[..] A war fought against Russian A2/AD capabilities would be fundamentally different than one fought against China, because the dominant domain of warfare in Europe will be on the ground. This changes the counter-A2/AD problem in a number of ways. First, defeating aggression on the ground is harder than defeating an amphibious invasion. Russia does not have to load its army onto vulnerable transport ships to invade its neighbors. Second, speed would be of the essence in mounting an effective defense. The slow, deliberate “peel the onion” approach that DoD has adopted thus far to counter A2/AD capabilities is inadequate in Europe, where it would risk ceding ground to an aggressor, who could then seek a negotiated solution with redrawn borders. The United States must therefore be prepared to defeat aggression on the ground within range of an adversary’s still extant A2/AD capabilities. This is a dramatic shift for U.S. ground forces, who have fought for half a century under the protective umbrella of U.S. airpower. In ground combat inside A2/AD areas, however, U.S. ground forces could find themselves fighting within range of an enemy’s missiles that threaten U.S. aircraft and bases. Yet ground forces will still need to halt an enemy’s advance, even while operating with reduced air cover and potentially subject to enemy air attacks. [..]
Uncertain Ground: Emerging Challenges in Land Warfare
vara bungas: Autors runājot par Ķīnas A2/AD apraksta Taivānas aizstāvēšanas modeli. Baltijā viss ir savādāk, kā jau vairākkārt teicu RU A2/AD ieroču sistēmas (PGA, OTRK) tur Baltiju savā darbības radiusu “burbulī” pat neizbraucot no boksiem. Līdz ar to alternatīvas savlaicīgi izvietotam un aizsargātām sabieroto bāzēm nav. Netraucētu arī FI un īpaši SE dalība NATO. Citādi visticamāk nekādi VJTF vienkārši netiks ielaisti mūsu AOR.
vara bungas 
Interesanti ko tas varētu nozīmēt http://www.delfi.lv/news/arzemes/polija-aizsardzibas-ministrijas-parstavji-iebruk-nato-centra-lai-nomainitu-amatpersonas.d?id=46857381
Opozīcija pārņem varu. Ja piemēram RD varu pārņemtu NA nedodu ne pieci, ka rātsnamam netiktu nomainīta atslēga.
Pēc būtības centrs Krakova ir tāds pats centre of excellence kā “mūsējais” Stratcoms, pieredzes apmaiņas un ideju workshops. Nekas vairāk.
http://www.globalpost.com/article/6662710/2015/10/05/nato-open-counter-espionage-hub-poland
“This is an issue for the Polish authorities,” “The Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence in Poland has not yet been accredited by NATO,”
Ja tas notiktu pašvaldībā, tad tā būtu izrāde vietējai publikai. pagaidīsim ar ko tas beigsies- ar kaunu un atvainošanos vai arī ar ignorēšanu no pārējo valstu puses.
šis ārišķīgais pašlepnums drīzāk izskatās pēc sabotāžas nekā savu interešu aizstāvības. Baltijas reģionam tas tikai nāks par sliktu!
Sakars tam visam ar pieejas nogriešanu krieviem, ko iepriekšējā poļu “it kā pro-eiropeiskā” valdība sadarbojoties ar čekas pēctečiem FSB bija nodrošinājusi:
FSB at home in Warsaw Behind-the-scenes cooperation between the Civic Platform coalition government and FSB spies. – http://www.currenteventspoland.com/analysis/FSB-at-home-in-Warsaw.html
“The Polish Ministry of Defense terminated an agreement signed between Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Also, Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz recalled Col. Krzysztof Dusza and Col. Piotr Pytel from the Expert Center for NATO’s Counterintelligence Operations. They were both part of the SKW directorate during the time when the agreement with FSB was signed, allowing for impunitive infiltration into Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service.
“We were able to establish, that cooperation with FSB continued practically to the end of the PO-PSL coalition government, despite Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Under the terms of this cooperation, at least one training course was conducted in the Russian Federation, during which at least a few SKW functionaries took part.”
According to information obtained, which is presently being verified, security clearance documents of the above mentioned individuals are currently being reviewed. One of the reasons for initiating this review process is the role of these individuals during the previous government’s term in office in the execution of the SKW-FSB cooperation agreement.”
jaunā politiskā elite maina ierēdņus atslēgas posteņos, viss normas robežās, ziņa piesaista uzmanību tikai ar “NATO”un “counterintelligence” pieminēšanu. Turklāt tas PL CI centrs nav saņēmis akreditāciju un nepastāv de jure kā NATO institūcija.
Varbūt tāpēc arī nebija akreditēts?