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Conclusions and recommendations

• The Russian threat has to be clearly acknowledged, treated as a strategic long-term challenge and taken fully into account in NATO’s defence planning and future posture in the Baltic Sea area.
• Effective deterrence requires a clearly increased presence of Allied forces in the region. NATO’s forward defence has to move from a symbolic to a meaningful presence.
• The Alliance’s forward presence must balance two key aspects: military effectiveness and multinationality. Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready. The United States should exercise leadership by providing the framework and certain key capabilities, which would then be complemented by contributions from other Allies.
• In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized units. A continuous presence of two brigades would be necessary, in addition to the indigenous forces of the Baltic countries.
• An increased presence of air assets, including transition from Air Policing mission to Air Defence, and maintenance of a robust naval presence in the Baltic Sea, is required.
• The Baltic countries will need to allocate additional resources for the Host Nation Support, including the development of necessary infrastructure.
• Alongside the strengthening of the forward presence component, the Alliance needs to refine capabilities for the deployment of reinforcements and follow-on forces, and for the neutralization of Russia´s A2/AD capabilities. The Allies should demonstrate their ability, in collective defence exercises, to rapidly move large numbers of troops to the Baltic region.

avots

vara bungas:  obligāta lasāmviela visiem bungotājiem,  igauņi pacentušies apkopot visu reģiona militāro pamatinformāciju vienā dokumentā (līdzīgus ražoja arī pēc mūsu AM pasūtījuma) un nu varam kārtējo reizi pārliecināties, ka mūsu argumenti un pieņēmumi būtiski neatšķiras no igauņu kolēģu domām. Svarīgi, lai šos pētījumus lasītu politiķi (vēlams pret parakstu), lai vēlāk netaisītu “lielas acis” par to, ka “nebija informācijas”. Progress novērojams  arī  tajā apstākllī, ka vēl nesen šādi pētījumi mūsu pīļu dīķī  būtu absolūtais “top secret”. Līdz ar to mēs visi esam baigie malači, bet, ja jūs zinātu  kā  tracina “pokazuha” un simboliskie žesti no visām pusēm – pašmāju, NATO,  Eiropas, amerikāņu…

[..] he VJTF should be able to deploy a lead element at 48 hours’ notice, with the rest of the force following within seven days. However, these timelines specify the force’s ability to start deploying, not its actual arrival in the theatre of operations. Because its units rotate and because it is not tied to any particular area of operations, the VJTF cannot  have  its  equipment  and  supplies  pre-positioned.  Therefore,  in  reality,  the actual  arrival  of  troops  with  all  their  equipment  is  expected  to  take  much  longer.
Logistical hurdles in the way of rapid deployment would be greater if the framework nation  was  geographically  distant  from  the  Baltic  theatre. 19  In  addition,  the  actual arrival  of  the  VJTF  in  the  case  of  a  crisis  is  not  immediately  assured.  The  SACEUR (NATO’s  operational  commander)  has  been  given  authority  to  initiate  activities  to prepare the VJTF for deployment, but the movement of troops would still require a prior political decision by the member states at the North Atlantic Council. Making this decision in a forum of 28 sovereign states will inevitably take some time.  Therefore, the value  of  the  VJTF  as  a  quick  responder  and  an effective  instrument  in combat operations  is  rather  questionable. 20  It  seems  rather  to  be  a  political  tool  to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and the multinational character of its response.