vara bungas: Talibu taktikas noslēpumi
“[..] Sir, I thought the ANA were sending engineers to sweep Route Kelowna daily for IEDs?” “They are. And they’re getting ambushed almost daily as well. The Afghan National Army can only send a small team of ‘engineers’—and believe me, I use the term very loosely—kitted out with old American equipment that couldn’t fi nd an atomic bomb buried under the road. When they’re close to finding something, the Taliban usually detonate it and use it as a signal to initiate their ambush.”
I’d heard of that before. That technique, not surprisingly, is called an IED-initiated ambush. The Taliban would set up an IED in the middle of the road and then lie in ambush and wait until someone stepped on or drove over it (or they might just detonate it themselves with a command wire or radio-controlled device), and then pop up and shoot the hell out of anyone who was still alive. They would use the shock and fear that often paralyzed soldiers after an IED went off (and the fact that everyone in their kill zone
was most likely deaf and concussed from the blast) to mop up any survivors.
“Mark my words,” the major continued, “at some point in your tour you’ll probably end up going to rescue the ANA engineers after they’ve been hit.”“Nice,” I responded. Poor bastards. [..]
“[..] Nice. So they [taliban] talk openly on their Icoms? Not too big on OPSEC?” I asked.
“No, they’re lazy as hell. Sometimes they’ll speak in code, you can
task Ali to try and figure it out; they’ll be talking about the weather for ten minutes, storm clouds, when the sky is actually clear. They know we monitor them, so sometimes they’ll try and feed us disinformation—‘We see them now, our ambush is ready,’ crap like that. You shouldn’t completely change your patrol plan, but you can’t entirely ignore it either; because like I said, they’re lazy, and they may actually be telling the truth about their upcoming plans. [..]”
No grāmatas “The Taliban don’t wave” / Robert Semrau (atrodama uz libgen.rs)