Baidena pierakstīšanas svētki


vara bungas: Man nav ko piebilst, lasiet. “Liela brēka, maza vilna” , bet varianti saglabājas, jo īpaši attiecībā uz RU mieruzturētāju parādīšanos ORDLO, par ko sen bija runa un kas var tikt pasniegts RU iedzīvotājiem kā visa pārvietošanās priekšnesuma kulminācija un galvenais mērķis. Ja draudi iebrukumam UA teritorijā (ārpus ORDLO) būtu reāli (apstiprināti ar militārās izlūkošanas informāciju) ap šo laiku NATO sarosītos tā, ka to varētu pamanīt ar neapbruņotu aci. Nav jau vairs 14.gads.

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The purpose of these attention-grabbing Russian deployments is unclear. Most Western reporting and analysis of the Russian deployments do not identify a likely Russian course of action they would support. Many frame the Russian activities as a test of the Biden administration.[17] The Kremlin’s movements may be intended to support one of several possible courses of action.  

The most likely objective of these activities is to coerce Ukrainian President Zelensky to make concessions in the ongoing peace process. The Kremlin routinely escalates its aggression in eastern Ukraine to pressure Ukraine during negotiations.[18] Russian deployments may be intended to complement Putin’s discussion with French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel on March 30, which the Kremlin exploited to suggest Russia may continue the Ukrainian peace process without Ukrainian participation.[19] President Zelensky’s government continues to focus on negotiations despite ongoing Russian aggression. Zelensky issued a statement on April 1 decrying Russian threats, calling for further negotiations on a ceasefire, and reaffirming his commitment to “negotiate a truce as the fastest tactical step.”[20] The Kremlin likely seeks to intimidate Zelensky into unfavorable negotiations that exploit his stated desire to reach a settlement and extract concessions such as direct recognition of Russian proxies or the resumption of water supplies to occupied Crimea. 

The Kremlin may intend to create a pretext to deploy “peacekeepers” in Donbas by creating the impression of a Ukrainian provocation. The Kremlin falsely frames itself as a neutral party in the Donbas conflict and has previously proposed creating a supposedly neutral peacekeeping force, potentially including Belarusian forces.[21] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has conducted a disinformation campaign claiming Ukraine will launch an offensive against Russia’s proxies in eastern Ukraine since early March.[22] Russian deployments may be intended to provoke Ukrainian forces into an attack on Russian proxies in violation of ceasefire agreements or to set conditions in which a false-flag attack by proxies on themselves could be more readily blamed on Kyiv. The Kremlin could then exploit Ukrainian “aggression” to call for the deployment of a peacekeeping force involving Russian or Belarusian troops.  A Kremlin-backed peacekeeping force in Donbas would legitimize the Kremlin’s desired framing of Russia as a neutral arbiter in a Ukrainian civil conflict and grant Russia a permanent lever of influence against Ukraine.

Russian force movements may be intended to distract from another Kremlin line of effort, such as ongoing military pressure in Belarus. The Kremlin’s force deployments in Crimea and on Ukraine’s eastern borders—and Western reactions to them—have drawn widespread attention in the US government, mainstream media, and analytical community. Russian exercises around Ukraine may be intended to draw US attention, or political capital for a response, away from other Kremlin lines of effort. The Kremlin is rapidly advancing its ongoing campaign to integrate the Belarusian military into Kremlin-dominated structures, including establishing a new joint training center and deploying additional Russian forces to the Kaliningrad exclave to threaten NATO’s eastern flank.[23] The Kremlin could additionally seek to distract from escalating repressive measures inside Russia or another international effort. Analysts should keep a watchful eye on other aspects of the Kremlin’s malign global campaigns during these attention-grabbing actions near Ukraine.

Russia is unlikely to be preparing for either a major or localized offensive against Ukraine at this time. Large-scale Russian force deployments, a logistical buildup, and a likely NATO response would be indicators of looming large-scale offensive operations against Ukraine. Russia’s frontline conventional units have not deployed at the brigade level or above during ongoing readiness checks in the SMD. Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) has likewise not mobilized key regiments and divisions that would likely be necessary to support an offensive against Ukraine. ISW has not observed or captured reports of the buildup of logistical supplies—including fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—which would be necessary to support a major offensive. The United States, Ukraine, and NATO would almost certainly observe the preparations for a major offensive and issue far more strident statements than they have so far made.

Russian deployments do not indicate preparations for an imminent, more-localized conventional escalation either. If Putin intended to conduct a sudden operation—such as a surprise air assault to secure the Crimean canal, or a mechanized offensive using forces permanently stationed on the Ukrainian border—the Russian military would not have openly telegraphed ongoing deployments. The Kremlin has additionally not set conditions in the information space for major operations. Russia’s campaign to regain dominant influence over Ukraine is concentrated on the information space, and the Kremlin has not taken rhetorical steps to justify a major offensive. The Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign claiming Ukraine will attack occupied Donbas would not likely support an overt Russian conventional attack into Ukraine on any scale without further conditions-setting. The Kremlin is therefore unlikely to be preparing for offensive action at this time. [..]

avots

PS Zināšanai un pārdomām par to kā pārvietot RU BS Krimas grupējumu uz kontinentu, ja rastos šāda akūta nepieciešamība, apstākļos, kad pretinieks pretojas.

The Isthmus of Perekop (Ukrainian: Перекопський перешийок; translit. Perekops’kyy pereshyyok; Russian: Перекопский перешеек; translit. Perekopskiy peresheek Crimean Tatar: Or boynu, Turkish: Orkapı) is the narrow, 5–7 kilometres (3.1–4.3 mi) wide strip of land that connects the Crimean Peninsula to the mainland of Ukraine. The isthmus is located between the Black Sea to the west and the Sivash to the east. The isthmus takes its name from the Tatar fortress of Perekop.

7 domas par “Baidena pierakstīšanas svētki

  1. Pēdējā bildē 2reiz skatījos un domāju, kā rakstā par ua iemaldījās Karēlijas karte ar Manerrhiema līniju, bet tad pieleca…

  2. Neapsriedīšu autentiskumu, vai ko citu, bet viens bērns būs pietiekami, lai propogandas mašīna iedarbotos. Aizvien reālāks variants paliek par krievu miera uzturētājiem, bet ko tas viņiem dos ? Ne teritorijas,ne krimai ūdens.

  3. Man dzīvē ir gadījies gan piekaut vājākos, gan kādreiz Moldovijas padomju sociālistiskās republikas vienu no ministriem “nolikt zem stobra”. Bet – gan jau visi ir redzējuši dokkadrus par gadījumu Sīrijā, kur vāgnerieši ar veseri vietējam dragā locekļus un pēc tam ar lāptu nocērt galvu. Un komunistiskā merkele un komunistiskais francijas prezidents klusē kā par “sīku starpgadījumu”…

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