Finland, NATO and NBP9 problems — Epämuodikkaita ajatuksia

There are great differences between Baltic, Nordic Poland, or BNP9, countries. Baltic countries Estonia Lithuania and Latvia ha too little manpower and too small economies to have really 1st rate national defense, and they thus need NATO to bolster them up. On the same time they are too close for comfort to Russia, and without […]

izmantojot Finland, NATO and NBP9 problems — Epämuodikkaita ajatuksia

10 domas par “Finland, NATO and NBP9 problems — Epämuodikkaita ajatuksia

  1. Vispār starptautiska Sāmsalas “festunga” idejā kaut kas ir. Igauņu salu ieņemšana krieviem gāja ļoti smagi arī 1944.g un “fait accompli” tur pie minimālas pretgaisa aizsardzības nevar uzzīmēt.
    Par koordinētiem Fi+3B iepirkumiem protams jauks un dzelžaini loģisks, bet diemžēl laikam sapnis.

    • Fi tāpat ir labi, viss ko vār vēlēties ir kaimiņu aviācija X stundā. Ne visiem kaimiņiem tā ir. Tādēļ arī Helmem par plānu B atteica ātri un nepārprotami.

  2. Hi Guys,

    If Google translate did any justice to your comments, it seems to be that you guys feel that you do not enough help from allies. Id still like to poin out that Saaremaa strongpoint would be largely defensable with help of Air force assets, and Swedish and Finnish (and NATO) naval assets. (Naturally this would also be bolstered with ground forces). So somewhat like “Festung Saaremaa” But I’m afraid the parallers end there. IF NATO is to keep on fighting in Baltics it will need to have a strongpoint in area. It is a totally different thing of making opposed landing accros the Baltic from Sweden than it would be to make one with assets supporting it (artillery MLRS air power) from Saaremaa. What do you guys think?

    • 3B together have population larger than FI. But mobilisation reserves are much smaller due to the absence of political will particularly in LV. Politicians here have nano-size balls.
      Festung Saaremaa totally makes sense because even the narrow and shallow straights turn into strategic depth for attacking RU land units.
      But RU occupying everything but Saaremaa is not a particularly great outcome either

    • I think that for LV most important is fate of Gotland, which could be real strongpoint in our area. Unfortunately for our defence we have to consider 500 km of coastline available for amphibious landing on every klick. For the beginning LV needs mobile RBS-15 systems, which are not even in the procurement plans. But it is still important for us if FI can and will lock RU navy in the gulf of Finland. The time is playing against us, and we still losing it trying to figure out how far NATO will go supporting our defence. It could be fair deal if NATO will lease or just donate 3B some expensive (for us) AD, AS missile systems.

    • Both points (a forward base and a “festung”) make sense. A kind of “stronghold”, moreover if international, turns quick political gains and fait accomplis almost impossible under most scenarios.


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