vara bungas: Stāsts par to kā 100K+ lieli rietumvalstu un host nation koalīcijas spēki 252 dienas buksēja ieņemot Rīgas lieluma pilsētu Mosulu Irākā, ko aizstāvēja 3K-12K viegli bruņotu Daesh kaujinieku. Galvenais secinājums – pilsētu vieglāk un lietderīgāk aizstāvēt nekā pēc atkāpšanās atkarot.
[..] Operationally, Mosul demonstrated that while the defenders will more often than not lose an urban fight, they will always make it extremely difficult for the attackers to achieve victory. The defenders do initially have the advantage because urban terrain can be used for concealment to fight and to maneuver; attacking forces cannot use surveillance, reconnaissance, or aerial assets to full effect; buildings can serve as fortified bunkers; the defender maintains relative freedom of maneuver; and defending forces can use subterranean systems to their advantage. While it has been proven throughout urban warfare history that generally attackers do eventually prevail, winning comes at a cost of much human life lost and extensive collateral damage.
Mosul also demonstrated the large amount of resources fighting forces must have to achieve victory. Almost all doctrinal attacker-to-defender manpower ratios in military operations remain at the 3-to-1 standard. In Mosul the coalition had approximately one hundred thousand personnel and ISIS somewhere between three thousand and twelve thousand fighters. This ratio—between 8-to-1 and 33-to-1—is an incredibly high number that any one nation, even with a large population and strong industrial base, would struggle to put into battle. Another resource challenge is ammunition expenditure. Concrete, steel, brick, and wood means expenditure of increased amounts of ammunition to destroy the enemy. In urban warfare, fighting forces can normally expend up to four times the amount of ammunition that they would normally use when fighting in a rural environment. [..]