In today’s security environment, sub-conventional weapons may no longer be confined to sub-strategic targets. Weaponized social media, widespread open-source information that used to be the exclusive domain of intelligence collection, and an increasingly “post-truth” atmosphere suggest a new and dangerous battlespace. In this context, small wars could quickly morph into big wars in ways that are difficult to anticipate or manage, perhaps rendering traditional military conflict “overrun by events” before the shooting starts and prompting consideration of tools and options normally reserved only for crises of existential proportion.
vara bungas: Garš raksts par to, ka mūsdienās šķietami sīks bruņots konflikts pelēkā zonā var ātri pāraugt par kodolkaru un nebruņots konflikts arī var, ja pietiekami daudz ir ieguldīts dezinformācijā. Mazs piemērs, Backas blefs par NATO “draudīgo koncentrāciju” iepretī Grodņai, legalizēja RU spēku pastāvīgo rotāciju (klātbūtni) BY, kas vecajos labajos bipolaras pasaules laikos nebūtu tik viegli izdarāms, jo tiktu uzskatīts par draudu indikatoru, kas prasa rīcību. Kopumā kodolvalstu lēmējiem arvien lielāks kārdinājums rīkoties ātri un izlēmīgi (lasi: agresīvi), kamēr datu un “troķšņu”, uz kuru analīzes pamata šādi lēmumi tiek pieņemti kļūst arvien vairāk, līdz līmenim, kad tos vairs nevar ne apstrādāt, ne izprast. Šādā realitātē nev neiespējami, ka kāda trešā valsts sarīda uz kodolkaru divas citas.
[..] Advanced technology is also blurring the threshold between conventional and strategic conflict, including the increasing commingling of nuclear and conventional payloads on non-ballistic missile delivery systems such as hypersonic vehicles, long-range cruise missiles, or extended-range torpedoes, as well as ever more effective missile defenses. Similarly, conventional and strategic warning and surveillance assets and advanced command-and-control capabilities continue to be integrated in ways that potentially undermine escalatory firebreaks by creating new counterforce or precision strategic-strike opportunities and enhancing the potential efficacy of missile defenses. These developments may bolster incentives to move first and fast in a high-end conventional fight. As traditional firebreaks between conventional and nuclear warning and delivery systems erode and the strategic effects of cyber and space operations multiply, the ability to manage and maintain strategic stability grows more difficult.
[..] strategic stability at the nuclear level could actually encourage or enable conflict at lower levels of the spectrum, especially through the use of surrogates or proxies. Seemingly, this allowed great powers not only to keep small wars and big wars separate, but also to engage in levels of sub-strategic conflict and competition even as the risks of nuclear war appeared to abate. Several behavioral rules seemed to help limit escalatory risks associated with this type of conflict, including not attacking the central territory of the adversary state, operating via surrogates and third parties where possible, and encouraging strategic transparency and crisis communications [..]
[..] cyber- and space-based threats are ever more capable of achieving strategic effects, raising concerns about the role of nuclear weapons in deterring their use. At the same time, most nuclear-armed states are expanding advanced dual-use (nuclear and conventional) delivery systems and integrating many of their early warning, command-and-control, and surveillance capabilities across conventional and nuclear missions[..]
[..] advanced nuclear-armed states may become dependent upon conventional surveillance and targeting systems to provide strategic warning. For example, hypersonic weapons, boost-glide systems, long-range cruise missiles, and other capabilities are designed to elude traditional U.S. early-warning systems (e.g., radars and satellites), reduce confidence in strategic warning, and defeat American missile defenses. To counter these new delivery systems, the United States may have to rely on conventional situational awareness systems, including systems that are more visible or intrusive, to provide nuclear warning, support nuclear missions, and supplement strategic situational awareness. If an adversary were to discover and target these surveillance systems, would such an attack be considered conventional or strategic?[..]