Acīm neredzamas patiesības

vara bungas: Varam bez gala sapņot, ka cīņai ar UAS sapirksimies ievērojamā (pietiekamā) daudzumā Sky Sabre, NASAM vai analogus, pa to laiku mēs reāli varētu kļūt izcilnieki mānekļu, maskēšanas un maskēšanās mākslā pret optisko novērošanu no gaisa. Viss kas nepieciešams: zinātniska pieeja un metodisks atbalsts. LATpat kamuflāžas sērija liecina par ko pretēju, bet uz kļūdām mācas.

[..] In light of this threat, the British Army has recently ordered a short/medium-range [surface-to-air missile] system called Sky Sabre. If deployed forward in significant numbers, it should dramatically reduce the Army’s vulnerability to both surveillance and attack by hostile UAVs in situations where friendly air cover is unavailable,” he said.

Drones are not, however, invulnerable, he added. “U.S. and British Reapers and Predators in Syria had lots of problems with Russian electronic warfare. Since the Reaper can be targeted, you can imagine that less sophisticated platforms can be more easily affected,” he said.

Bronk expects that more militaries will spend more money on air defense to balance out the drone threat — “particularly countries which don’t have strong air forces.”

“One option is the Russian SA-17 system, which has a 75-kilometer range compared to the 10 kilometers of TB2 missiles, or the cheaper and more contained SA-15 with a 10-kilometer range. Western products include the [National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System] NASAMS, which already helps to defend Washington, D.C., with a roughly 15-kilometer range and the NASAMS 2 with a 30- to 40-kilometer range,” he said. [..]

Peter Roberts, the director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, said the world is waking up to the reality of modern warfare. “For a while there was the romantic view that either drones or tanks or missiles would win wars on their own,” he said. “There is no silver bullet on the battlefield, and this is an era which is rediscovering that.”

Roberts added that urban warfare is also undergoing a revival, as is the art of deception in war. “Whether it’s the Russians in Ukraine or the Iranians, the use of decoys is back — something we once knew about, then forgot in the 1990s.”

The world is also returning to an era of proxy wars, he said, from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh to Yemen.

“That means wars fought on the edge of great powers using mercenaries and sponsored guerilla groups and insurgents,” he said. “It also means more sophisticated weapons in the hands of smaller, nonstate groups like the Houthis in Yemen using cruise and ballistic missiles and drones. It is potentially very nasty.”



10 domas par “Acīm neredzamas patiesības

      • is it a surprise attack if everybody is talking about possibility now, and some are sounding warnings for at least a few months already?

      • First, there is no surprise anymore. Second, now is too early for large ground operations. as it mentioned in ICDS paper “encroaching muddy season [rasputitsa] is inhospitable to large-scale operations.” What they have at the end of the day? unfavorable conditions and non existent surprise. Of course they need some retribution for Medvedchuk humiliation and RU TV cancellation, but that cannot be casus belli. What we can expect before war is real good and big provocation which would happen much closer to summer season.

        • Yes, that is why the most likely scenario they imagine is escalation, to create the pretense for sending “peacekeeping forces”. It might not work, but the author thinks that Russia is in a forced position.

  1. “NASAMS 2 with a 30- to 40-kilometer range”

    Yeah, no.
    The finnish have said that it is nowhere near that.
    In any case, there will never be enough anti-aircraft missiles to combat such a threat. The only real option is to either dig in and camouflage (plus decoys) or keep the pace extremely high.

    • There is AMRAAM-ER missile designed for NASAMS somewhere about that. Anyway, missiles with active radar homing are far too expensive for such targets. Especially if they actually are air-to air missiles which is the case. Recent AIM-9X and AIM-120D cost about million. If You have air force, it has same sense – after You loose all aircraft, you still can use remaining missiles. But a million $ missile is not affordable for such countries like 3B.

  2. Keps tur atkal patriotiskus štampus sarakstīja no TV. Paši krievi oficiāli rakstīja, ka bārdaiņu “trieciendroni” ar EW traucējami nav (acīmredzami inerciālā sistēma ar barometrisko altimetru), bet par Pancir problēmām bija visai skaļš skandāls
    Vispār pret lētu dronu vienīgais racionālais līdzeklis ir ne stipri dārgāks kontrdrons, varbūt pat vairākkārtīgi lietojams. Nekādas “rocket science” burtiski. Pa spēkam arī kādam pašu uzņēmumam. Izmantojams arī citādi, teiksim izlūkošanai, novērošanai vai arī pat triecieniem.
    Nu un liela problēma nabagiem ir, ka “lētas raķetes” mērķi maz kāds uzstāda. Oficiāli tāds bija zviedru Bamsei, kura, izskatās, tā arī ir pamesta novārtā, jo paši zviedri nu iepērk Iris-T SLS ar raķetēm pa 400 000 gabalā. vēl ciešamas opcijas ir DĀR Umkhonto un turku Hisar. Pārējie piedāvā sistēmas ar gaisa kaujas raķetēm, kuru cena aug eksponenciāli ar katru jaunu versiju. Jo tajās realizē kaudzi zenītraķetēm neaktuālu prasību.


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