Afterītis (papildināts)

vara bungas: Garš lasāmgabāls, bet absolūti obligāts izlasīšanai. Autorss Dens Raiss US virsnieks, kas bija/ir UA virspavēlnieka ģenerāļa Zalužnija padomnieks. Ļoti vērtīgs ieskats UA kara pirmajās dienās. Te tikai daži citāti…

[..]Briefly, General Zaluznny sought to change the culture from the old Soviet-style top-down hierarchical leadership to a much more western approach.  This required pushing down decisions to the point where decisions needed to be made, creating leaders who took the initiative based on the ‘leaders’ intent” and create a learning environment by performing ‘Lessons Learned’ exercises (in the US we call these After Action Reviews) after all activities, large and small, across the entire army. When the Russians attacked, all dispersed units needed to be able to take the initiative on their own, knowing the Russians would be hitting them with Electronic Warfare (EW) and jamming all communications.  US 10^th Special Forces Group, US Army National Guard and NATO Special Operations helped train 26,000 Ukrainian soldiers to help with this culture change, helped create Special Operations Forces (SOF) and put 500 Ukrainians through US Army trained Special Forces Q-Course, created psychological operations (PSYOPS), information operations (I/O), Strategic Communications (STRATCOM), engaged the Ukrainian population with more stories of Heroes of Ukraine (similar to our Medal of Honor).  The Army of 2022 was much more professional and prepared than the Army of 2014^[6]. [..]

The Russians’ armored columns were not dispersed and spread out across a massive plain, as in the World War II during the largest tank battle in history at the Battle of Kursk (500 east of Kyiv).  In hindsight the Russian desire for need for offensive speed and mass, vs dispersed security and maneuver, was a poor strategy.   Instead, these massive, armored columns were attacking in formation on multiple lane highways in convoys that were up to 40 miles long.  Javelins fired from up to a mile away with precision accuracy, completely destroying the first tanks or BMPs could stall the whole column. Then pre-sighted artillery claimed the majority of Russian casualties. For several days the 40-mile armored column north of Kyiv was stalled after sustaining massive casualties. [..]

Russian electronic warfare (EW) was vicious and effective at the beginning of the Battle for Kyiv. The Ukrainian forces were often “blinded” by it, it took down their eyes and ears, and often fell back to old fashioned runners when their communications went down. The two commanders with whom I spoke shook their heads when remembering it^[8].  They noted that Russian artillery, EW, and drones were superior in every way, to include in significant numerical superiority.  Despite these disadvantages, however, it was superior leadership, morale, innovation and the will to fight for their country that favored the Ukrainians.   [..]

At the pivotal point in the Battle for Kyiv, on 21 March 2022, the 72nd Brigade for Ukraine was taking huge losses. The Brigade Commander Colonel Vdovychenko Oleksandr, called the Commander-in-Chief, General Zaluzhnyy, and requested permission to withdraw.  Zaluzhnny told him that if he withdrew, and the Russians pushed through the chokepoint, and flooded into Kyiv, they would lose Kyiv and likely the war.  

General Zaluzhnny ordered Colonel Olesksandr to fight to the last soldier.  Oleksandr’s unit did not withdraw and held fast.  They fired many more Stingers, NLAWs and Javelins.  And eventually the Russians withdrew.  The world almost lost Kyiv and thus Ukraine. As that Brigade Commander in Moschun personally told me that story, he said “nature and people saved Ukraine that day.”   When asked how the Stingers and Javelins performed, he raised his thumb, with a destroyed Russian armored personnel carrier behind him that was taken out by a Javelin from 1 kilometer, held up his thumb and said in English “super”.[..]

You’ll be fighting with robotic tanks and ships and airplanes,” Milley said. “We’ve witnessed a revolution in lethality and precision munitions. What was once the exclusive province of the United States military is now available to most nation states with the money will to acquire them.”  “We can no longer cling to concepts and organizations and weapons of the past. We may not have divisions and corps of the past. We may not have tanks and Bradley’s, carriers, or manned fighters and bombers.”

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UPD1 Svarīgs papildinājums par REC no kara pirmajām dienām.

[..] One Ukrainian officer told Christian Brose, an aide to the late U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., how Russian info warriors tricked a commander into returning a wireless call from his mother. When he did, they geolocated him in mid-call and killed him with precision rockets, Brose wrote in the book “The Kill Chain.”[..]

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