[..] The periphery is coming apart. Whether those countries leave the EU, are pushed out or stay is of little consequence. The common experience of Eastern Europeans makes them unique. The experience of southern Europeans in the past 10 years makes them unique. Britain has never been anything but unique. And Germany is by far the most unique, the most unlike any other nation in Europe. What the EU doesn’t want to face is that Europe is a continent of many unique nations and nothing more. [..]
[..] Europe, meanwhile, is still a mess, struggling as it is with meager economic growth and social unrest. Anti-European Union and anti-immigration parties continue to gain traction in spite of some significant defeats, most notably in France. As these political battles rage on, more important cultural differences will continue to pry nations away from the EU. Poland, in particular, will force policymakers in Brussels to decide what to do with an elected government that chooses not to adhere to EU ideology. Poland and others like it will resist whatever the EU tries to do to bring them to heel.[..]
George Friedman
vara bungas: Nav noslēpums esmu vecā Frīdmena fans. Tas ir slikti , kļūstu neobjektīvs, paļaujos utt. Tomēr GPF komandā ir arī daudzsološa jaunatne. Piemēram Džeikobs Šapiro, kurš perfekti un galvenais īsi raksturo pašreizējo RU stāvokli un tās tuvako nākotni. Iesaku.
Kopumā GPF komanda nonāk pie šāda secinājuma, ka 2018. gada ģeopolitiskos notikumus raksturos nespēja(-s), kas krājusies (-šās) visu iepriekšējo desmitgadi.
Diemžēl GPF gada pronoze ir maksas produkts, tomēr tās kopsavilkums ir pieejams
Summary
It’s difficult to ignore how dramatically the world has changed since 2008, when the global financial crisis shook the foundations on which the international order was built. The systems that had been in place for a generation have since begun to slowly fall apart. And though they have not yet crumbled entirely, the possibility that they will has forced many countries to imagine a world without them. Some have done so more eagerly than others.
It is little surprise, then, that the past 10 years have been marked by systemic dysfunction, massive shifts in trade processes and radical internal political changes. Change, it seems, has been the one constant. This is the context in which we enter 2018. The dysfunction that will characterize the year has a decade’s worth of momentum behind it. But only in some areas will dysfunction lead to disruption.
One such area is the Middle East. For more than 15 years, Sunni insurgents have been fighting U.S. forces there, and the wars they’ve waged have been the defining trait of the region. That is no longer the case. Now that the Islamic State has been defeated in Iraq and Syria, at least as a “caliphate” with territorial integrity, traditional powers have begun to compete for the space the jihadists have since vacated. Best positioned to win this competition is Iran, which has already begun to change the balance of power in the region.
Europe, meanwhile, is still a mess, struggling as it is with meager economic growth and social unrest. Anti-European Union and anti-immigration parties continue to gain traction in spite of some significant defeats, most notably in France. As these political battles rage on, more important cultural differences will continue to pry nations away from the EU. Poland, in particular, will force policymakers in Brussels to decide what to do with an elected government that chooses not to adhere to EU ideology. Poland and others like it will resist whatever the EU tries to do to bring them to heel.
In China, the appointment of a de facto dictator does not so much solve the country’s problems as it does confirm the threat of their existence. Beijing knows that it needs to fix its financial system, but doing so requires structural reform that will inevitably hurt the economy. Whatever the government does will test the perceived infallibility of President Xi Jinping. Central to its efforts in 2018 will be the One Belt, One Road initiative, which is meant to spur growth, create jobs and bring a semblance of prosperity to the interior as Beijing expands its influence all the way to Europe. (We doubt it will succeed in this regard.) China will continue to creep into the waters to the east, even as it figures out just what to do about North Korea.
In 2017, Russia managed to stave off domestic unrest, thanks in part to some creative fundraising to offset the losses incurred due to low energy prices. In 2018, it will use its strategic reserves to buy even more time – time it desperately needs to try to diversify its economy. It won’t be enough, though, since these kinds of changes take a generation. That won’t stop Russia from acting tough abroad, engaging in activities that are ultimately peripheral to its interests, to inflate its power in the eyes of its people. And it won’t be enough to solve Russia’s economic problems.
These and other trends are detailed in our 2018 annual forecast. Thorough as it is, the document itself might be too large for many of our subscribers’ inboxes. We have attached a PDF of the forecast for your convenience. If you would prefer to read it on our site, you can do so here.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Autors par britiem var rakstīt. Tomēr ideja, ka poļi ievēlēja valdību, lai šie ieceltu “savējos” tiesnešus ir dīvaina. Turklāt no kurienes ir izrauta ideja, ka poļiem nepatīk ES un šie vēlas izstāties?
Par cilvēku demokrātiski izteiktām vēlmēm var diskutēt plaši. Piemēram, grieķi vismaz 3 reizes nobalsoja, ka viņi saglabās savu dzīves veidu [kuru jāapmaksā ziemeļeiropiešiem]. Vai Latvijā, kad 2006. gadā 2/3 latviešu nobalsoja par Andri, Aivaru, Aināru; turklāt uzreiz pēc Jūrmalgeitas un Ventspils burtnīciņu atrašanas.
Poļiem patīk ES, no kuras viņi saņēma vairāk par 15 miljardiem euro, bet vienlaicīgi poļiem patīk neatkarība iekšējo lietu kārtošanā, ko viņi pateicoties savai vietai un lomai reģionā spēj arī aizstāvēt. Tas nepatīk ES un process, kura rezultātā PL var zaudēt balsošanas tiesības jau ir sasniedzis 2.stadiju
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/13/ec-to-investigate-polish-governments-controversial-new-laws
http://www.hfhr.pl/en/rule-of-law-procedure-for-poland-european-commission-takes-another-step
Neviens nevar pateikt kas būs tālāk, Frīdmens pieņem ekstrēmo iznākumu. Btw tieši PL problemātikā viņš ir speciālists un prognozē šai valstij reģionālā līdera lomu, kuram gribot vai negribot pievienosimies ari mēs (3B).
Poļiem ar 40 miljoniem iedzīvotāju, gadsimtiem ilgu valstiskumu, mononacionālu sabiedrību būtu dabiski kļūt par Austrumeiropas līderiem. Diemžēl Poliju nomoka parastās Austrumeiropas problēmas. Cilvēki ir vienmēr gatavi balsot “Pret”, bet ar “Par” ir lielas grūtības. Valsts vadītājs Kačinskis ir vienkāršs deputāts, kurš neieņem nekādu valsts amatu, bet pie kura pēc instrukcijām un atskaitīties dodas gan valdība gan prezidents. Gluži kā pie mums agrāk uz “Mākoņiem”, un vēl agrāk pie Lemberga. Var jau uzskatīt par lielu drosmi prasīt, lai viņiem piešķir lielākas balstiesības, jo 2. pasaules karā mira daudz poļi; vai prasīt no vāciešiem kompensācijas. Tomēr, ja viņi pat nevar progonzēt pretprasību “Labi, vācieši naudu, bet poļi atdod vācu zemes”, tad tā nav drosme bet stulbība kaitinot savu sabiedroto.
Brāļi Kačinski gan iepriekšējā ievēlēšanas reizē gan tagad iesnieguši ES valstu vadītājiem lēmumus, kuri art 27:1 ir noraidīti. Pēc līderības nemaz neiskatās, drīzāk pēc muļķīgas stūrgalvības.