Draudu nav! Nu, gandrīz

vara bungas: Uzlādēju pīpi un ar baudu izlasīju RAND jaunāko ziņojumu par RU aktivitāti Eiropā.

[..]This report examines current Russian hostile measures in Europe and forecasts how Russia might threaten Europe using these measures over the next few years[..] some U.S. analysts of Russia note lower Russian interests and objectives for influence in the Baltics. [..] willingness to commit significant resources appear to be greater for other former Soviet republics [..]

šeit

  • VB: Man šķiet, ka mūsdienās par termina   “former Soviet republic” lietošanu jāsit ar svečturi pa seju. Vienīgā republika, kas pievienojās savienībai puslīdz  brīvprātīgi bija pati RU.
  • VB: jauna definīcija… ” term hostile measures encompasses a wide range of political,
    economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military activities that could
    be perceived as harmful or hostile” Tātad tas ir visa veida nedraudzīga darbība, kas nav kinetisks vai kiber uzbrukums, noteikti, ka  lawfare arī te iederās.
  • “we cannot definitively prove the absence or existence of Russian influence” VB: nezinu vai lasīt tālāk?
  • “Russian way of operating—increasing tension to create crisis and opportunity that Russia can then exploit” VB: Ok.
  • ” given the intensive focus on internal security in the Baltic states, it will be difficult for Russian covert action to achieve a major change in the Baltic countries’ alignment without
    support from overt forces that would, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, bring support from NATO countries”  VB: tātad,  jo vairāk stiprināsim politisko un ekonomisko  neatkarību, jo lielāka  kļūs tieši bruņota konflikta iespējamība. Tā viš ir… NBS attīstība nedrīkst atpalikt no valsts izaugsmes citās jomās.
  • “Baltic countries tend to prioritize the risks posed by conventional Russian military aggression in seeking assistance from their allies. ” VB: Protams, skat. augstāk.
  • “but there are risks of a large allied military presence in the region facilitating Russian hostile measures: Russia might take aggressive action because it perceives a threat, and local Russian speakers might oppose an allied military presence. ” VB: Neesmu pamanījis šādus signālus no ru-runājošiem, ja kādam nepatīk NATO, tad neatkarīgi no tās klātbūtnes apmēra. Drīzāk autori formulē attaisnojumu Rietumiem, lai militārā klātbūtne 3B būtu ierobežota.
  • “U.S. bilateral engagement bolstering capabilities relevant to both conventional conflict and hostile measures [..] also be especially beneficial [..] VB: Labi, bet  tad jābūt NBS pašu spējām, kuras US bilaterāli stiprinās. Esošais atbalsta līmenis zināms un apsveicams, tā palielināšana, gan nav manāma. Mēs joprojam pērkam nevis saņemam US bruņojumu.
  • “Russia has cultivated relationships with extremist parties throughout Europe, particularly
    on the far right—and, for reasons quite apart from Russian actions, these parties are on the rise. Given Europe’s ongoing challenges in the areas of economics, terrorism, and immigration, these extremist parties will pose a significant vulnerability for Europe over the near term.”  VB: Tā, kuri mums te būs labējie ekstrēmisti-populisti?  NA un TS – soli uz priekšu, nākt un taisnoties!
  • “the Army should develop counterintelligence, public affairs, civil affairs, and other key enablers to better counter Russian hostile measures.” VB: Godīgi sakot līdz šim neesmu manījis nekādu vērā ņemamu US Army PR aktivitāti, kas būtu  adresēta  speciāli LV publikai, ja neskaita malkas ciršanu bērnu namam. Tā kā PR darba nearts lauks.
  • “Hence, although Russia does have agency in creating and utilizing tension in Europe, it operates in an opportunistic fashion, exploiting circumstances, as they arise, to achieve its strategic ends.” VB: Pareizi , mūsu kļūdas ir viņu uzvaras. Piedodiet par kārtējo atgādinājumu, bet  Saeimas pozīcijas un opozīcijas vienotība (jau vairākus sasaukumus) B/OMD  noliegšanā prasa izskaidrojumu.
  • “Russian influence over groups or individuals within a country is a fundamental element of its use of hostile measures. However, individuals and groups could fall under a range of several types or forms of influence—some individuals might directly follow Russia’s orders; others
    might share similar interests on a given topic.”
  • ” one analyst in Latvia highlighted that Russia had decided to support anti–gay marriage leg-
    islation in order to gain support from conservative parties,” VB:  te laikam par Stambulas konvenciju ir runa.  Domāju par to  katram lasītājam būs savs viedoklis.
  • “Efforts by Russia to increase the leverage of a proxy can go along with diminishing control or alignment of interests, and efforts to increase Russia’s control might diminish the leverage of a given proxy” VB:Tas ir,  piemēram, RU publiskais atbalsts  SC var mazināt SC ietekmi un kaitēt RU mērķu sasniegšanai. Nudien tā tas ir.  SC līgums ar “Jedinaja Rossija” nenāca par labu SC.
  • ” Russia might have reason to believe that NATO is more likely to abandon the Baltics than other members. In discussions, U.S. policy analysts sometimes questioned the original admission of the Baltics to NATO while acknowledging that they should be defended now as
    members of the alliance. ”  VB: Nepatīkami to dzirdēt, bet izskatās, ka tā ir taisnība. 3B kā čemodāns bez roktura. Nest ir grūti, pamest – žēl.
  • “In Estonia, one study claimed that 37  percent of Russian speakers are either “success-
    fully integrated” or are “Russian-speaking patriot[s]” while many of those who have not integrated are older, former Soviet citizens. It is generally agreed that integration has gone better in Latvia— one-third of marriages are interethnic, 15 percent of those serving in Lat-
    via’s armed forces are Russian speakers, and 64 percent of Russian speakers identified as either strongly or moderately “affiliated to Latvia” in a 2014 survey. ”  VB: Viss kā dziesmā – mēs esam čempioni mani draugi, mēs cīnīsimies līdz galam…
  • “The absence of a significant, clear, or concerted campaign initiated by Moscow does
    not mean that one could not emerge in the future, however.”  VB: Tā nu absence… ru-runājošie tiek informatīvi apstrādāti gluži plānotā veidā un apjomā.
  • “The confidence of Estonian and Latvian officials also reflects the relatively well-developed security forces of these countries. Their focus and ability to monitor Russian groups is demonstrated by the publications from the internal security services in these countries
    and reflected in discussions with officials and analysts.  In some cases, this attention might become counterproductive when groups that reflect the genuine and legitimate concerns of the Russian  speaking community are identified as tools of Russia—Estonia’s Centre Party and Latvia’s Harmony Centre might be the best examples.” VB: nu nav tas labākais piemērs, SC šo frāzi izmantos savā labā. Bet šis piemērs nav nejaušs. Autori gribētu redzēt SC LV valdībā.
  • “Russia has other means to influence the politics of the Baltic states besides creating ethnic tensions. One such tool is to support policies or legislation that would divide the Baltic states from the EU and/or lead to greater political or ideological alignment with Moscow.” VB:Tas tiesa, labējiem konservatīviem spēkiem vajadzētu atrast zelta vidusceļu, lai nepūstu gaisu RU stabulēs pamatoti kritizējot EU. Nepamatota ES kritika ir “vienos vārtos” par labu RU.
  • “it is worth identifying two different strategies that shed light on how Russia might approach conflict in the Baltics. First, Russia used snap exercises to launch an operation by Spetsnaz and other ground forces to rapidly seize Crimea, supported by information operations, intelligence, and other techniques. Russia then annexed and consolidated control over the territory. Second, Russia’s operations in eastern Ukraine had a quite distinctive character and evolved over the course of 2014. It appears that Russia initially used proxies and intelligence assets to shift the trajectory of protesters supporting Ukraine President Viktor Yanukovitch toward separatism.” VB: Tēzi par protestiem jāiegaumē, bet par pēkšņām mācībām pie LV robežām sen saku, ka tām  jākalpo par trigeri gatavības pārbaudēm NBS un vienību štābu pāriešanai lauka režīmā.
  • “After Russian forces helped seize the area, separatist leaders might declare their intent to secede and be annexed into Russia, which would make Russia’s intention to
    defend the area with nuclear weapons more credible.” VB: Tas nenozīmē, RU tiešān lietos MII Baltijā, bet ļoti ticami draudēs to darīt, kas pamatīgi un ne par labu mums  ietekmēs Rietumu  lēmuma izstrādes  procesu.
  • “The Baltic countries have plans to rapidly defeat pro-Russian forces and force Russia to escalate the conflict or accept the defeat of its proxies.” VB: Varbūtība, ka  RU necentīsies eskalēt ir ļoti, ļoti zema. Paradoksāli, bet panākumi zaļo cilvēciņu un viņu draugu apkarošanā vienā valsts reģionā automātiski nozīmēs nepieciešamību nekavējoties izsludināt izņēmuma stāvokli visā valstī un sākt vispārējo mobilizāciju.
  • “You should not allow them to enter”  VB: tā teica Riho Terras, tā ir ļoti pareiza izpratne par zaļo cilvēciņu apkarošanu. Nekādu “Slavjansku 2.0 “nedrīkst pieļaut jau kopš paša sākuma. Tas prasa  ļoti ātru politiskā  lēmuma pieņemšanu un NBS gatavību zibenīgi uz to reaģēt.
  • “Further research needs to be done to understand how the Baltic countries would fare against well-trained Russian special forces or local militias backed by Russian forces and to understand how the Baltic forces might adopt asymmetric tactics to fight a conventional Russian force. ” VB: Kā saka “welcome” pētīt, LV acīmredzami paļaujās uz NATO resursiem, bez eFP atbalsta spēja cīnīties ir ļoti ierobežota (ne vairāk kā 1/3 no NBS).
  • “Russian economic influence is largely exercised through Russian companies. “
  • ” Covert military action remains a concern, although the Baltic countries, bolstered by a con-
    ventional NATO force, can likely counter this threat short of a major Russian military operation.[..] Although corruption or other types of nonethnic political manipulation could have a dramatic effect, the Baltic states’ recent political stability and commitment to the rule of
    law suggest that Russian-sponsored corruption would likely have little systemic effect on the countries’ stability”  VB: Patīkami dzirdēt it īpaši par politisko stabilitāti 😉 LV atkal izbrauc uz kaimiņu rēķina. Sen ir teikts Baltijas valstis ir jāanalizē pa vienai.
  • “Russian hostile measures in the Baltics and Southeastern Europe have attracted considerable attention over the past several years, but Russian hostile measures against the rest of Europe are also on the rise.”
  • ” there are no obvious major vulnerabilities that Russia can easily exploit to its advantage within NATO. Indeed, there generally seems to be an inverse correlation between the likelihood of Russia employing tactics and those tactics’ potential impacts on NATO and U.S. security. For example, although Russia currently produces propaganda, engages in targeted corruption, and uses economic pressure—and will likely continue to do all this for the foreseeable future, the
    impact of these tactics on European security and U.S. interests has been questionable at best. Conversely, the likelihood that Russia will use covert or denied military means—little green men—in a NATO country appears quite low, although such activity, if it were adopted,
    could pose a significant risk of escalating to full-scale conflict. In other words, in assessing the risk of Russian hostile measures over the next few years, there seem to be trade-offs between probability and risk.” VB: Citiem vārdiem:  Militārā konflikta varbūtība ir zema, bet ja tas notiks, tad pilnvērtīga kara risks ir liels. Dimžēl tāda ir RAND galvenā prognoze, ko  katrs var tulkot pēc savas patikas.
  • [..] some countries, especially the Baltic states, might not be supportive of U.S.-led actions to increase resilience to Russian hostile measures. For example, the Baltic countries believe that they should have the lead role in developing policy toward Russian speakers and tend to downplay the concerns of Russian speakers in their country. It is unclear how to persuade Baltic countries of the need for U.S. assistance,  but tying greater
    U.S. military assistance to accepting outside aid might be feasible.[..] VB: Pat nezinu, ko kolēģiem ieteikt, ja viņi redz LV stiprināšanu kā piekāpšanos RU spiedienam (piemēram ņemot  SC valdībā) apmaiņā pret US militāro palīdzību. Tas nu gan būtu riskanti.

VB: Pētījuma turpinājums ir veltīts Rietumeiropas, Centrāleiropas un Dienvideiropas valstīm. Ir vērts iepazīties,  daudz vērtīgu atsauču un  citātu. Tas ko es neatradu šajā ziņojumā un nezinu, kā to tulkot, ir analīzes par Baltkrieviju neesamība. Iespējams top kāds atsevišķs pētījums, bet nudien mūsdienās nevar rakstīt par 3B drošību apejot Baltkrievijas faktoru.

 

 

One thought on “Draudu nav! Nu, gandrīz

  1. “tātad, jo vairāk stiprināsim politisko un ekonomisko neatkarību, jo lielāka kļūs tieši bruņota konflikta iespējamība. Tā viš ir”
    Nu bet vai tad varēja gaidīt ko savādāku? Sitīs pa vājo vietu.
    “Saeimas pozīcijas un opozīcijas vienotība (jau vairākus sasaukumus) B/OMD noliegšanā prasa izskaidrojumu.”
    Es sapratu, ka tas ir retorisks jautājums.
    “It is generally agreed that integration has gone better in Latvia…
    and 64 percent of Russian speakers identified as either strongly or moderately “affiliated to Latvia” in a 2014 survey. ” VB: Viss kā dziesmā – mēs esam čempioni mani draugi, mēs cīnīsimies līdz galam…”
    Domāju, ka tā ir nepareiza aptauju rezultātu interpretācija.
    “The confidence of Estonian and Latvian officials also reflects the relatively well-developed security forces of these countries. ”
    RAND slikti informēts.
    ” Pat nezinu, ko kolēģiem ieteikt, ja viņi redz LV stiprināšanu kā piekāpšanos RU spiedienam (piemēram ņemot SC valdībā) apmaiņā pret US militāro palīdzību. Tas nu gan būtu riskanti.”
    Anglosakši atkal dzīvo savā pasaulītē, kur tiek pieņemts, ka vienas puses piekāpšanas ir labas gribas žests un no pretinieka tiek sagaidīts tas pats.

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