vara bungas: Pat amerikāņi atzīst – brīnumlīdzekļu pret UAS novērošanu tuvākajā laikā nebūs. Nāksies no jauna mācīties maskēties. Mans (retorisks) jautājums – vai NBS ir tīkli vismaz diviem gadalaikiem katrā mašīnā?
[..] Since the Korean War, U.S. ground forces have operated with near total air supremacy in every conflict. The collapse of the Soviet Union and ongoing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations have led U.S. forces to take air supremacy for granted. Meanwhile, U.S. ground units’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) designed to mitigate enemy air operations through passive defensive measures, such as signature management, have atrophied. Marine units, without the layered air defenses employed by the Army, are particularly at risk. After decades of operating without enemy air threats, the Marine Corps had little incentive to invest in air-defense systems or train to operate under contested or hostile airspace—until now. New low-cost, prolific, and highly effective unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have changed the character of air warfare. The Marine Corps needs to adapt to this new reality by acquiring air-defense systems capable of engaging a range of aerial threats and change or modify long-standing TTPs to increase unit survivability from aerial attack. No longer can joint and service airpower be taken for granted, nor can it be assumed that friendly air protection will be adequate. These assumptions need to be erased from training and operational planning baselines. In future fights, the air domain will be contested at best and hostile at worst. Units deploying overseas, especially in combat zones, need to deploy with appropriate antiaircraft and counter-UAS weaponry with the competence to operate them. The most immediate and effective way for Marines to prepare for this is by updating their TTPs to place increased emphasis on camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) and to rigorously incorporate these skills into current training evolutions. [..]
Many are familiar with the collective groan that accompanies the instruction to “cammie paint up,” and it is often left undone in field exercises. Similarly, Marines rarely “veg up” and camouflage themselves after their initial field training at The Basic School. In training, tactical vehicles are rarely camouflaged adequately with many vehicles painted the wrong color for the environment. Unit camouflage netting is set up for shade—not for concealment. Such skills were often considered unnecessary—an attitude perpetuated by veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan where stability and counterinsurgency missions led some to believe that hiding was either impossible or unnecessary. [..]