Palikšana savā vietā

vara bungas: Interesants ieskats US SOF iespējamajā taktikā sastopoties ar lielvalsts armijas iebrukumu draudzīgās valsts teritorijā. Vestpointiešu stāsts par mācību scenāriju, kas gan vairāk tēmēts uz abām Korejām, manuprāt ir pat pārāk atklāts. Sanāk, ka ļoti iespējams, ka SOF vadība var ļaut pretiniekam pāriet saviem tīmiem pāri, lai nebūtu vēlāk jāriskē ar filtrēšanos iekšā. Fantastika LV apstākļiem (nav kalnu masīvu), bet tomēr.

[..] The special operations joint task force commander made a second key decision by leaving the SFOD-As in place despite undeniable indicators and warnings of an impending invasion. As the enemy invaded, the SFOD-As went to ground and allowed the enemy to advance past them as it attacked south. Had the commander withdrawn the SFOD-As from the battlefield when competition transitioned to crisis, he could have only recovered depth by reinserting units of action later in the fight at far greater cost after the enemy had established its antiaccess / area-defense bubble. Infiltration of SOF in the rear of a peer enemy introduces extremely high risk. Stay-behind operations remove the high risk of infiltrating a denied area and present the more manageable risk of going to ground ahead of an enemy invasion.[..]

Pielaikojot aprakstīto mācību situāciju LV apvidum, sanāk, ka īpašā vērtē būs lielās un mazās ostas, kas varētu kalpot kā pretinieka spēku ieejas punkti.

[..] North Torbian military mission was to seize key energy infrastructure, aerial ports of debarkation, and seaports of debarkation. [..]

Uz to draudzīgo spēku SOF atbildēja paredzāmā veidā – apdraudot MSR (main supply route) un apgādes mezglus (nodes)

[..] As the enemy established hasty defensive positions and its operational tempo slowed, the US SOF and partner force’s operational tempo accelerated, focusing on the already vulnerable class III (fuel), V (ammunition), and IX (repair parts) supply depots in the enemy support zone. This marked the first transition point in the conflict for both friendly and enemy forces: the enemy could no longer sustain offensive operations, and friendly forces pivoted from a preeminent focus on survivability to deliberate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Here, the CJSOTF employed the SOF, cyber, and space triad to simultaneously converge effects against the enemy. [..]

Iestājoties līdzsvaram kaujas laukā (uzvara vai pamiers), SOF turpina daboties

[..] During transition, specific attention must be given to both physical and human networks in addition to the stability and resistance networks necessary to deter future conflicts. The hardening of a society against subsequent incursions occurs through the simultaneous reestablishment of these networks, which can each be leveraged to degrade threat actor influence during competition, crisis, and conflict. Finally, the establishment of networks by SOF assists conventional forces when conducting stability operations in areas arrested from enemy control by enabling the rapid consolidation of gains and return to civilian control. [..]

Kā man šķiet ar austākminēto netvorkingu US var sakt nodarboties LV jau tagad, nav ko vairs gaidīt.

Nu un galvenais secinājums: US SOF advancētais aprīkojums ar aborigēnu “bumerangiem” ir slikti savietojams. Izrādās Visuvarenai un Visaptverošai Slepenošanai ir ēnas puses. Kurš to varētu iedomāties?

[..] One of the largest exercise gaps was the ability to utilize technical means to achieve integration between the joint force’s SOF and conventional forces as well as partner nation entities. While 7th Special Forces Group remedied many communications architecture issues that were internal to the CJSOTF, the fact that SOF, conventional forces, and partner forces utilize different platforms for their common operational pictures and common intelligence pictures (COP and CIP) was a complication 7th Special Forces Group could not address during the exercise. The current lack of a COP and CIP standard across the Army and joint force requires operations and intelligence professionals to understand not only their own architecture, but also how to connect with other units’ and agencies’ architectures. This is complicated further by classification requirements when corresponding with host nation and coalition partners.[..]

avots