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vara bungas: US valdība jau labu laiku strādā pie savas kritiskās infrastuktūras (enerģētikas un IKT) aizsardzības no EMP trieciena graujošās iedarbības neatkarīgi no tā vai to izraisītu dabiska parādība (saules vētras) vai pretinieka uzbrukums ar virszemes kodolsprādzienu (NEMP). Septembrī US valdība savām aģentūrām un kontraktoriem izplatīja ziņojumu  Electromagnetic Pulse Shielding Mitigations, kas satur rekomendācijas kritiskās IKT infrastruktūras aizsardzībai, radot īpašu … aizsardzības infrastruktūru. Domājams, ka US savā teritorijā, ar savām finansiālajām spējām to visu pacels, bet pārējiem pamatīgi jāpadomā un jāparēķina varbūtību piedzīvot tādu saules vētru kā 1859.gadā (t.s. Carrington event), kas tolaik sagrāva telegāfa sistēmas, bet mūsdienās varētu ietkmēt daudz trauslākus datortīklus (un ne tikai tos, bet vispār jebkādas elektroniskās sistēmas). Savukārt RU gadījumā jebkurš bruņots konflikts jāuztver caur kodolieroču izmantošanas prizmu. Gatavošanās izdzīvošanai bez ierastām sakaru sistēmām un mūsdienu tehnoloģijam ir reāla problēma, par kuru, protams, nevienai valdībai negribās pat domāt, kur nu vēl izdot rekomendācijas.

[..] Public awareness of manmade EMPs began on July 9, 1962 following the Starfish Prime test,
during which the U.S. detonated a 1.4-megaton thermonuclear weapon 250 miles above
Johnston Island in the mid-Pacific. On the Hawaiian Islands, 900 miles away, burglar alarms
were triggered, circuit breakers opened, and over 300 streetlights in Honolulu failed nearly
simultaneously. A few months later, to better understand EMP effects, the Soviet Union
conducted a series of high-altitude nuclear tests over Southwestern Siberia, inadvertently
demonstrating the weaponization potential of high-altitude EMP (HEMP), as revealed to U.S.
scientists in 1995. [..]

CI (critical infrastructure) owners and operators can implement EMP protections in many ways, but critical, time-urgent systems should be housed in an overall EMP barrier with protected POEs. This document
presents three low-risk EMP protection approaches: equipment enclosures for small groups of
collocated equipment, shelters for clusters of MCE, and rooms or buildings for protecting an
entire system.

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Par RU kodolstratēģiju vienkārši un saprotami rakstīja Maikls Kofmans:

[..] The Russian military thinking behind targeting, particularly with strategic conventional weapons for escalation management purposes, is to select objects or nodes whose destruction has the potential to create cascading effects on the system as a whole. Targets may, and likely will, include those that have both a deterrent effect and practical military value should the conflict continue; that is, there are targets that may be considered dual purpose. [..] Although Russian military analysts propose different lists, they overlap considerably. Political, economic, and military-related targets often include nonnuclear power plants, administrative centers (political), civilian airports, roads and rail bridges, ports, key economic objects, important components of the defense-industrial complex, and sources of mass media and information. Military targets tend to include command and control centers; space-based assets; key communication nodes; systems for reconnaissance, targeting, navigation, and information processing; and locations where means of delivery for ballistic or cruise missiles are based. [..]

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