vara bungas: Kārtējais pētījums par 3B drošības tēmu. Šoreiz no European Army Interoperability Centre Briselē. Ļoti politkorekts dokuments ar daudzām un labām atsaucēm uz labiem avotiem. Visvairāk vērā ņemamas manuprāt ir “kartiņas”par katru no 3B valstīm. Jāsaka, ka par LV pētniekiem nebija daudz, ko teikt. Zīmīgi, ka attiecībā uz LV “mehanizāciju” ar KIM, autors pamatoti lieto vārdu “motorisation”, kas ir vairāk atbilstošs termins. tāpat vērā ņemams visu 3B deklarētais uzsvars uz sava karaspēka kaujas gatavību un īpaši LT rīcība šajā virzienā, savukārt LV joprojām fokusējas uz “host nation support”, kas labi raksturo mūsu stratēģiju un ekspektācijas.
NB Visi izcēlumi VB
At the national level, the Baltic countries sharply increased their spending in the military sector. In the past three years, investment grew mostly in the area of land forces – mechanisation, artillery, anti-tank, air-defence – and territorial defence (TDF). Notably, in Latvia and Estonia, TDF has been integrated with manoeuvrable forces; on the other hand, in Lithuania, TDF is included in the land forces (Szymański). The Baltic countries responded to Moscow’s aggressiveness with a fast modernisation of their Armed Forces. For example, in 2014 – as a direct response to what was happening in Crimea – Lithuania bought the Polish GROM man-portable air-defence systems in 2014 (€37.6 million from non-budget funding) and in 2015, Latvia acquired three medium-range PS-77 Multi-Role Radars (MRR), to complement the already deployed three AN/PS77 radars. In general, the Baltic countries have purchased second-hand and cheaper armament and military equipment, as part of more extensive negotiations.
As pointed out by Szymański, some changes also occurred in the structure, training, and organisation of the Armed Forced of the three countries.
For example, war-gaming practices focus mostly on urban warfare, and place protection of critical infrastructure and public administration buildings, as a top priority (Szymański). Each of the three countries developed speciﬁc features to counter Russia’s assertiveness in the East, trying to ﬁll the gap in their defence and security strategies.
As noted before, Estonia was a country that perceived itself to be more geographically removed from its allies, and therefore it has always relied more on its own local population in its security strategy. Thus, Tallinn has devoted ﬁnances for defence spending for a considerable amount of time. Of the Baltic countries, it is the one with the highest investment in defence budget, even before Russia’s invasion in Crimea. Indeed, already in 2014, Estonia allocated 2% of its GDP on defence expenditure. After the invasion, new features were developed, e.g., the introduction of the “two plus two rule ” which adds to the essential 2% of GDP, additional funds for support, and a defence investment fund from the general budget pool.
As the Estonian National Defence Development Plan of 2017-2026 underlines, cyber defence is a factor of utmost importance for the Baltic country, which relies on a strongly digitalised public administration system. Consequently, Tallinn wishes to establish a separate cyber defence command before 2021. Emphasis is also placed on the relevance of the readiness of the battalions, which should be mechanised in a stronger manner – CV90 infantry ﬁghting vehicles – and better armed. The 1st Infantry Brigade will be equipped with self-propelled artillery, becoming a mechanized force ready for engagement and the 2nd Infantry Brigade will have increased combat capabilities, thanks to an additional artillery battalion equipped with 122mm howitzers. Finally, the Development Plan underlines the need for strengthening military intelligence and sur-veillance capability with the aim of also en-hancing early warning capacities.
Looking at Latvia, the country invested less in its military sector before 2014, compared to the other two countries. According to data from NATO, Latvian defence spending in 2012, and 2013, was around 0.9% of its GDP, due to the heavy cutbacks in personnel and funding following the ﬁnancial crisis. After Crimea, the country openly addressed Russia as a potential aggressor in its Defence Concept and Priorities. Te government’s 2016 defence priorities, stressed the need for reaching an investment of up to 1.7% of GDP by 2017 and 2% of GDP by 2018, to ensure the capability to strengthen the defence and security structures of the country. As elaborated by Szymański, the modernisation programme for 2016–2028 sees three main priorities –early warning and command, combat readiness, and host nation support. Due to the proximity of the airborne forces in Pskov, Riga invested on the acquisition of radars – AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel and TPS-77 radars –, and motorisation of the First Battalion with CVR[T] armoured vehicles. Moreover, to enhance the readiness of its AFs, the land forces have been moved from Riga – strengthening the militarisation of the Eastern region of the country. For example, from 2018, the base of Latgale now hosts a regular army unit. Latvia is not following the same steps as Estonia regarding compulsory military service, as the country’s plan to rein-force the AFs does not involve reinstatement of compulsory conscription due to ﬁnancial shortages, a lack of military instructors, insuf-ﬁcient infrastructure, and the ambiguity of a part of the population regarding Russian assertiveness (Szymański). This notwithstanding, its renewed defence strategy pushes for voluntary involvement in the training of the National Guard. Te involvement of the civil sector is demonstrated, for example, by the invitation from the government directed to large ﬁrms, in order to show greater ﬂexibility in allowing their employees to participate in these trainings – as reported by the LRT. Finally, the country has also developed a Cyber Security Strategy (2014-2018) to strengthen Latvian awareness and responsiveness to threats in the cyber domain.
In Lithuania, as analysed in the ﬁrst chapter, a mixed structure of professional and selective conscription for the army was set up in the past two decades. After the Crimean crisis, Lithuania put in place a strong strategy to overcome its military shortcomings. Te country has eﬀectively increased its defence budget, which enlarged the percentage of GDP from 0.8% in 2013 to 2,06% in 2018. Te White Paper on Lithuanian Defence Policy of 2017 includes three priorities – modernisation of the AFs, rapid reaction, and a prepared reserve. For the ﬁrst priority, the White Paper demands the restructurung of the AFs and a signiﬁcant investment in equipment and infrastructure. Dealing with the internal organisation of the Army, Vilnius set up a structure of two brigades at peacetime, and three at wartime, including a trained reserve. Moreover, the White Paper proposes a new mobilisation system which should provide ﬁnancial incentives to professional services to increase their participation in the AFs. Since the country could be potentially attacked through Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, or the Pskov Oblast via Latgale in Latvia, Lithuania is supporting the spread of defence capabilities in critical areas, e.g., through the formation of two additional brigades in Klaipeda and Vilnius. Turning to investments, air defence has been reinforced through the acquisition of the Norwegian air defence system, NASAMS, together with the mechanisation of the infantry with 88 Boxer infantry ﬁghting vehicles, and the increase of their eﬃciency through selfpropelled PZH2000 Howitzers. Regarding the cyber domain, setting up the National Cyber Security Centre and later the Cyber Security Council – to ensure cooperation between public and private sectors – Vilnius is prioritising the implementation of measures to increase the resilience of critical infrastructures and public administration institutions against cyber threats.In relation to the rapid reaction component, it has already been partially strengthened since 2014, giving this section the support of Air and Special Forces, as well as logistics backing. To ensure the speed of their deployment, Lithuania amended its laws to give the Presidency the power to authorise the deployment of the AFs directly, without needing parliamentary approval (Szymański). Despite the steps already taken, the White Paper underlines the need for improving the Rapid Reaction Component, due to its small size – it is currently only composed of 2,500 troops – and the ongoing barriers for its deployment. Finally, the third priority for a prepared reserve has been addressed strongly so far. Already in 2015, selective conscription was reinstated in the country so as to enhance the participation of the citizens in the security of the country. Te White Paper stresses how, through an increase in volun-tary military service, Vilnius wants to ﬁx the deﬁcit problem of many units, with those who are sincerely motivated in ﬁghting for their country. [..]
VB ieskatā svarīgākā pētījuma rekomendācija ir “mācīties, mācīties un vēlreiz mācīties” 🙂
“Tirdly, NATO should conduct more extensive and realistic war games, to understand the real capabilities, and the practical obstacles that its forces could face in the case of a conventional attack against its territory.”