[..] My sense is that Russia sees itself in decline and therefore it needs to act quicker than China. That is why the use of force in Ukraine and the threat of use of force in the wider European region are means to achieve quicker gains.[..]
[..] Russia may not engage in open military confrontation, but act under the threshold of NATO’s Article 5. There are multiple scenarios that one can conceive for such an action below the military horizon. And in this case, there may be very little political will among NATO allies to call for an expeditionary force. In brief, there are two problems we face: one is the timeframe of the threat, the other is the type of the attack that might occur. That is why the Wales summit had more of a rhetorical than practical impact. To deter against a limited war, it is necessary first and foremost to increase costs for the aggressor at the very outset of his operations – and this means to strengthen the ability of local forces to respond quickly and effectively. To promise a response hours, if not days, after the war has started (and in fact, when operations may have already ended, having achieved the purpose of the limited war), does nothing to shore up deterrence against this type of threat.[..]
[..] If you look at the Georgia and Ukraine wars and apply that template to a Baltic state the problem is that in a politically divided alliance by the time it has any semblance of political unity the Russians already have accomplished in the first 48 hours whatever territorial objectives they had, long before a spearhead force can arrive. What this suggests is that defense in depth doesn’t work against limited war.[..]
Jakub Grygiel is the George H. W. Bush Associate Professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University
vara bungas: Pirmais citāts gluži kā no VB mutes izrauts 🙂 Intervija no “must read” sērijas, lai pārliecinātos, ka ne tikai mēs domājam pareizi. Izcēlimi VB. Pamanījāt, ka pēdējā laikā 5.panta liecinieki pieklusuši?