2 fāzes 10 soļi

vara bungas: zemāk vērsija par 4GW konflikta  attīstību RU izpildījumā no Douglas V. Mastriano (Small Wars Journal).  Pievērsiet uzmanību, ka par I.fāzes visiem pieciem punktiem VB ir gana rakstīts, tie ir dažādā gatavības pakāpē, bet kopumā var teikt, ka izpildīti. Savukārt II.fāzes 2.punkts ir procesā. Līdz ar to  RU neizpildīti (vai šķietami neizpildīti) paliek 4 punkti no 10. Tas atbilst arī manām subjektīvām nojautām, par stāvokļa nopietnību.

[..] Putin’s adaptable and long-term approach encompasses two phases and ten parts.  Phase 1 of this emerging operation approach it to create or shape an environment favorable to Russian strategic interests. Phase 2 exploits the advantages or NATO Alliance cleavages created during Phase 1 and seeks to alter the strategic environment through an ambiguous/hybrid landpower intervention in Eastern Europe.

Phase I – Shaping a strategic environment favorable to Russian interests:

1.  Nacionālisma  kurināšana savā valstī. Consolidate political power and use nationalism to maintain domestic support.  At the core of the strategy of ambiguity is the maintenance of Putin’s powerbase and his need for popular support.  Putin secures his base by casting the West as the enemy of Russia and thus fuels the engine of nationalism.

2. Kodolarsenāla modernizācija. Modernize and leverage Russia’s nuclear arsenal to bully neighbors.  The modernization of Russia’s already massive nuclear arsenal is a threat to regional stability.  Yet, a greater concern is the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin threatening to use nuclear weapons against any European States that it views as a challenge to its national interests.  Such was demonstrated when Moscow threaten Denmark with nuclear targeting should it join NATO’s missile defense shield in March 2015.  The use and threat of nuclear strikes is clearly a part of Russia’s emerging strategic / operational approach.

3. Sauszemes spēku modernizācija. Modernization of Russians conventional land forces.  The May Victory Parade in Moscow witnessed the unveiling of Russia’s intent to replace its fleet of armored vehicles with significantly modern systems.  Although facing economic challenges, it seems that at least the Western Military District will benefit from this incredible boost to conventional land force capability and capacity.

4. Ekonomiskais spiediens. Apply economic incentives and blackmail to pressure neighboring country’s economic well-being. Although this tactic has been successful against Ukraine, the dynamics of doing this against other European nations is a bit more complex.  However, it is unlikely that Germany and other NATO members, who rely on Russian energy, are willing to have their economic well-being put at long-term risk and thus these are vulnerable to coming to some sort of terms with Russian interests in the east.

5. Informatīvā kara intensificēšana. Capitalize on long-term IO campaign. The tools of the IO campaign include high-quality Russian television, radio programming, hockey clubs, youth camps, and the internet.  They are designed to export Moscow’s strategic messaging across Europe, specifically targeting the Russian diaspora.

Phase II – “Invade” a neighboring nation through a hybrid mix of irregulars, augmented by Russian intelligence and special forces, supported, when the conditions are right, by a gradual introduction of conventional forces.

1. Naida kurināšana krievu diasporā. Use subversive activity to create instability in ethnic Russian areas.  With a continuous IO campaign brewing in the background, the groundwork is laid to manipulate disgruntled ethnic Russians in any region Putin chooses.  As in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, these movements start as peaceful protests, but ultimately lead to taking over government buildings and inciting armed insurrections.  Once engaged in low-level combat, the Russian rebels proclaim their right to self-determination and eventually appeal to Moscow for aid.  However convenient, the Kremlin does not need popular support in the Russian diaspora to achieve its strategic ends.  Should the local populace in a contested region not support an uprising, Moscow can simply export a separatist movement from Russia to provide the pretext for an intervention.

2. Spēku koncentrācija pierobežā. Move a large conventional force along the borders to dissuade action against the subversives. As in eastern Ukraine, Moscow responded to the instability by deploying a large conventional force along the border under the guise of aiding refugees and containing unrest.  The real reason, however, was to intimidate Ukraine, which hesitated out of fear of provoking a response from Moscow.

3. Dezinformācijas kampaņa, lai slēptu patieso nodomu. Leverage ambiguity to maintain strategic flexibility.  Deception and disinformation are the key ingredients of the Russian approach, and Putin uses these tools to sow ambiguity and thus obscure his strategy.  As a result, Putin remains a step ahead of NATO’s decision-making process, and quickly adapts his actions to keep the Alliance off balance.

4. Militārais atbalsts “glābtējiem”. Violate international borders and support the pro-Russian insurgents. As the Ukrainian Army launched its offensive to subdue the rebels in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Army was poised to provide support to their comrades.  These “volunteer” soldiers provided armor, artillery, and air defense assets that blunted Ukrainian offensive action.  Meanwhile, the Kremlin equivocated about its intentions and denied involvement in the conflict.  Had there been a determined international response against Moscow, Putin could have withdrawn support from the separatists, denied complicity in the violence, and waited for a more opportune time to try again.

5. Humanitārā krīze, kuras novēršanai izmanto iebrukumu. Seize an area to achieve a limited strategic end. When the security of a targeted region collapses, the international response is mired in debate, and a humanitarian crisis ensues, the conditions are set for Russian forces to intervene.  Despite characterizing the intervention as a temporary salve to an unacceptable human crisis, Putin would deploy forces for as long as needed to achieve a security environment favorable to Moscow.  With such an approach, Russia can attain limited strategic objectives with minimal risk.  The ultimate goal of this methodology would be, in the long term, to discredit NATO and thereby undermine the security of any NATO member.  In the short to midterm, such an approach could easily be used against Moldova or other area outside of NATO to expand Russian influence.[..]

avots