Dienas ripo


vara bungas: Ļoti īss, bet saturīgs INTSUM no Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) par Zapad-2021mācībām. Kopumā sakrīt ar VB agrāk izteiktajiem pieņēmumiem, tostarp :

  • “Zapad does not start and end during its active phase”. Kā jau agrāķ teicu un centos apkopot “krājkasē” – Zapad sērijas mācības nav 10 dienu pasākums septembrī. Tā ir secīgu un paralēlu epizožu sērija, kas šogad sākusies neierasti agri (februārī) un turpināsies vismaz līdz oktobrim.
  • “Deployment of a division-level unit should have been regarded as a signaling effort at best, rather than a genuine attempt to conduct offensive operations against a neighboring state.” Šis indikators ir viegli manipulējams un grūti pārbaudāms ar OSINT metodēm, bet NATO izlūkošanas lidojumu intensitāte LT un PL liek domāt, ka NATO valstu valdības zina, kas īstenībā notiek. UA piemēram notiek armijas augstākās vadības kadru maiņa, ko var interpretēt dažādi. Gan kā gatavošanos karam stiprinot komandvadības ķēdi, gan to, ka “draudu nav” un var nodoties  eksperimentiem. Es sliecos piekrist otrajam variantam, neizslēdzot pirmo.
  • key to understanding Russian intentions is the combination of two factors. On the one hand, there is the quantity of equipment that is moved and on the other, there is the context within which this movement is taking place.” Tieši tā, ja RU plāno konvencionālo operāciju pret NATO  vai UA vispirms jābūt a) koncentrētiem pietiekami un neierasti lieliem RU spēkiem (check) un  b) jāiestājas atbilstošai haosa pakāpei  starptautiskajās attiecībās (provokācija? civilā krīze? pagaidām neizpildās).
  • “If Russia was preparing to go war, the scale of the forward deployment of troops would be significant enough to warrant concern: the buildup would be in excess of a reasonable deployment for an exercise and would be a further indicator of probable preparation for offensive action.” RU pavasara staigāšana gar UA robežām koncentrēja  RKA un DKA neierasti lielu kaujas tehnikas daudzumu, kas netika atvilkta un visticamāk tiks izmantota Zapad epizodēs. Reasonable deployment līmenis sen pārsniegts.
  • “What the most recent troop redeployments into the Western Military District (WMD) have highlighted is that, within a month, Russia can redeploy units from other districts to create a favorable conventional balance ratio at chosen axes, including against the Baltic States. However, not all Russian large-scale, strategic-operational, or readiness exercises are a prelude to military intervention. Some Russian military exercises are simply training activities; others seek to signal Russian resolve to maintain the status quo; and the rest serve domestic and international propaganda purposes. The upcoming “Zapad-2021” exercise is likely to tick all of these boxes, although the main focus could be placed on the defense of Belarus, highlighting the advances made in the Belarus-Russia defense relationship.”  Tā arī domājām, ka mēnesis+- ir pietiekams laiks RU, lai koncentrētos karam, šobrīd šis nosacītais “agrā brīdinājuma” mēnesis ir izsmelts un situācija dažu diennakšu laikā var aizripot pa jebkuru ceļa atzaru: karš, militārā spiediena eskalācija nemilitāru mērķu sasniegšanai, RU iekšējās propagandas mērķi.

Piezīmju blociņam:

“At a tactical level, moving a 120-vehicle motor rifle battalion with personnel and air defense assets by rail requires some 78 to 80 flat rail cars, which necessitates the utilization of two train echelons per battalion. Redeployment of the entire motor rifle brigade would require 16 to 18 military echelons.2 At the same time, it takes around three to five hours to load one train with equipment. This means that the process of redeployment of a brigade-level unit would take several days, depending on their access to platforms, prior warnings of movement, and troops’ proficiency with the loading process. The pace of movement also depends on air defense conditions imposed by opposing forces’ air operations. Deep rear or unimpeded transportation can cover a distance of 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers within 24 hours. Therefore, the effective functioning of railway troops is key to ensuring combat and mobilization capacities of the Armed Forces and ground forces in particular.”

Atbildēt

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