vara bungas: Kārtējais pētījums par 3B drošības tēmu. Šoreiz no European Army Interoperability Centre Briselē. Ļoti politkorekts dokuments ar daudzām un labām atsaucēm uz labiem avotiem.  Visvairāk vērā ņemamas manuprāt ir  “kartiņas”par katru no 3B valstīm. Jāsaka, ka par LV pētniekiem nebija  daudz, ko teikt. Zīmīgi, ka attiecībā uz LV “mehanizāciju” ar KIM, autors pamatoti  lieto vārdu “motorisation”, kas ir vairāk atbilstošs termins. tāpat vērā ņemams visu 3B deklarētais  uzsvars uz sava karaspēka kaujas gatavību un īpaši LT rīcība šajā virzienā, savukārt LV joprojām fokusējas uz “host nation support”, kas labi raksturo mūsu stratēģiju un ekspektācijas.

NB Visi izcēlumi VB

“[..]National Level

 At the national level, the Baltic countries sharply increased their spending in the military sector. In the past three years, investment grew mostly in the area of land forces – mechanisation, artillery, anti-tank, air-defence – and territorial defence (TDF). Notably, in Latvia and Estonia, TDF has been integrated with manoeuvrable forces; on the other hand, in Lithuania, TDF is included in the land forces (Szymański). The Baltic countries responded to Moscow’s aggressiveness with a fast modernisation of their Armed Forces. For example, in 2014 – as a direct response to what was happening in Crimea – Lithuania bought the Polish GROM man-portable air-defence systems in 2014 (€37.6 million from non-budget funding) and in 2015, Latvia acquired three medium-range PS-77 Multi-Role Radars (MRR), to complement the already deployed three AN/PS77 radars. In general, the Baltic countries have purchased second-hand and cheaper armament and military equipment, as part of more extensive negotiations.
 As pointed out by Szymański, some changes also occurred in the structure, training, and organisation of the Armed Forced of the three countries.
For example, war-gaming practices focus mostly on urban warfare, and place protection of critical infrastructure and public administration buildings, as a top priority (Szymański). Each of the three countries developed specific features to counter Russia’s assertiveness in the East, trying to fill the gap in their defence and security strategies.  
As noted before, Estonia was a country that perceived itself to be more geographically removed from its allies, and therefore it has always relied more on its own local population in its security strategy. Thus, Tallinn has devoted finances for defence spending for a considerable amount of time. Of the Baltic countries, it is the one with the highest investment in defence budget, even before Russia’s invasion in Crimea. Indeed, already in 2014, Estonia allocated 2% of its GDP on defence expenditure. After the invasion, new features were developed, e.g., the introduction of the two plus two rule ” which adds to the essential 2% of GDP, additional funds for support, and a defence investment fund from the general budget pool.  
As the Estonian National Defence Development Plan of 2017-2026 underlines, cyber defence is a factor of utmost importance for the Baltic country, which relies on a strongly digitalised public administration system. Consequently, Tallinn wishes to establish a separate cyber defence command before 2021. Emphasis is also placed on the relevance of the readiness of the battalions, which should be mechanised in a stronger manner – CV90 infantry fighting vehicles – and better armed. The 1st Infantry Brigade will be equipped with self-propelled artillery, becoming a mechanized force ready for engagement and the 2nd Infantry Brigade will have increased combat capabilities, thanks to an additional artillery battalion equipped with 122mm howitzers. Finally, the Development Plan underlines the need for strengthening military intelligence and sur-veillance capability with the aim of also en-hancing early warning capacities.
Looking at Latvia, the country invested less in its military sector before 2014, compared to the other two countries. According to data from NATO, Latvian defence spending in 2012, and 2013, was around 0.9% of its GDP, due to the heavy cutbacks in personnel and funding following the financial crisis.  After Crimea, the country openly addressed Russia as a potential aggressor in its Defence Concept and Priorities. Te government’s 2016 defence priorities, stressed the need for reaching an investment of up to 1.7% of GDP by 2017 and 2% of GDP by 2018, to ensure the capability to strengthen the defence and security structures of the country.  As elaborated by Szymański, the modernisation programme for 2016–2028 sees three main priorities –early warning and command, combat readiness, and host nation support. Due to the proximity of the airborne forces in Pskov, Riga invested on the acquisition of radars – AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel and TPS-77 radars –, and motorisation of the First Battalion with CVR[T] armoured vehicles. Moreover, to enhance the readiness of its  AFs, the land forces have been moved from Riga – strengthening the militarisation of the Eastern region of the country. For example, from 2018, the base of Latgale now hosts a regular army unit. Latvia is not following the same steps as Estonia regarding compulsory military service, as the country’s plan to rein-force the AFs does not involve reinstatement of compulsory conscription due to financial shortages, a lack of military instructors, insuf-ficient infrastructure, and the ambiguity of a part of the population regarding Russian assertiveness (Szymański). This notwithstanding, its renewed defence strategy pushes for voluntary involvement in the training of the National Guard. Te involvement of the civil sector is demonstrated, for example, by the invitation from the government directed to large firms, in order to show greater flexibility in allowing their employees to participate in these trainings – as reported by the LRT. Finally, the country has also developed a Cyber Security Strategy (2014-2018) to strengthen Latvian awareness and responsiveness to threats in the cyber domain.
In Lithuania, as analysed in the first chapter, a mixed structure of professional and selective conscription for the army was set up in the past two decades. After the Crimean crisis, Lithuania put in place a strong strategy to overcome its military shortcomings. Te country has effectively increased its defence budget, which enlarged the percentage of GDP from 0.8% in 2013 to 2,06% in 2018. Te White Paper on Lithuanian Defence Policy of 2017 includes three priorities – modernisation of the AFs, rapid reaction, and a prepared reserve. For the first priority, the  White Paper demands the restructurung of the AFs and a significant investment in equipment and infrastructure. Dealing with the internal organisation of the Army, Vilnius set up a structure of two brigades at peacetime, and three at wartime, including a trained reserve. Moreover, the White Paper proposes a new mobilisation system which should provide financial incentives to professional services to increase their participation in the AFs. Since the country could be potentially attacked through Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, or the Pskov Oblast via Latgale in Latvia, Lithuania is supporting the spread of defence capabilities in critical areas, e.g., through the formation of two additional brigades in Klaipeda and Vilnius. Turning to investments, air defence has been reinforced through the acquisition of the Norwegian air defence system, NASAMS, together with the mechanisation of the infantry with 88 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles, and the increase of their efficiency through selfpropelled PZH2000 Howitzers. Regarding the cyber domain, setting up the National Cyber Security Centre and later the Cyber Security Council – to ensure cooperation between public and private sectors – Vilnius is prioritising the implementation of measures to increase the resilience of critical infrastructures and public administration institutions against cyber threats.In relation to the rapid reaction component, it has already been partially strengthened since 2014, giving this section the support of Air and Special Forces, as well as logistics backing. To ensure the speed of their deployment, Lithuania amended its laws to give the Presidency the power to authorise the deployment of the AFs directly, without needing parliamentary approval (Szymański). Despite the steps already taken, the White Paper underlines the need for improving the Rapid Reaction Component, due to its small size – it is currently only composed of 2,500 troops – and the ongoing barriers for its deployment. Finally, the third priority for a prepared reserve has been addressed strongly so far. Already in 2015, selective conscription was reinstated in the country so as to enhance the participation of the citizens in the security of the country. Te White Paper stresses how, through an increase in volun-tary military service, Vilnius wants to fix the deficit problem of many units, with those who are sincerely motivated in fighting for their country. [..]
VB ieskatā svarīgākā pētījuma rekomendācija ir “mācīties, mācīties un vēlreiz mācīties” 🙂
Tirdly, NATO should conduct more extensive and realistic war games, to understand the real capabilities, and the practical obstacles that its forces could face in the case of a conventional attack against its territory.”

27 domas par “Izziņa

  1. LOL, ”motorisation” vai ”Motorized infantry” gan pēc definīcijas nozīmē tupa ”kājnieki, kuri pārvietojas ar kravas mašīnām vai cita veida transolīdzekli, kam ir motors” (kas tā kā mums jau bija PD brigādē, ar zirgiem vai velosipēdiem taču nebrauca pirms 2014. gada).

    Acīmredzot nabaga poļu analītiķis skatījās virsū uz latviešu CVRT brīnumu, un nevarēja izdomāt kā savādāk to visu nosaukt.

    • Nu vēlajos PSRS laikos ar “motostrelki”, “motopehota” (motorized infantry, motostreēlnieki) apzīmēja kājniekus uz riteņu BTRiem, tātad APC. Lai sauktos par “Mehanizētiem” citās valstīs vajag KKM/IFV , ko var pastiprināti ar tanku apakšvienību. Domāju polis pareizi nosprieda, ka cvrt neko nepasaka par to KĀ mūsu karavīri pārvietojas, bet KKM viņiem nav, tātad … 🙂 cvrt kā zināms pirka kā “platformas” atbalsta ieročiem.

      • Well, this is partly correct. AFAIK, Russian “motorized” units can technically also be on tracked platforms, like the MT-LB. The main difference between “motorized” and “mechanized” seems to be the inclusion of tanks. There is actually a slight debate in certain Estonian military circles, whether the procurement of IFV’s counts as mechanization. Some argue that without tanks there is no mechanized unit. I consider it to be a clash between Western and Eastern perspective on military. Those who learned under the Soviet doctrine consider tanks as an essential piece of mechanization, those who learned the slightly different NATO doctrine tend to consider the inclusion of any armoured units with offensive capabilities (IFV’s, APC’s, SPH’s etc) as mechanization. Technically it’s just semantics. “As long as the cat catches mice…” etc.

        I think the far more important issue with Latvian forces is the lack of sufficient reserve. Once the main units have been depleted then there is nobody to replace them. Three thousand men is not enough for that.

        • Nowadays should not be such thing as “light infantry without APC or armored vehicles” when we are speaking about regular force. Can we agree that “mechanized” structure means tracked IFV with or without tanks, but “motorized” means vehicles on wheels, with or without armor? Sub units of a unit should not differ in speed or terrain crossing capabilities, so it is no option to mix tanks with wheeled vehicles. As I mentioned before LV cvrt are not intended to be personnel carriers, those are wannabe AT platforms and for sure fire support.
          I agree with you concerning LV reserves, it is reason why I am dissident here 🙂 Official point of view stands ” we have 7K full time soldiers in regular army, that is double more than EE. Plus we have 8K paramilitary force, which is trained as regular force and fully compatible with it. Combined it is enough to provide host nation support to nato”. Please, do not point me on deficiencies of such position, I spent years explaining them to people.

          • I disagree with you here, light infantry still has its place on the battlefield. A properly dug in light infantry can be an extremely difficult opponent. For defensive tasks, they are perfectly usable. Heck, most of FInnish Defence Forces is still un-armored. Only actual manouver units are armored, territorial forces are based on light infantry. Problem is that for the Baltic countries, this is not a voluntary choice, but rather a resource based reality. Now, each country is looking to rectify this issue, but it takes time for the economies to catch up to that dream. For Estonia, the likely timeframe for armoring the manouver units is 2030+. Again, that is the dream – to armor two brigades. If the economy gets hit, then that perspective starts slipping.
            When it comes to Latvian “mechanization”, I consider those battalions armored recon/cavalry units, not full manouver units. The equipment and manpower just isn’t compatible with such tasks.

        • Regarding Latvian units not having reserves – unfortunately, you are “dead-on”, so to speak. For a reasons, Cris-cross discussed here above and beyond. And even if we could have enough hardware acquired and stock-piled as needed (which is not necessarily the case) – we would be far stretched (literally and figuratively) to enough personnel to operate that equipment. Not to mention having enough people to service/man more sophisticated equipment, for what one would need at least 2 additional (fully operational) crews ready for the one already operating to timely replace the losses incurred.

          Unfortunately for Latvians, the leadership tends to react only to hard kicks in the “a.s”, as for the most part, they have the mentality, best described as follows: ” Why would one buy a fire extinguisher (e.g. develop their own armed forces) if the fire department (NATO) is just a phone- call away?!” the good thing is, that lately they have seen the necessity to have that extinguisher handy, because,as evidence shows, consequences for those not having it are burnt and damaged house, so to speak. Hopefully, the lessons are being learnt quick enough.

  2. Vienīgais pieklājīgais NBSā ir pašgājējartilērija. To iespējams nopirka, jo NATO EFP bataljonam neviens artu negribēja kontributēt. Pārējais ir koloniālā policija/uzņemošie spēki un SAR


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