vara bungas: Publikai būtu jāsaprot, ka izlūkošanas profesionālis brīfējot komandierim vai prezidentam savas prognozes vai secinājumus NEKAD neteiks kategoriski “būs tā” vai “būs šitā”, iespējamības tiks raksturotas varbūtības pakāpēs, jo pilnīga pārliecība objektīvi var būt tikai par to, ka mēs visi kādreiz mirsim, visos citos gadījumos ir iespējami varianti daži no kuriem ir ticamāki par pārējiem. Attiecīgi lēmēja (komandiera, prezidenta) loma ir uzklausīt argumentus, kas pamato izlūkošanas secinājumus un balstoties uz tiem izdarīt atbildīgu izvēli par labu optimālam course of actions. Ja šī izvēle izrādīsies pareiza par izlūku tulīt aizmirsīs un likumsakarīgi slavēs lēmēja ģēniju, ja nepareiza, sāksies runas par intelligence failure. Kabulas krišana ir tam spilgts piemērs.
[..] A senior congressional official who asked not to be named in order to discuss sensitive briefings told ABC News that intelligence officers had warned the U.S. leaders about a swift and total victory by the fundamentalist Taliban militants who had held power in Kabul during the late 1990s up until after the Sept. 11 attacks. “The intelligence community assessment has always been accurate; they just disregarded it,” the official told ABC News, speaking about the Biden administration. [..]
[..] Some U.S. officials privately said it had been a mistake for Presidents Biden and Trump to announce the military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, believing that it emboldened the Taliban to launch its offensive. “What is happening in Afghanistan is not the result of an intelligence failure,” former Acting CIA Director Michael Morell tweeted on Sunday. “It is the result of numerous policy failures by multiple administrations. Of all the players over the years, the Intelligence Community by far has seen the situation in Afghanistan most accurately.”[..]
UPD1 Douglas London retired from the CIA in 2019 after 34 years as a Senior Operations Officer, Chief of Station and CIA’s Counterterrorism Chief for South and Southwest Asia.:
[..] there was no intelligence failure by the agency in warning either Trump or Biden as to how events would play out. Operating in the shadows and “supporting the White House” will prevent the intelligence community from publicly defending itself. But the failure was not due to any lack of warning, but rather the hubris and political risk calculus of decision makers whose choices are too often made in their personal and political interest or with pre-committed policy choices, rather than influenced by (sometimes inconvenient) intelligence assessments and the full interests of the country.[..] avots
vara bungas 
Nu vai arī Intelligence Community vnk piesedz savu pakaļu.
Esmu pārliecināts, ka šīs valsts IC var apzināti samelot, bet ne kļūdīties īstemiņa prognozēs. Ja viņi apzināti melotu infopieseguma operācija nebūtu anonīmu komentāru veidā. Tad parādītos kkas līdzīgs portfelim ar dokumentiem, kas aizmirsts autobusu pieturā. Šajā gadījumā jūtamas dusmas, bet ne plānota otmazka. Klūdas neiespējamību pastiprina paša jautājuma saturs “Cik ilgi ANA noturēs Kabulu bez CAS atbalsta?”, to pat mēs VB varētu nekļudīgi prognozēt 😉
Considering that Biden had already decided to withdraw no matter what, the validity of the assessments of the intelligence community were irrelevant anyway.
This link about the relationship of culture and fighting was shared on an Estonian forum.
https://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars
It is definitely quite pertinent given the recent events, but I found a quote that seemed especially relevant to the Baltics as well: “Secondly, armies fight as they train. Troops are conditioned by peacetime habits, policies, and procedures; they do not undergo a sudden metamorphosis that transforms civilians in uniform into warriors.”
Yes, interesting reading. This link was published here, too – three days ago – https://varabungas.camp/2021/08/14/propaganda/#comment-279717 😉
Vēl par tēmu: