbalstīt esošos medijus un žurnālistus, kas jau tagad piedāvā citu redzējumu uz notiekošo Krievijā un pasaulē … Jo tie, kas līdz šim par spīti visam ir spējuši izdzīvot, ir patiešām dzīvotspējīgi…

    • Doždj? Nez, no malas liekas, ka šos pie dziesmas neņem, jo tāpat pēc vajadzības danco kā Vovka spēlē.

      Medusa? Nu raksta netā. Nu viss. Un arī ar to – arī tie patiesību nebūt acīs nemet (laikam pat Krievzemes opozīcija nelasīs).

      Īsumā: paši tikpat apjukuši/iebiedēti kā krievu opozīcija kopumā. Tak pašam Navaļnijam problēma ir Putins un Donbass, bet Krimnaš ir ok, pēc izteikumiem.

      • nav jau viņiem naudas un dušī viņus visu laiku nopietni, mēģināt šobrīd darīt kaut ko publiski opozicionāru pie esošā režīma Krievijā ir šausmīgi grūti un neizdevīgi … pieeja informācijai ļoti sadrumstalota, cilvēki ir reāli iebaidīti, noskaņojums ir ļoti depresīvs ….

        Navaļnijs gan ir Kremlim salīdzinoši ērtā opozīcija 🙂

        • Man likās, ka ērtā ir Žiriks un Zjuganovs?

          Tad kas ir neērtā? Ķesaks, NS un reiberta airsoftisti?

          • kopš kura laika Žirinovskis skaitās opozīcija? Zjuganovs varbūt pašā sākumperiodā …

            Ņemcovs bija viena no reālās opozīcijas sejām. Vēl ir nacionāli konservatīvais spārns, bet tie visai reti pagaidām galviņas ceļ. Opozīcija visai strauji uzplauks brīdī, kolīdz “pazudīs” Putins – tas gan nenozīmē, ka priekšgalā būs šobrīd skaļāko balsu īpašnieki. Būs cilvēki aiz kuriem nostāsies Krievu biznesa intereses, kas šobrīd baidās ko skaļāk teikt Jukos un citu līdzīgu gadījumu dēļ … Navaļnijs nepieder pie tiem “prātīgajiem”, kāds bija Ņemcovs ar kuru sadarbotos Krievu bizness…

  2. Klausos Putina sarunu ar tautu. Nedaudz šokējoši – Putinam ļoti samiernieciska pozīcija. Novēršanās no DNR/LNR, lai visu risina Ukraina, jāveido konstruktīvas attiecības ar Kijevu, Krievijai nav ienaidnieku, nacismu nevar pielīdzināt staļinismam, bet Staļins pastrādāja noziegumus Eiropā pēc 2. pasaules kara, Krievija nebūvēs impēriju. Nekā kareivīga. Vai nu “maskirovka”, vai situācija tiešām katastofāli slikta. Sāku šaubīties par pavasara ofensīvas prognozi 🙂

    • Būtu interesanti zināt, cik no Krievijas arsenālā esošajiem kodolieročiem ir patiesībā rīcībspējīgi, kuros radioaktīvais elements vēl nav sabrucis un ir spējīgs radīt kodolreakciju, kas nepieciešama atombumbas detonēšanai.

      • Otrs līdzīgs jautājums – cik no tām raķetēm spētu pārvarēt ASV pretraķešu aizsardzību.
        Nebiju redzējis sīkākas aplēses, izrādās, ka ASV kodoluzbrukuma gadījumā Krievija zaudētu 0,8-37 miljoniem iedzīvotāju (atšķirībā no scenārija – vai uzbrūk tikai raķešu šahtām, bumbvedēju un flotes bāzēm, vai visiem svarīgākajiem objektiem, laika apstākļiem, cilvēku atrašanās telpās vai ārā utt.). Uzbrukuma gadījumā 90% krievu raķešu un bumbvedēju tiktu iznīcināti, kas nozīmē, ka prettrieciens nebūtu iespējams.
        http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/planphoto/planphoto.asp

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