vara bungas: Kontekstā ar Bena Latkovska rakstu NRA, atcerējos neseno RAND pētījumu “Anticipating Adversary Military Interventions” , ko jau agrāk sev atzīmēju kā ticamu un labu atspēriena punktu prognozēm. Pētījums nav veltīts tikai RU, bet visiem US sāncenšiem nosakot galvenās pazīmes, kas varētu liecināt par augošo militārā konflikta risku. Attiecībā uz RU RAND izvirza trīs galvenos indikatorus/zīmes (signposts), kas var norādīt uz strauji tuvojošos krīzi:
- Spēku samēra izmaiņas postpadomju teritorijās, kas apdraud nosacītu RU dominanci “tuvajā pierobežā” , jo īpaši, ja šos procesus veicina US vai CN. (piem. karš GE).
- Iespēja izmantot sev izdevīgu situāciju, lai pie iespējas paplašinātu RU ietekmi jebkur pasaulē, mainītu spēku līdzsvaru sev par labu vai pro-aktīvi novērstu apdraudējumu savām esošajām pozīcijām. (piem. karš SY, vagneriešu sirojumi).
- RU nacionālo ienterēšu (kā RU tās saprot) aizskārums (kā RU to interpretē), “sarkano līniju” pārkāpšana attiecībā uz RU vienpusēji deklarētām “RU tiesībām”. (piem. karš UA).
Tā kā šīs pazīmes ir pietiekami stratēģiskas tās var apaudzēt ar zemāka ranga indikatoriem, līdz pat taktiskajam līmenim un sekot to esamībai vai neesamībai, meklēt, atrast, atmest, norakstīt, apkopot trendos. Pats tā daru un jums iesaku. Nepalaidiet garām tabulas ieraksta beigās.
[..] Signposts of Russian Interventions
We identified three primary signposts for Russian interventions.
First, Russia has exhibited a particular willingness to conduct military interventions, including combat missions, in post-Soviet Eurasia. Several key factors overlap in this region that explain Russia’s heightened interest, and threats to any of them could be sufficient to trigger Russian military action. These factors include the potential for changes to the regional power balance away from relative Russian predominance, challenges to Russia’s status as the dominant power in the region, and the potential for direct, external threats to Russia that could manifest in the region, such as terrorism. Russia has demonstrated a willingness to take large-scale military action in post-Soviet Eurasia when these drivers were present, and it seems likely to do so in the future if they manifest again. Russia’s activities within post-Soviet Eurasia seem especially likely to be triggered by the perceived interference of other major powers (e.g., the United States and China) in territories that Russia considers to be within its sphere of influence, whether by NATO in areas bordering Europe or, possibly, in Central Asia.
The second signpost has to do with the Russian desire to preserve existing regional power balances and, especially, to avoid adverse trends in those balances. Although we did not find evidence of Russia proactively intervening to shift regional power balances in its favor, particularly outside post-Soviet Eurasia, we see evidence that Russia is more likely to intervene to prevent relative losses in regional power balances that would adversely affect Russian interests. The intervention in Georgia, for instance, acted against a change to the status quo that Russia viewed as potentially unfavorable or likely to diminish Russian influence. U.S. planners might therefore view changes in the regional power balances that could prompt significant perceived losses in Russian influence as possible motivators of Russian military action. Examples might include events in Georgia, Belarus, or Ukraine that seem to lessen Russian influence. Outside this region, changes in the balance of power that threaten Russian influence in the Middle East may be especially likely to trigger military activity. Analysts typically can observe such shifts qualitatively but may also track relative measures of economic activity or military capabilities.
Finally, it is important to note that Russia is often very open about its vital interests, intentions, and redlines, and U.S. policymakers can use these statements as possible signposts of future interventions. In Ukraine in 2014, for example, Russia signaled clearly that Western interference and expanded influence would trigger a strong Russian reaction. Russia similarly signaled that it planned to respond in the aftermath of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that promised eventual NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Although not every statement by a Russian leader reveals a true intent or interest, efforts todiscern those redlines or areas in which Russia is in earnest could help identify circumstances for which Russian intervention is more likely, in turn guiding U.S. defense-planning decisions.