vara bungas: Kārtējā novērojumu porcija no RUSI (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies) par evolucionārām izmaiņām RU taktikā.
[..] Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops.[..]
VB: Domājams tas būs uiversāls kājnieku personāla sadalījums mūsdienu karā. Vidusmēra karavīri, trieciena berserki, spečuki, nolemtā masa. Kurai grupai tu pieskaitītu sevi?
[..] Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. [..]
VB: Zinu, mēs vajadzības gadījumā mobilizēsim būvnieku lobiju ™
[..] Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m. [..]
VB: Termālā maskēšana NBS? Dod Die-s tikt galā ar redzamo spektru.
[..] integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. [..]
VB: Testējam. Neguļam…
[..[ shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. [..]
VB: Smagie mīnmetēji ir ok, šķiet to jau visi saprot (īpaši UA), bet tiem vajag daudz kvalificētu apkalpju. VAD ir īstā vieta, kur tādas gatavot.
[..] Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires. [..]
VB: Ukraiņi veiksmīgi eksperimentē ar aizsargtīkliem (nejaukt ar maskēšanās tīkliem) pret klejojošo munīciju.
[..] Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. [..]
VB: Pat ta, ja 10K kritušo ukraiņu dronu mēnesī ir pārspīlējums, tas tomēr dod priekšstatu par to, kādam ir jābūt dronu piesātinājumam NBS = min. 4-5 gab. uz vadu (2 dežūrā gaisā, 2 rezervē, 1 treniņiem ).
[..] FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. [..]
VB: 500 kg sprāgstvielas kompensē 50 m neprecizitāti. Interesanti, JDAM var piekabināt pie An-2?
[..] wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. [..]
VB: RU iemācijsies izmantot UA civilo telekomunikāciju infrastruktūru (okupētajās teritorijās) savām vajadzībām. Mums ir laiks padomāt kā to nepieļaut, ja gadījumā kas.
[..] centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations.[..]
VB: Lūk šis ir, manuprāt, galvenais, bet ārpus kara apstākļiem šo procesu nevar atdarināt. Nav nāves briesmu.
vara bungas 
Interesantāko daļu izlaidi, kas izklausījās pēc totāla bullshita par AES 256 “…Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”
Tad komentārs no 4chan tieši par to pašu –
*****
It’s obviously the Ukrainians not using the Motorolla correctly.
>Ukie gets AES 256
>Uses it wrong, gets artyd
>Explains to west Russia decrypted it in real time to save face
>West has to take what they say at face value because we are the good guys
If the rest of the faggots in the thread actually read the report or at least searched the PDF, they would see the other paragraph on the matter.
“Another function of Russian EW troops is interception and decryption of Ukrainian military
communications. The Russian military is proving highly capable in this area. Ukrainian officers
recalled one incident in which the Russian headquarters gave pre-emptive warning to its units
of an artillery strike based on Ukrainian troops calling in a fire mission.56 The Ukrainian troops
were communicating with Motorola radios with 256-bit encryption, but it appeared that the
Russians were able to capture and decrypt these transmissions in near real time. The most likely
system for such functions is the Torn-MDM.57 When the Russians are not intercepting traffic,
Ukrainian units note that they are reliably able to suppress the receivers on Motorola radios out
to approximately 10 km beyond the FLET.58”
>Appeared
>Apparently
Notice the language RUSI is using to distance itself from the claim? Because they know either the claim is total bullshit but don’t want to flat out call the Ukies liars or they suspect the radio was used incorrectly.
Izlaidu, jo MUMS tas nav aktuāli. Cik NBS to Motorolu. Motorolas by design izmanto policija, civiliās aģentūras, tādēļ šifrēšana attiecīga – piemērota “pretinieka” spējām. Te drīzāk jāruna par to vai NBS masā prot izmantot rācijas šifrētā režīmā.
Gan jau ka prot, neuztraucies 😉
Tomēr kaut kā nav miera…
Stāsts faktiski par uguns jaudu, ja tā ir tad nav viegli ar to tikt galā. It sevišķi, ja vēl prot vizinaties/pabraukaties. Izrādās ka 152 mm sistēmas ir pārāk smagas/ pat lādiņi smagi un dod priekšroku 120 mm mīnmetejiem.
Tas stāsts, ka paspēj atšifrēt artilērijas pieprasījumu un pabrīdinat. Tas ir pilnīgs fufelis. Visi tāpat pēc pirmā blieziena ielien visdzilakajā kaktā un lēnam rāpo uz dziļāku kaktu.
Karadarbība vairumā notiek nedaudzos nelielos apbūvētos pleķīšos – Bahmuta, Avdejevka, Marjinka, Ugļedara – kur vairumam artilērijas atbalsta uzdevumu 7 km tāluma pietiek. Un dronu terora apstākļos mīnmetējs ir daudz vieglāk slēpjams.
AES265 (izmantojot esošās tehnoloģijas) praktiski nav atlaužams ar brute-force metodi un ir viens no visplašāk izmantotajiem šifrēšanas mehānismiem. Tas gan nenozīmē, ka nav iespējams atšifrēt komunikāciju, kas tiek šādā veidā šifrēta (piemēram iegūstot šifrēšanas atslēgu uzlaužot iekārtu).
Domāju pie vainas human factor, kad neizmanto visas iekārtas spējas vai izmanto tās nepareizi.