vara bungas: Mašīntulkojums no raksta SE valodā, ne ko piebilst, ne ko atņemt. Lai gan runa rakstā ir par zibenskaru, visu to pašu var attiecināt uz civilo krīzi par kuru sabiedrībai ir jāsaņem brīdiniājumu no saviem politiķiem un to kontrolē esošiem specdienestiem. Kas traucē?
1) uzmanības nepievēršana ilgtermiņa izmaiņām oponenta dispozīcijā.
2) sevis mānīšana, savu vērtību piedēvēšana oponentam.
3) pašierobežojumi bailēs ļauties provokācijai.
4) palaušanās uz pašu plāniem, kas maz saistīti ar reālo stāvokli, neatbilst situācijai.
[..] Another important factor to consider is the amount of time the intelligence service has to act, which is usually limited. Although a decision can be made by an attacker regarding an attack a long time before it occurs, the indicators will be at its highest for the last 24 hours (runa ir par zibenskaru/zibensuzbrukumu – VB) before the attack begins. In order for a defender to act adequately, very short lead times between the intelligence service are required. and the decisive level, military or political. But it also requires that all the nation’s armed forces have a high level of readiness, in order to act quickly on the threat that arises. This also requires that the highest military and political leadership is cohabited, but also that the highest political leadership has an understanding of certain military issues otherwise precious time can be wasted in explaining these basic factors.
Another important factor that is likely to affect , is partly psychological but also cultural. There is a risk that a reflective thinking will arise where the attacker’s actions try to be explained on the basis of their own motives and what the soon-to-be attacked thinks is rational action because what he sees as rational action is based entirely on his norms.
Within this framework, there is also a governing assumption that a nation only uses an armed attack as the absolute last resort, which need not be the case, but the military means can be a natural part of resorting to a nation’s security policy.
What should be particularly taken into account is that no surprising attack has come as a “flash from clear sky”. Without various forms of security policy crises and / or tensions have existed before it came to pass. Here, what can be categorized / termed as “side crises” should also be taken into account. On a number of occasions, intelligence agencies have been involved in analyzing other crises that affect either the soon-to-be-attacked nation or the general security situation and thus missed signals of an imminent surprise attack. Of course, a large number of crises also seem destabilizing in themselves, which could means that a party chooses to act when a window is revealed that allows a surprising attack.
Retired Colonel Bo Hugemark has deservedly over the years touched on the notion of surprising attack in the Swedish defense and security policy debate. According to him, four factors can affect a defender against a surprising attack.
The first is that the defender does not notice long-term changes in an event. antagonist’s peacetime point of departure but also its practice pattern.
The second is that the defender engages in wishful thinking and / or self-deception, i.e. an inability to penetrate into the imaginary world of the attacker.
The third is that the defender falls into self-deprecation, i.e. that the defender wants to avoid provocation
The fourth is that the defender himself makes his own preparedness increase, i.e. depart from the previously drawn up plans.
Based on the previously reported text, it is interesting to note how three of the four factors Hugemark touches on can mainly be considered to have psychological aspects and the first factor mainly relates to clear military facts. Which could prove the thesis of surprising attacks and possibly in the long run, strategic assault is in many ways based on psychological factors, something that Hugemark also advocates. In this context, it is also interesting to note how big a problem it seems for different nations’ intelligence services to identify a surprising attack, since a large part of our emergency response system was based that our intelligence service would provide an early warning to be able to take adequate contingency raises and utmost mobilization to meet an armed attack.