Nagi niez

vara bungas: Zemāk izvilkums no Maikla Kofmana jaunākā raksta “Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future?” , kas ir diezgan long read , tādēļ piedāvāju konspektu. Kofmanam piemīt spēja pārliecinoši argumentēt savu viedokli, kas bieži atšķiras no meinstrīma uzskatiem, kas padara šo autoru īpaši ievērojamu. Galvenā raksta doma – RU niez nagi  izkauties ar UA aci pret aci, kādā lokālā konfliktā, piemēram uz robežas, bet nav pazīmju, ka RU gatavotos  pārvērst šādu konfliktu par stratēģisku uzbrukumu Kijevai. Iemesls vēlmei “leģitīmi” izkauties  varētu būt atriebība par zaudējumu baznīcu karos.

[..]Actual points of escalation are rarely predicted[..]

VB: Te gan jāpiebilst, ka konfliktu dēļ Azovas jūras gan prognozēja, gan paredzēja.

[..]notable escalation in violence is likely in January[..]

[..]no evidence of Russian preparations for a major assault in Ukraine, certainly not in Crimea.  It is possible, but highly improbable. [..]

VB: Līdz vasaras sākumam var piekrist, bet maijā-jūnijā būtu jāveic prognozes pārskatīšanu.

[..]the long term force posture and structure changes to create three divisions along Ukraine’s borders, return earlier displaced brigades, and a focus on modernizing equipment in the Southern MD, mean that capacity and capability is there to engage in a high intensity conventional conflict with Ukraine at any time. [..]

VB: Ja ir griba uzbrukt un ir spēja uzbrukt, tad tas ir tikai laika jautājums, ka uzbrukums notiks. Mieru var pagarināt palielinot starptautisko spiedienu pret RU (griba) un attīstot un atbalstot UA armiju (spēja).

[..]The recently arrived tanks near Ukraine’s borders are most likely being stored in Rostov region near the port for shipment[..]

VB: Pagaidām tam nav pierādījumu. Bet labs indikators.

[..]it hard to understand why Muzhenko would use google earth satellite images of old T-62 tanks to push this story in the media[..]

VB: Informācijas karš.

[..]Russian Rostov region is seeing a steady build up of forces as part of the formation of the 150th division in the reestablished 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern MD). This will prove a decade long process. [..]

[..]There are also interesting force structure changes afoot in the Russian VDV, creating much larger air mobile formations, which were partially covered during experiments in Vostok-2018 exercises. [..]

VB: GDK pārtop par ekspedicionāru spēku kā USMC

[..]There is no evidence of the sort of hardware one would expect in support of an offensive operation or the formation of battalion tactical groups near Ukraine’s borders in Crimea[..]

[..]More than likely Russian troop movements are indicators of preparations for an artillery duel – exchanges of indirect fire that typically escalate in January/February. [..]

VB: Šito nesapratu, jo līdz šim RU vēl nav veikusi apšaudes no Krimas teritorijas.

[..]There is cause for concern that long term Russia may need to resolve the fresh water crisis in Crimea, but no way to know how this situation will play out in the coming year. [..]

VB: Vēl viens labs indikators. Ja RU neko nedarīs, lai atrisinātu problēmu tehniski, iespējams, ka to plāno risināt ar militāro spēku.

[..]Kherson may be relatively easy to cut off, but it would require a substantial number of forces to effect this kind of operation and earn Russia an entire new host of problems. [..]

[..]it may seem easy to to dismember a country on a map, but in reality a state is full of integrated pieces that depend on each other for electricity, water, road networks, trade, supply of food, etc. Resolving the fresh water problem in Crimea by taking another region that would itself bring new supply challenges, and while it could probably be done relatively quickly, it would also require a substantial force build up and subsequent deployment. [..]

[..]Russia could build up forces in Crimea relatively quickly, combining an air mobile airborne operation with a ground assault, but there would be indications and warnings. [..]

VB: Uz mums arī attiecas. Nekas liels nevar notikt nepamanīts, ja kāds skatās un zina kur skatīties.

[..]These {Russian} warnings indicate the expectation of a conflict, with Russia positioning Ukraine as a the provocateur, something that’s become rote in Russian political statements. The messaging is probably not meant for domestic audiences, or Ukrainian audiences, but for the West, which Russian elites believe can heavily influence Ukrainian decision making. As such, they represent a pattern of thinking reminiscent of the run up to the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, reflecting the Russian perception that they can threaten the potential risk of escalation in order to get the United States to lean on what Moscow sees as Washington’s client state. [..]

VB: Izskatās, ka RU gaidīja no UA jūrniekiem atbildes uguni. Tiešām atgādina 080808.

[..]Hence warnings of imminent danger tend to crop up every fall around November-December time. Putting aside the likelihood that Russia itself will execute some of the more dire plans discussed above, there is little incentive for Russia to launch any attack during the election as it would only benefit Poroshenko’s cause, in every scenario. [..]

VB: Lai ievēlētu Juļu, RU jāmazina spriedzi, tas tiesa.

[..]one should not ignore the likely outcome of a chain of events that results in a conflict spiral between these two actors, but there is no sign that Russia intends to intervene in Ukrainian politics via overt military means. [..]

[..]Separatist units are organized and supported with logistics, technical capabilities like EW, air defense, and other equipment, by a contingent of Russian regulars in Ukraine stationed further behind the line of control. [..]

[..]Russian public statements are designed to paint them as the reasonable party seeking to deter potential Ukrainian adventurism, but in truth, it feels like Moscow is looking to bloody Ukraine at the first available opportunity. [..]

[..]the Russian leadership turned what could have been a minor incident into a serious clash, overt, heavy handed, with disproportionate use of force. This is at best personal inference, but it is unlikely that Russia is planning an offensive operation to seize Kherson. [..]

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