Dienas grauds

vara bungas: kas latvietim var būt sarīgāks par ārzemju latvieša viedokli par Baltijas reģiona aizsardzību? Jo īpaši, ja šis ārzemju latvietis ir SE ģenerālmajors Kārlis Neretnieks. Šādu rakstu nevar palaist garām, tādēļ zemāk tā mašīntulkojums no zviedru valodas par lietām, kuras mēs VB apspriežam jau 12.gadu – Arktika, A2/AD, Gotlande, Suvalku koridors, Karaļauči, NATO papildspēki… Domas lielā mērā sakrīt – 1) RU nekad (kamēr pastāv tās kara flote) nesamierināsies ar FI, SE un 3B dalību NATO. 2) SE pastiprinās izlukošanu pāri mūsu galvām (gribat zināt “kas būs?” – sekojiet SE darbībām, rakstiem, paziņojumiem utml) 3) Ja US nepiedalās, Eiropai pagaidām nav jaudas nodrošināt ātru papildspēku ierašanos 3B 4) Suvalku koridors mazticama militārās mobilitātes opcija konvencionāla kara gadījumā.

NB Visi izcēlumi mašīntulkojumā mani, visas pretenzijas par stilu adresējamas AI

Nato och den nordisk/baltiska regionen – ett strategiskt och operativt bedömande
av Karlis Neretnieks

Résumé
A strategic and operational assessment of the Nordic-Baltic region: the importance of the High North cannot be overestimated. Russia will protect its second-strike capability at any cost. Doing that, Russia will try to create an exclusion zone when it comes to hinder NATO air and naval operations as far south as possible into the Norwegian sea. A secondary effect of this ambition, if successful, might be that bringing reinforcements to Scandinavia will become a quite hazardous endeavour for the alliance. Which in turn would make it doubtful if NATO can reinforce its Nordic members and the Baltic states by sea. Russia trying to create an air defence zone to the west of the Kola peninsula will affect Finnish, Swedish and
Norwegian land territory. The conclusion being that: Norway, together with UK, Germany and US must contain the Russian Navy as far north as possible and that Finland and Sweden will carry the main burden when it comes to repulse any Russian offensive on land. Presently Sweden does not have the means to be a major player in such a concept. In the Baltic Sea area, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are all dependent on allied reinforcements to be able to ward off a Russian attack. The main problem being lack of ground forces and air defence assets. Their limited resources, both regarding economy and population, make it necessary to bring in these assets from the outside. Of the two alternatives: by sea across the Baltic or by land, the latter is a doubtful option due to Russian possibilities to influence movements of larger
units through the Suwalki-gap, either by attacking and closing the gap, or by using artillery and drones deployed in Kaliningrad or Belarus. The difficulty to move larger units through the Suwalki-gap makes the option to use the Baltic Sea an attractive alternative, assuming that shipping can be protected. The main threat probably being submarines, antiship missiles and mines. To cover the time gap between the arrival of reinforcements from the US and the UK, Swedish assets could probably play a decisive role in the Baltic states.

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The Nordic-Baltic region  is a key area for NATO, which therefore places high demands on the Alliance’s deterrence and warfare capabilities. In the Northern Areas, roughly defined here as the northern Nordic region with surrounding sea areas , Russia has a clear need to be able to counter possible attacks on its base areas on the Kola Peninsula and to protect its strategic nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The threat to the Baltic States is of a different nature. There, Russia may see opportunities to realize parts of its resurgent imperial ambitions, but also to exploit the countries’ vulnerable position to undermine NATO’s credibility as a as a security guarantor.
The article aims to analyze the challenges NATO may face in making it credible making it credible that the alliance can defend the North and the Baltics.
The more southern parts of the Scandinavian peninsula will only be affected to the extent that it clearly affects operations in the directions mentioned above, which are deemed of greatest strategic importance to the Alliance and which are also likely to be the most interesting from the Russian point of view. The defense of Finland is only concerned to the extent that it affects NATO’s operations in the North and the Alliance’s support to the Baltic states.
However, it can be noted that the Finnish defense force is the one in the region that best prepared in all respects to fight a war, if necessary. Both the geographical directions, the North areas and the Baltic Sea region respectively are treated from two points of view: what would be advantageous from the Russian point of view and as a consequence; how should NATO be able to act as a deterrent and what does it require of the necessary warfare capability of the alliance. For both cases, the paper concludes with some reflections on desirable Swedish capabilities on how best to contribute to the Alliance’s deterrence and warfare capabilities. The article is part of the Royal Swedish Academy of Academy’s project SV-A-R which is reported in detail on the Academy’s website. This link to the project also means that the overall security policy aspects, such as factors that could influence US engagement in Europe or the NATO-EU relationship, are discussed very briefly, as they are dealt with other parts of the project. The same applies to the importance and implementation of ‘hybrid-warfare’, even if, for example, successful cyber attacks against the Swedish electricity supply would affect the Alliance’s ability to utilize the Swedish railway network. An important capability linked to Sweden’s role as a hub for reinforcement transportation both to the Nordic region as well as to the Baltic states.

The northern areas from a Russian point of view

The Norwegian Defense Commission points out in its report from 2023 that: “There are many suggests that during a transition period Russia will increasingly lean towards nuclear weapons as a more central part of its security policy.” One conclusion that suggests that the northern regions will not lose importance in Russian eyes, quite the contrary. In addition to the great and likely increasing importance for Russia to protect its submarine-based nuclear capability, the threat that based on the Kola Peninsula could pose to maritime the Atlantic routes to Europe, and those to to Scandinavia via the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea, should be taken into account when Russian intentions are to be assessed. To protect the base areas on the Kola Peninsula and the strategic nuclear submarines, Russia has developed what in Western debate is often called the Bastion Concept. It aims a deep defense zone that will give the Northern Navy freedom of action at sea especially in the Barents Sea, but also to protect the bases. The protection of the extensive gas extraction on the Yamal Peninsula is also a significant task. At sea, the zone extends from the Kola Peninsula down to the Norwegian Sea and northwards to the Arctic Ocean. It should not be seen as an impenetrable bubble, which would be an unrealistic goal, but rather as a concept where the aim is to impose a very high cost on an opponent in the event that it tries to with its own combat forces in the zone. The concept also includes creating a threat to NATO’s Atlantic links and to the sea routes to Scandinavia. This is probably a fairly limited threat, at least as far as the Atlantic links. However, NATO cannot ignore it and must therefore deploy resources to meet that eventuality. The
announced two years ago, the addition of conventional submarines to the Northern Navy is probably part of such planning.
Weapons development in general, such as the existence of the Kalibr cruise missile, based on both surface ships and submarines, with ranges of several hundred kilometers, in some versions up to 1500 kilometers, means that the protection of maritime transport to Europe and Scandinavia cannot be neglected. Although several types of anti-ship missiles have very long ranges, the weapons carriers, ships and aircraft, must have bases from which they are launched. These bases must be protected. A major problem from the Russian point of view to be able to use such long-range systems is probably target data information, which means that the threat to NATO’s maritime links to Europe and Scandinavia also has a space dimension. In this regard, from a Nordic-Baltic perspective, it may be worth noting that even if Russian resources are not sufficient to affect maritime transport across the North Atlantic to Europe, maritime traffic to Scandinavia may be exposed to considerable risks. Such a lower level of Russian ambition would spare the Navy submarines and aircraft from the high risks associated with trying to attempting to cross the GIUK gap ( maritime gap between Greenland, Iceland, UK – VB).
Military reinforcements as well as the transportation of supplies to the Nordic/Baltic area could probably be affected to a to a fairly large extent, possibly even be interrupted. However, it is not enough to create a defense zone at sea. NATO countries Norway and Finland both border Russia and in close proximity to the Russian base areas. From the Norwegian border to Murmansk is approximately 100 km, from the Finnish border about 200 km.

From the North Norwegian air bases there are also short approach routes to the operational areas of Russian strategic nuclear submarines. The incentives for Russia to expand the air defense zone around the bases on the Kola Peninsula and also to try to prevent NATO from using air bases in northern Norway are very strong. Depending on the size of the forces Russia has at its disposal to expand the defense zone in the Arctic and to act in surrounding maritime areas, or vice versa, how weak NATO is in the region, there is the possibility that a Russian operation could have high objectives. Should Russia occupy the Norwegian airfields and ports down to, for example Bodø in Nordland county, NATO’s ability to base air and naval forces in northern Scandinavia would be drastically reduced which would have serious consequences for the Alliance’s ability to prevent Russian forces, mainly submarines and long-range aircraft from operating in the Norwegian Sea. The importance of the North Norwegian air bases is illustrated by the fact that Norway and the US, as recently as this year (2024), entered into a
agreement (corresponding to the Swedish DCA agreement with the USA12) whereby the USA was allowed to use the two air bases Andöya and Bardufoss in Troms County. Both are located slightly north of Narvik. In addition, the Russian combat forces that can support operations in the Norwegian Sea would be about 1000 kilometers closer to their area of operations. The possibility of bringing Allied reinforcements to the north via Narvik would disappear and also Trondheim, where the US Marine Corps had pre-stored materiel, would be considerably more exposed. High Russian risk-taking and use of for example, of Trojan horses cannot be ruled out. Rather, various methods based on surprise appear to be the most likely, since NATO’s ability to counteract depends to a very large extent on the amount of advance warning the Alliance might receive.

To otherwise attempt to occupy Norwegian airfields and ports airfields and ports, by using sea or airborne units is likely to be too risky, and even if Russian planning is no stranger to either high risks or losses. Although the primary purpose of Russian military operations in the far north is to protect its own bases and combat forces against against air and naval attacks, Russian planning must also take into account that NATO, depending on how the situation develops may also pose a threat on the ground. One
cannot ignore, for example, the risk that US Marine Corps units could possibly carry out fairly extensive landings in the rear of Russian units advancing through Finnmark. They also constitute a latent threat directly to Russian territory if NATO were to succeed in gaining air and maritime supremacy in the Barents Sea.

The High North from a NATO point of view

The first, and biggest, problem NATO commanders NATO decision-makers have to deal with related to the Russian military potential in the High North, whether Russia launches offensive operations or not, is: does the Alliance to dare to fight Russian military infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula, and Russian submarines in the Barents and the Arctic Ocean at all? How would decision-makers in Russia react to what could be perceived as a threat , or direct attack, on Russia’s second-strike capability, the ultimate guarantor for Russia’s survival as a nation in the event of a conflict with the US (or China). There is the risk that NATO will have to fight a war in the far north and the Arctic with its with its hands tied. Russian offensive actions on the territory of NATO countries and even in the Norwegian Sea can be met with force, but fighting the areas from which the threat comes may be out of bounds.

The risk is that ‘self-discouragement’, an over-interpretation the risks, could play a role in NATO’s assessment process. They binds itself in a way that means that it unable to effectively counter a Russian attack. Another strategic conclusion of the same as how Russia perceives the threat to its second strike capability, is: if the Alliance fails to prevent the Russian anti-ship systems from operating in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea, the risk is that any reinforcements will not be able to be deployed to the Nordic-Baltic area. This in turn could jeopardize the defence of the Baltics and, by extension, the Nordic area. Only the first case, that Baltic region cannot be defended, would put the the Alliance in a position where it would have to plan for a reconquest of the Baltics, a likely protracted continental war of enormous dimensions. Alternatively, if the reconquest option is not implemented, it would clearly that the Alliance, and thus also the US, cannot stand up to its obligations. Something which would probably lead to several states, such as Japan and South Korea, which today dependent on the US for their security, might feel compelled to seek other security policy solutions, including consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Issues already being discussed in Tokyo and Seoul.
A further problem of strategic significance may be the threat to Norwegian gas and oil extraction
in the Norwegian Sea. Facilities that can be knocked out with relatively limited efforts. With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the drastic reduction of European gas imports from Russia Norway’s gas assets have become increasingly important for securing Europe’s energy supply. In 2023, Norwegian gas accounted for 30% of EU’s gas needs. Among the strategic challenges, there is also a wild card whose importance is extraordinarily difficult to assess, China. How will China act in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO: strictly neutral; covert support to Russia, which is then in conflict with China’s main global adversary; or paradically, perhaps even support for NATO to gain advantages at Russia’s expense in Asia. The question cannot be answered, as the answer probably depends on how the global situation is assessed in Beijing at the given moment. However, NATO cannot ignore the problem and must therefore have some kind of planning to counter a threat in the Arctic that may also include a Chinese component.
The threats NATO faces to the alliance’s maritime links, and land territory lead to a number of operational conclusions. Perhaps the most important is that maritime security capabilities in the Norwegian Sea and especially in the North Sea must be ensured. Failure there will have likely to have strategic consequences for the response of both the Nordic region and the the Baltics. Looking at national alignments it is clear that Norway plays a key role and key role, and will have to bear a heavy  burden, as regards the protection of maritime links to the Nordic-Baltic region. This is both in terms of its own capabilities and in supporting other countries’ efforts, including by offering basing facilities in Norway. The countries that can primarily be expected to participate in operations in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea are, in addition to Norway: the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. All in all, this means that Norway will need to invest significant resources in to participate in and support the naval activities in the Norwegian Sea. This means that it will fall primarily on Sweden and Finland to counter the Russian threat on the ground, at least tone before any reinforcements have time to be supplied. Available Norwegian ground combat forces should be focused on operating primarily on Norwegian territory and be able to counter threats such as raids and bypasses via airdrops directed against base areas and supply lines. It should be noted that the Russian Northern Navy has a tradition of amphibious operations that stretches back to the Second World War. For reasons of sovereignty and the need for practical peace and the link to naval operations, Norway should have a reasonably good ability to respond to a threat on its own, at least in the early stages, to meet a threat on the in Finnmark.
Spitsbergen and Bear Island pose a special problem for Norway, which must ensure that Russia is not in a position to occupy any of the islands and use them to deploy sensors and long-range air defense and anti-ship systems , which would make it significantly more difficult for NATO to operate in parts of the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and the Greenland Sea. For Sweden and Finland, the requirement means
to be able to counter a Russian offensive in the North two major challenges: the limited availability of readily deployable units in the area and the possibilities to deploy reasonably quickly. The area is sparsely populated, so the potential to mobilize personnel who live in the region, and thus would be quickly available to respond to an attack, is limited in both countries. Although Finland has a large army, by European standards the possibilities to reinforce northern Finland is limited by the threat to the Finnish heartland, the southern two-thirds. The majority of the population lives there and most of the Finnish economy is located there, that is, what constitutes the country’s ability to defend itself. The fact that that part of Finland also borders on the resource-rich strong St. Petersburg region, which thus can form the basis for large-scale military operations, accentuates the problem. The Swedish heartland is not threatened in the same way, so Sweden should be well placed to make a substantial contribution to the defense of the Arctic. However, such an approach is not without its problems: Sweden currently has only a few ground combat units at all, and even fewer that have the ability to fight in the northern environment; the connections between southern Sweden, where possible reinforcement resources might be available, are also very vulnerable. The distance between Mälardalen and Luleå is about 1000 kilometers and any transport must cross ten major rivers, with each river crossed by only a few bridges. The possibilities of knocking out or damaging these with modern long-range missiles means that that it must be assumed that transportation Sweden in a north-south direction could be subject to serious disruption. The supply of foreign reinforcements to the North faces similar problems, how to get there, how to ensure supply? To some extent, the problems can be solved by pre-storage of equipment and supplies in northern Finland or northern Sweden and then flying in the personnel. This is an attractive solution as it not only solves part of the part of the transportation problem but also units can be in place quickly. However, even if units are earmarked for operations in a particular area, in most cases they also have additional tasks, if events do not unfold as planned. For the United States, which plays on a global stage would be very risky to commit too many resources to only one possible case of war. This means that if there is talk of more extensive reinforcements, the bulk of the equipment transported by sea to the area of operations, it will not be in place in advance. Incidentally, some of the same reasoning can be applied to the supply of Swedish units from southern Sweden. Should their material be pre-stored in the north so that only personnel need be transported to the intended area of operations, or should the unit’s equipment also be located in the south to ensure that the unit can, reasonably quickly, also solve other tasks than just in the northern North? In the case of the Northern Calotte, three possible reception areas for sea-borne reinforcements :

• Narvik in northern Norway, which is close to the likely area of operation, a few hundred
  kilometers, and has reasonably easy land connections through Swedish
  Lapland. However, sea transportation is very risky due to the proximity to the Northern Navy base areas.
• Trondheim, where the threat to maritime transport also exists but is likely to be easier to deal with because of the distance that Russian submarines, aircraft or missiles have to cover to reach the area of operations has increased by about seven hundred kilometers. Here, however, the problem of rather long and vulnerable land links through Norway and Sweden should come into play, main rivers to be crossed. The biggest transport engineering problem is probably the  desire to be able to transport heavy equipment such as tanks and heavy artillery systems by rail.
• Swedish ports on the west coast are probably the option that provides the best
  to protect maritime transport, while at the same time it also involves the longest, most
  time-consuming and vulnerable land transport.
  
  As the availability of ground combat units will be limited, especially in the early stages, and that the transportation of reinforcement is associated with risks that can lead to significant delays, air forces, both Nordic and potentially deployed, will play an important role in initially delaying a Russian penetration on the ground.

Something that will require a development of basing possibilities in the North and the pre-storage of large quantities of weapons. Long-range ground-based combat systems will also play an important role in covering the large areas, both in the early and later stages of an operation. The number of ground combat units will always be limited in relation to the size of the area of operations. Conducting a static defense will therefore not be possible. The battle will therefore need to be conducted over very large areas, for example the Swedish and Finnish forces that primarily have to face an enemy advancing through northern Finland must therefore also be prepared to conduct attacks in a northerly direction into Finnmark. An offensive movement that may involve movements of several hundred kilometers. The argument that the need for ground combat in the Northern Calotte can be limited with the road-poor terrain, and the difficult terrain conditions in general, is often given too much weight. The area is exceptionally large by southern Swedish or continental measurements. The total land area of Troms, Finnmark, Swedish Lapland. Norrbotten and Finnish Lapland is around 85% of the area of Germany or almost twice the size of the entire Baltic States. The road network is also considerably denser than is apparent from a superficial view. The forest road network is extensive and there are rarely far between different road ends that allow to ‘jump’ from one road system to the to the next on load-bearing ground, thereby creating advance lanes. In addition, modern combat vehicles, both tanks and armored vehicles, have a significantly higher off-road capability than what was basis for Swedish war planning in the 50s, 60s and 70s. The trials that were conducted , among other things, during the purchase of a new tank in the early 1990s gave a frightening picture of how we had underestimated what vehicle development had entailed. There is a risk that that by relying too much on the terrain in northern Sweden and Finland can offer to an attacker make the same mistake that the French General Staff made in 1940, when it assumed that the defense of the Ardennes could be solved with
limited forces because the terrain there would not permit an advance with large units.
To this should be added tactical considerations. For example, what does it mean that it is the
attacker is the one who chooses the time and place for an attack. Something that, among other things means that he is likely to be the one who will be first in many cases, for example through helicopter airdrops, at locations where it is optimal to destroy the connections that would delay his advance.
Overall, the ingredients of NATO’s collection of capabilities to counter Russian operations in the High North and surrounding sea areas should consist of:

• a highly developed capability to conduct anti-submarine warfare and maritime security in
  the North Sea.
• the ability to protect bases and other in structure in northern Norway against both
  air attacks (including protection against various types of missiles and drones)
  as well as good capability to counter threats on the ground in the form of sabotage, raids
  and airdrops.
• the ability to respond in mobile combat to fairly extensive Russian ground operations in the entire
  area between the Russian border and Troms county in Norway.
• ability to use ground-based, long-range systems to combat ground targets.

• early deployment of large air combat forces with a good capability for ground target
  combat for operations in the northern Nordic region.
• ensure rail and road links from connections from south to north in Sweden.

Some conclusions for Sweden regarding the defense the Nordic region
Of the capabilities listed above, Sweden’s most important contribution in terms of the Alliance’s ability to meet and repel a Russian attack in the northern areas would primarily be tied to ground operations and air defense. Some areas that appear to be particularly urgent are:

• providing a large part of the ground combat required a couple of high mobility and strike capability;
  long-range indirect combat systems, such as rocket artillery; drones for both reconnaissance and weapons operations; fighter units for in the depths of the attacker’s territory of the aggressor.
• to create a base system for air combat forces in northern Sweden that allows for the
  of both Swedish and foreign air forces operations in the northern areas.
• to ensure the possibilities to transport Swedish and foreign units and supplies from southern Sweden to the northernmost parts of the country, that being able to protect and restore sensitive connections, which requires air defense, engineering units and extensive resources for protection and surveillance.
• Norrbotten’s central location in the area, and good connections both by rail, road, air and also by ship to Luleå suggests that Sweden should also play a central role in terms of logistics for operations in the North.

The above could constitute a rough orientation of the “Capability Targets” that NATO should set with regard to Swedish capabilities in the North.

Baltic Sea Region

The area can be roughly divided into the following areas Northern Baltic Sea with the Gulf of Bothnia , Åland and the Gulf of Finland which require certain specific capabilities, and the Southern Baltic Sea where the defense of the Baltics and related problems are completely decisive for NATO’s capabilities.

Northern Baltic Sea
The importance of the Bothnian Bay is mainly constituted by the need to be able to conduct maritime traffic between Sweden and Finland if ship movements on the Baltic Sea proper becomes too risky.
The possibility of maintaining maritime traffic between both countries is of great importance for Finland’s supply, but also for the supply of military reinforcements . To equivalent transportation by land would be more time-consuming, would not allow for the transportation of as large quantities of goods and likely to be affected by an attacker’s attempt to disrupt the north-south connections in in Sweden. Sea transportation via the Gulf of Bothnia is also a way to supply combat forces in northern
Sweden, Norway and Finland, if the land connections to the north of Sweden are interrupted
or disrupted.
The importance of Åland is a function of the need to protect maritime links in the Gulf of Bothnia as the possession of the archipelago provides opportunities to make it difficult, or even impossible, for Russian submarines from entering the Gulf of Bothnia. Should Russia succeed in occupying the archipelago and deploying long-range anti-aircraft and anti-ship combat systems, all shipping to southern Finland and the northern Baltics would be seriously hampered.

In addition, both Swedish and Finnish flight operations would be negatively affected. In addition to having to fly around to avoid the risk of combat in the air, there could be a threat to nearby air base areas. The route between Mariehamn and Arlanda or Uppsala is approximately 130 kilometers and it is about same distance to Turku. Not a great distance for a modern air defense system like the S 400, and nor for a rocket artillery system like the Russian Tornado, provided that target data can be obtained. The Gulf of Finland can be relatively easily closed to surface ships by grouping anti-ship missiles boats on Finnish and Estonian territory. Both countries have qualified such systems. The short distance between Finland and Estonia means that even the use of mines would be an effective way of blocking the bay for ship movements both on and under the surface. The bay is only 48 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Kronstadt’s former importance as a naval base has thus diminished considerably. However, because of new construction and repair activities. The base still has military significance. In the event of war probably mostly as a base for submarines that may have some opportunities to get in and out of the Gulf of Finland. Despite extensive German and Finnish mines during the Second World , it was not possible to prevent Russian submarines from entering the Baltic Sea until a submarine net was stretched from Naissaari in Estonia to Porkkala in Finland.

The southern Baltic Sea and the Baltic States strategic importance
The strategic importance of the Baltics is very much linked to a large extent to NATO’s credibility as a defense alliance. NATO must be able to make it credible that the Baltic countries can and will be defended. Should the alliance fail to create the required deterrence capability, in eyes of Russia, the risk that Russia’s imperial ambitions will once again extend to the Baltic countries. The consequences of such a failure would likely have repercussions both regionally and globally. In Europe, some states might start to pursue an adjustment policy out of fear, or with a focus on purely national interests, without regard to the security of all. The survival of the Alliance would be threatened. As already mentioned, linked to the need to maintain maritime links across the North Sea to the Nordic-Baltic area, the consequence of an unsuccessful response of the Baltics could be that US allies such as South Korea and Japan would begin to doubt both American willingness and ability to contribute to their defense and then consider their own nuclear weapons programs. Such thoughts have already been cautiously aired in both countries , indeed even in Germany.
How NATO’s, and thus by extension an American failure in the Baltics would be interpreted in Beijing, it is difficult to predict. However, the the likelihood that Taiwan’s security would increase is probably small.
NATO’s 2022 security strategy points to the need to stop an attacker early, including to avoid exposing the civilian population in occupied areas from terror and persecution similar to what has happened in Ukraine in recent years. A moral aspect that is intimately linked to the values the alliance was once created to protect.

Russian operational perspective

From a Russian perspective, a military operation directed against the Baltics is a relatively straightforward campaign. The countries have a long land border with their size, a long land border with Russia. The distances are fairly short, usually only around one to two hundred kilometers before a Russian attack reaches vital targets such as capital cities or ports and airfields. The latter are important for receiving reinforcements. The rapid deployment of large forces in the face an attack is facilitated by the Russian side’s well-developed rail and road network in the direction of the Baltics. A legacy from the time when the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union, and before that in the Tsarist Empire. For example, Latvia’s border with Russia and Belarus is crossed by some twenty better roads, including three European roads, and three railway lines. Large of the countries’ territory, together accounting for more than fifty percent of their total area, are also within artillery range of Russian or Belarusian territory. Also the use of drones also benefits from the relatively short distances. The basing of air combat forces in the Baltics and also the use of ports will be associated with major risks, unless effective countermeasures are taken. The Russian exclave of Kalingrad, together with Belarusian territory provides good conditions for creating flank protection for an operation in the Baltics. Building difficult to overcome defense lines in Belarus and Kaliningrad can be done long before an eventual attack on the Baltics. Blocking the so-called Suwalki Gap, the common the Polish-Lithuanian border, can only be done in the context of an attack launched. However, the gap is only 60 km wide and can probably be taken, and partially blocked including with mines, before NATO has time to act with larger forces. Moreover, the entire area can be covered from the outset with artillery fire from Kaliningrad and Belarus, area also allow the deployment of large numbers of smaller drones.

The fact that the Baltic States have a land border with Russia, there are good opportunities to protect the
the initial stages of the Russian operation against air attacks with air defense systems deployed on Russian and Belarusian territory. Much as is currently happening in Ukraine, and where the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 is the classic example. The possibilities of using its own aircraft will also be fairly good for Russia as its own air bases will be located close to the areas of operation in question.
The problem of isolating the Baltic States from the outside world in connection with a military operation targeting one or more Baltic countries is from the Russian point of view mainly linked how to prevent reinforcements from being from being brought to the area by air or by sea transport across the Baltic Sea. Then be able to use Gotland for the deployment of sensors and long-range air defense and anti-ship systems would be a distinct advantage. This would affect NATO’s transportation to the Baltic region . The Estonian islands of Ösel and Dagö would offer similar advantages as the possession of Gotland, but with the disadvantage that they would be more vulnerable to combat from the Estonian mainland.

NATO – operational perspective

The Baltic countries’ own armed forces are very small in relation to the threats they have to face. Roughly speaking, Estonia has two brigades and four territorial defense battalions. The country also has a British-led battalion led battalion under the NATO Forward Land Forces (FLF), the majority of the units are reasonably modern equipment: armored vehicles , tracked artillery and rocket launchers artillery and rocket launchers are present in some high-priority band ; Latvia has a standing brigade which which today also includes foreign components from what constitutes the FLF, and in addition local defense units organized as four terterritorial brigades ; Lithuania has three brigades and six territorial defense battalions, the German battalion in Lithuania is to be 2027 turned into a permanent stationary brigade. In all three Baltic countries continue extensive rearmament and modernization programmes, including the supply of modern artillery systems, armored personnel carriers and air defense systems. The foreign troops that are in the Baltics within the framework of the FLF, and which today constitute approximately one battalion combat group per country, will in the future be expanded to one brigade per country, but they will become full only after the elements that are not in place (normally the bulk of the brigade) are contributed from the respective home countries. Because the Baltic countries’ combined land border with Russia is long, in the order of seven hundred kilometers, and that the aggressor is numerically superior to create threats in several directions simultaneously and is also the one who can choose the time and location of an attack, he will only have to face limited elements of NATO assets in the Baltics where he is attacking. The forces that are normally present in the Baltics will always be insufficient to repel a Russian attack in the event that they cannot be reinforced. Above all in the form of qualified counter-attack units which can be rapidly deployed in the direction(s) where the attacker is massing, and air defense forces to counter the full range of air
threats: drones, missiles of various types and qualified attack aircraft. The problems associated with providing ground combat units to the Baltics are threefold: the general lack of such forces in the Alliance, especially among its European members; the possibilities to bring them there and the time aspect, they must not be late. As the time aspect largely determines how and when possible Swedish reinforcements in the Baltics can do the most good, the following here is a brief summary of  how the Swedish Defense Committee views other countries’, primarily the United States’, opportunities to strengthen the Nordic-Baltic region. In its report from April 26 this year, the defense committee assesses that the following time with regard to the provision of substantial resources: air forces days to weeks, naval forces weeks to months and ground forces months. To provide land reinforcements, there are there are several options. Multinational Corps North East (MCNE) with headquarters in Szczecin, in northern Poland, could be be an instrument for early reinforcement of the defense of the Baltics. Corps have no fixed division, they are supplied with resources according to need and location. The need to coordinate what is happening in the Baltics right now, including the setting up of three divisional staffs and to integrate existing units into those structures, however, means that the Corps is currently most focus on unit development and war planning in the Baltics. We are talking here about reduced divisions with two or three brigades and limited divisional resources. In the event of a war threat, the Corps can be reinforced.
At present, in 2024, it could possibly reinforced with one Polish and one German division, provided that they are given a few months for mobilization measures before the outbreak of war. Depending on the situation and the time available for preparations, it should not be ruled out that the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) may also have a role in this geographical area. This both to relieve the MNCNE but also to signal in a crisis situation that the Alliance is serious.

In the context of NATO planning, it is likely that US forces units may also have a role in this area, but even there it will take time before they can be in place. In the longer term, around 2030
NATO assets in Eastern Europe will have increased to a fairly large extent, mainly due to the fact that Poland is expected to have six divisions by then. Poland has also recently set up its own corps staff. However, it is questionable whether any corps, wherever it comes from, and even if has several subordinate divisions and has a fairly high level of readiness could reach the the territory of the Baltic States from Poland in when it is not too late. To do so, it must first break through the Suwalki Gap,
which Russia is likely to try to block as a blockade as a very first measure in the event of an possible attack on any Baltic country. In addition to physically blocking the gap itself with mines and mortars, the entire gap can be affected by indirect fire from both Kaliningrad and Belarus. It will not only be difficult and time-consuming to get through the gap, it will also have to be kept open so that thousands of vehicles, most of them unprotected trucks, can continuously pass through the gap to supply the fighting units who will advance several hundred kilometers in a northerly direction. It is about 250 kilometers as the crow flies from the Polish border to Riga. It is doubtful whether this is possible, unless
artillery and drone systems in Kaliningrad and Belarus that can re-mine cleared mines and combat vehicles crossing the gap have largely been knocked out beforehand. It is therefore likely that both Kaliningrad as well as nearby parts of Belarus will also have to be as part of an operation to enable larger forces to advance through the gap. Something that could be both difficult and time-consuming. The fighting in Ukraine over the last two years have clearly demonstrated the difficulties of knocking out defense grouped units which are supported by fieldwork and indirect fire. Which in itself should not be as surprising as it may sometimes seem in the debate. It is rare for campaigns to have like the Six-Day War in 1967 or the Kuwait War in 1990, when a rapid advance into the depths of the opponent’s group led to the collapse of the defenses within days. All in all, there are reasons to consider solutions other than an
advance through the Suwalki Gap to support the Baltics with ground combat units in the early
stages of a conflict. The alternative, if land is a doubtful possibility, is to fly and sea the the necessary reinforcements across the Baltic Sea. The threats to such a solution also appear more manageable. The Russian naval Baltic Sea bases, Baltiysk and Kronstadt, are both difficult to utilize after the outbreak of war.
Any resources in Kronstadt are in practice trapped in the Gulf of Finland. Possibly with the exception of submarines that might be able to past the Finnish and Estonian anti-ship missiles and mines that are intended to block all traffic in and out of the Gulf of Finland. Perhaps the greater threat is the Russian naval forces in the Baltic Sea, in Kaliningrad. But even there questionable are the chances of Russian vessels survive both at the quayside and if they trying to get out into the Baltic Sea. The naval port Baltiysk is less than 40 kilometers from Polish territory and can therefore, be reached by artillery fire without major problems. It can be with both conventional and homing shells. The entire Frisches Haff is less than 50 kilometers from the Polish border and does not offer any sheltered anchorages.
The distance to Baltisjk from the Lithuanian border is less than 120 kilometers, beyond normal
artillery range but well within range of rocket artillery, such as HIMARS, which is being procured for the Lithuanian defense with delivery in 2025.

It is also difficult for ships, including submarines to enter the Baltic Sea as it can only be done through about four to hundred meters wide channel. It is not only Russian submarines that can lay mines, so can NATO. The overall conclusion regarding the threat to NATO maritime transportation in the Baltic Sea is that Russian surface forces will have very limited possibilities of coming into action, to the extent that the vessels have before the outbreak of war, knowing that it will be their only effort.
An eventuality which should not be neglected for example, as part of a coup d’état occupation of some important coastal area or some island. Russia’s means to influence the supply of reinforcements and supplies to the Baltics by sea will consist not only of submarines and land-based and airborne missiles, but also submarine-launched and airdropped mines. Weighing up the Russian perspective and the resulting need for NATO to be able to act as a deterrent as well and, if necessary, to defend the Baltic states, a list of desirable capabilities in the Baltic Sea region would look something like this:

• to prepare the Baltic States through peacetime in the form of field operations that can be protected with various weapon systems whose effects can be rapidly deployed to threatened areas, already close to the border, could force an attacker into time-consuming and costly attacks.
• to be able to protect infrastructure that is crucial for receiving reinforcements against an enemy advancing on the ground, and against a very wide range of air threats. The ability to conduct counter-attacks and air defense systems against different types of targets is most important.
• that foreign aid and reinforcements can be delivered in several steps, following the principle ‘better a little delivered on time, than a lot delivered too late”. The sequence of steps could be: rapid/immediate air and missile operations; a first round of ground combat units that have material pre-stored in the Baltics and flown in; early transportation of heavier units from the immediate area which can fight to buy time until more distant long-range reinforcements can arrive.
• to defend the islands in the Baltic Sea: Gotland, Ösel, Dagö and Åland already before the outbreak of war.
• that the naval forces in the Baltic Sea have good air defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect maritime transport, and also have ships with good mine clear mines to keep shipping lanes and ports.
• offensive ground combat capabilities in Poland and Germany that is powerful enough to with high ambition to carry out an offensive into the Baltics, even if is in the rearguard.

Several of the capabilities that should exist are under development, including: fortification
measures at the Baltic states’ borders with Russia with Russia, the development of the countries’
forces to be able to protect areas important for receiving reinforcements, as well as pre-stocking of material to enable forces that are part of the FLF can be quickly be rapidly reinforced with influxes of personnel. What is missing are additional air and ground combat units that can reinforce the initial deployments, while waiting for larger reinforcements, mainly from the United States have time to arrive. There is also a shortage of naval ships to protect transportation across the Baltic Sea, especially in the early stages of a possible conflict.

Some conclusions for Sweden concerning the defense of the Baltic Sea region

Sweden has good opportunities to contribute to the defense of the Baltics, and thereby also
increase NATO’s deterrence capability. The strategic consequences of the Alliance failing to defend the Baltics in particular means that Swedish contributions must be assessed from a a strategic point of view, and not only with operational eyes. The following summary of desirable capabilities may therefore, in relation to its limited size, have a disproportionate importance when it comes to impact on security in Northern Europe.
Sweden should:

• have prepared for a very early reception of of the air forces of other countries at Swedish
  Swedish bases and support their deployments operations in the Baltics,
• be able to carry out a comprehensive and early deployment of ground combat units in the
  Baltic region, some brigades, to cover the time gap between a possible Russian
  attack and until more distant reinforcements can arrive,
• contribute to the defense of coastal areas on the other side of the Baltic Sea e.g. Ösel and Dagö, have a good capability to protect maritime transport in the Baltic Sea against submarine and air threats.
• be able to conduct operations with Swedish submarines to both hunt down Russian submarines and to help ensure that Russian naval forces are unable to leave their bases,
• already in the early stages, without extensive preparation and transportation of resources
  be able to defend Gotland against a limited Russian attack.

Here it may be worth recalling the old truth that a credible plan to provide reinforcements/be able to intervene can also contribute to deterrence. Credible planning for Sweden, within the framework of the Alliance’s can quickly contribute substantial resources in support of the defense of the Baltics is therefore perhaps Sweden’s most important contribution to continued stability in the Baltic Sea region.

Conclusion

The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO has very significantly improved the Alliance’s ability to defend the entire Nordic-Baltic region. The defense of the Nordic region can be coordinated and the countries’ armed forces will find it easier to support each other. Norway can thus more clearly concentrate its resources to the region, which is strategic Nordic perspective, crucial task of helping to keep the sea routes to Europe and Scandinavia open. This by making it more difficult for Russian ships, submarines and airborne anti-ship systems to come into effect. Sweden and Finland’s joint role in countering a Russian advance on the ground in the Nordic region is clarified is clarified and can be prepared in effective way. Finland’s operational depth for conducting operations will increase and the protection of sea and air  links can be coordinated with Sweden. Swedish territory can be utilized, and preparations made, to support the Baltic countries increases the Alliance’s ability to defend them against a Russian attack. A
clear direction for the Swedish defense power to help cover the time gap in the Baltic that exists before ground combat units from countries outside the immediate reaches the area, would further contribute to increasing the Alliance’s deterrence capability. At present, all countries in the region, with the possible exception of Finland, have serious gaps in contributing through credible warfighting capabilities to contribute to the Alliance’s deterrence capability. The problems and shortcomings are correctable, and some are already being addressed, but the next few years give cause for concern.

The author Karlis Neretnieks is a major general and member of the
KKrVA, former rector of the National Defense
lan, operations commander in the eastern military area
and Brigade Commander on Gotland.

UPD1 [..] In Latvia, the operation is led by a Danish divisional staff. The plan is for Sweden and Denmark to take turns in setting up a battalion as part of a brigade based outside Riga. The Danish and Swedish troop contributions will alternate on a six-monthly basis. The Swedish part will consist of a mechanized battalion starting in 2025 at the earliest. [..] avots