LT izlūki ziņo

vara bungas : LT publicēja valsts apdraudējuma pārskatu jau ievadā lecīgi apgalvojot, ka “Lithuania is the only country in the region and one of the few in the world whose intelligence services provide a joint public threat assessment.” LV valsts apdraudējumi apkopoti Nacionālās drošības koncepcijā arī domājams ne bez izlūku dalības. Lai gan… NDK ir politizēts dokuments (Saeimas komisijas, parlamenta balsošana), bet tīrs izlūkdienestu (joint) produkts tāds nedrīkst būt. Tur iespējams tiešām ir atšķirība.

“[..] A two-sided command post exercise of the Baltic Fleet and the 6th Combined Arms Army took place in the Western Military District in August 2020. During this exercise, participants practiced operating against each other, which had not been usual in the Russian Armed Forces combat training for a long time.[..]

LT izlūki pareizi vērš uzmanību, ka RU mācības arvien biežāk notiek divpusējā formātā, t.i. pretinieks nav iedomāts, bet atveidots ar reālu, līdzvērtīgu vai pārāku pretspēku, tā ir realistiskākā mācību pakāpe kādu var panākt miera laikā, kas liecina par gatavošanos cīņai nebūt ne ar “nelikumīgiem bruņotiem formējumiem”. Mēs arī to esam pamanījuši.

[..] Tactical nuclear weapons hold a special place in Russia’s military planning, since they fill the gap between strategic nuclear capabilities and conventional weaponry (e.g. tanks, artillery systems, war planes and war ships), which is still unable to reach Western quality standards. In addition, tactical nuclear weapons are a useful deception tool since it is impossible for the opponent to tell apart weapons of the same type that are armed with nuclear or conventional warheads.[..]

Manuprāt galvenais LT izlūku ziņojumā ir atgādinājums par RU taktiskajiem kodolieročiem reģonā pret kuriem mums nav nekādu risinājumu (risinājumi ir US, FR un UK rokās)

Garāmejot ziņojumā tiek atzīmēts, ka tanku skaits Karaļaučos tulīt pieckāršosies (no viena līdz pieciem TBn) salīdzinot ar 2015. gadu. Arī par to VB tika rakstīts.

Attieecībā uz RU izlūkdienestiem LT izlūki konstatē to pašu ko SE kolēģi, ceļot uz RU ir bīstami ikvienam, neatkarīgi no piekūves valsts noslēpmiem.

[..] Russian intelligence services exploit the border crossing procedures in order to debrief Lithuanian citizens. Russian intelligence officers inquire about their biographies, work experience, service in the Soviet institutions, family members, ties with foreign countries and attitude towards Russia. Russian intelligence officers also interrogate Lithuanian citizens about NATO exercises in Lithuania and military activities in proximity to Russia’s border.Russian intelligence services target Lithuanian citizens regularly travelling to Russia even if they do not have access to classified information or intelligence collection possibilities. [..].During the border crossing procedures, FSB inspects the content of the targeted individuals’ mobile devices – checks their contacts, messages and photos. In some cases, during staged examinations and artificially prolonged interrogations, FSB officers install malicious software on mobile devices of the targeted individuals. The malware allows remote interception of calls and correspondence of the device owner and provides access to the camera and microphone of the device.military exercises, border security, military and civil infrastructure, particular individuals and political sentiments in the border area. [..]

Diemžēl tas arī ir viss, kam es pievērsu uzmanību LT INTREPā. Interesenti var palasīt anekdoti par Progožina dubultnieka vizīti Seimā.

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