In the military sphere, these include ordering the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), led by U.S. General Phil Breedlove, to conduct prudent planning and present options in response to the situation. While such planning should be left to the current commanders and military experts, some ideas to consider would include:
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Increasing all intelligence-gathering functions through satellite, Predator unmanned vehicles, and especially cyber.
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Using the NATO-Ukrainian Council and existing military partnerships with the Ukrainian military to share information, intelligence, and situational awareness with authorities in Kiev.
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Providing advice to Ukrainian armed forces to prepare and position themselves in the event of further conflict.
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Developing NATO contingency plans to react to full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to a partial invasion likely of Crimea. NATO contingency planning can be cumbersome, but in Libya it moved quickly.
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Assigning one of the NATO Joint Force Commands (either Naples, Italy, or Brunsum, Netherlands) into direct overwatch of the situation.
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Standing up NATO crisis centers to full manning, especially at SHAPE and the relevant Joint Force Command.
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Ensuring that the Land and Maritime Component Commands (Northwood in the United Kingdom and Izmir, Turkey, respectively) are conducting prudent planning in their areas of expertise and feeding their analysis to the Joint Force Command.
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Bringing the NATO Response Force, a 25,000 man sea, air, land, special forces capability to a higher state of alert.
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Convening allies with cyber-capabilities (this is not a NATO specialty) to consider options — at a minimum to defend Ukraine if it is attacked in this domain (as Georgia was).
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Sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea and setting up contingency plans for their use.[…]
Džeimss Stavridis, ASV flotes admirālis (atv.)
vara bungas: Atvaļinātiem admirāļiem ir privilēģija teikt to, ko dienestā esošie admirāļi domā, bet pateikt nevar. Piedāvātie atbildes soļi nesniedzas tālāk par plānu kalšanu (sen jābūt) un izlūkinformācijas vākšanu (miera laika rutīna). Vienīgais kaujas atbalsts, ko NATO var piedāvāt UA ir konsultācijas kiberaizsardzības jomā. Nav daudz ņemot vērā, ka US un UK ir UA drošības garanti saskaņā ar 1994.gada Budapeštas memorandu.
UA nav NATO valsts, bet tās drošības garanti ir NATO valstis! US un UK ir tiesības un pienākums nostāties starp RU un UA karaspēku “boots on the ground” un, ja arī tad RU nerimsies, tas draudēs ar 5.paragrāfa iedarbināšanu un 3.pasaules karu. Skaisti? Tomēr nekas no tā nesanāks, memorands nav ratificēts ne tikai RU, bet arī UK un US parlamentos. Kādēļ? Tādēļ, ka kodolgalviņas pievāca, bet tad “paņēma un uzmeta”. Jāpārlapo Vašingtonas līguma LV eksemplāru vai tik paraksti nav veikti ir “izzūdošo” tinti… In god we trust, pārējie tur rokas uz galda.
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