Pakts kā fakts – 7 (papildināts 17.02.)

vara bungas:  🙂  un tomēr… pavisam īsi

zemāk  t.s. “Boisto plāns” – 2014.gada jūnijā uz Boisto salas notikušās pusslepenas RU un US  (bez UA un EU piedalīšanās) valdībām pietuvināto ekspertu sanāksmes darba rezultāts. Ar zaļu krāsu Boisto plānā atzīmēti punkti, kas atkārtojas Minskas -2 miera plānā.  Domāju, ka nākotnē, ja  turpināsies  politiskais process, zaļi pārkrāsosies arī citi punkti.  To vidū arī  24.punkts, kas ar lielu varbūtību ir RU agresijas galvenais iemesls. Minskas-2 plānā UA ārpusbloku statusa īesladēšana” netiek apskatīta, bet nav jābūt  meijerovicam, lai saprastu, ka neviens cits punkts no Minskas -2 plana nav četru prezidentu negulētas nakts vērts.

UPD1 17.02. re kur arī pieprasa, nepagāja ne 72 stundas…

“ДНР/ЛНР потребовали прекращения АТО и введения внеблокового статуса для Украины

(avots)

BOISTO AGENDA

Elements of an Enduring, Verifiable Ceasefire

  1. Ceasefire and ceasefire-monitoring by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
  2. Formation and deployment of a UN-authorized peacekeeping mission under Chapter 7 of the UN charter
  3. Withdrawal of regular Russian and Ukrainian army units to an agreed distance from conflict zones
  4. Removal of Ukrainian National Guard units from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
  5. Establishment of effective border control and halt of illegal trans-border transit of military equipment and personnel
  6. Agreed limits on significant armed-forces concentration in the vicinity of the Russian-Ukrainian border
  7. Confidence-building measures under OSCE auspices
  8. Verified demilitarization of illegal armed groups on both sides under OSCE auspices
  9. Formation of new Ukrainian law-enforcement forces in the conflict zone

Humanitarian and Legal Issues

  1. Return of and humanitarian assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
  2. Compensation for property losses and reconstruction of housing and commercial property
  3. Credible investigation of crimes committed during the crisis
  4. Amnesty for combatants not involved in war crimes during the hostilities

Economic Relations

  1. Preservation of Russian-Ukrainian economic relations, including defense-industry cooperation in view of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and other arrangements
  2. Enhancement of energy-related infrastructure and transportation networks
  3. International measures against illegal siphoning of gas transit
  4. Mutual guarantees for current status of labor migrants

Social and Cultural Issues

  1. Protection of the status of the Russian language and of traditional cultural ties between Russia and Ukraine
  2. Free access to mass media and television, including Russian mass media and television

Crimea

  1. Discussion of the settlement of legal issues pertaining to the status of Crimea
  2. Guarantee of uninterrupted water and energy supplies
  3. Protection of the rights of ethnic minorities
  4. Discussion of access by Ukrainian companies to development of offshore oil and gas reserves

International Status of Ukraine

  1. Mutual respect for the non-bloc status of Ukraine as stipulated by Ukrainian legislation

* * *

BOISTO WORKING GROUP

American Participants

  1. Thomas Graham–Co-chair of the Boisto Group; managing director of Kissinger Associates; former special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff (2004–2007)
  2. Andrew Weiss— Co-chair of the Boisto Group; vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian affairs on the National Security Council staff (1998–2001)
  3. Deana Arsenian—Vice president of the International Program and director of the Russia Program at the Carnegie Corporation of New York
  4. Rajan Menon—Anne and Bernard Spitzer professor of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York/City University of New York
  5. Robert Nurick—Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council
  6. Jack Snyder—Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations in the Political Science Department at Columbia University

Russian Participants

  1. Alexander Dynkin—Co-chair of the Boisto Group; director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); advisor to the prime minister of Russia (1998–1999)
  2. Aleksey Arbatov—Head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO; deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (1995–2003)
  3. Vyacheslav Trubnikov—Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary; member of the IMEMO board of directors; director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (1996 – 2000); first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia (2000–2004); four-star general, awarded with Hero of the Russian Federation medal
  4. Victor Kremenyuk—Deputy director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies
  5. Artem Malgin—Vice rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University)
  6. Feodor Voitolovsky—Deputy director of IMEMO
  7. Andrey Ryabov—Editor in chief of the World Economy and International Relations monthly journal

vara bungas: Visticamāk ka plāna 8., 18.,19. un 24.punktu piedāvāja RU grupas dalībnieks Nr.3.

 

VB ieraksti par šo tēmu   šeit, šeit , šeit , šeitšeit  un šeit

 

6 thoughts on “Pakts kā fakts – 7 (papildināts 17.02.)

  1. Iespējams, 2. punkts varētu arī parādīties, ja šis “pamiers” izgāzīsies. 24. punkts, ja tiks iekļauts kādā oficiālā dokumentā varētu nozīmēt kādas puses izgāšanos..arī UA iekšpolitikā. Interesanti būtu, ja “nomierinātājus” Franciju un Vāciju nomainītu, piem. UK un PL (kurus nevēlas ņemt sarunās)..sarunas ietu savādāk vai tomēr iestrēgtu pēdējo abu kategoriskās nostājas dēļ, vai arī RU pat tās neuzsāktu, jo tai nepatīk tādi, kurus nevar ietekmēt un nopirkt?

  2. viedoklis, ka Nato jātiek vaļā no vājajiem un nespējīgajiem: Bringing in the Baltics provided a dramatic example of adding countries which were security black holes— weak states with minimal military capability but potential conflicts with Russia.

    Today only Estonia meets NATO’s recommended two percent of GDP, itself a paltry level for a country screaming about the possibility of an invasion by the big bully next door. Latvia and Lithuania spend half that, but promise to eventually get up to two percent. Never mind, say the Baltics: America, if you please—despite being very busy around the world—put troops along their border and protect them.

    It’s probably not realistic to kick the Baltic States out of NATO, but then, the real problem for America is NATO, not particular members of it. Washington should drop out of the alliance, forging a set of more limited military cooperation agreements with the European Union and the European nations with the most potent militaries and significant bases. Needless to say, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would not be on that list.

    http://nationalinterest.org/feature/broken-hearts-club-6-allies-america-needs-divorce-12239?page=2

      • Un mūsējie impotenti, kas pie varas bijuši visus šos gadus, kā parasti neņēma vērā šādus izteicienus?
        Izskatās, ka te kādam ļoti patīk dzīvot uz parāda…

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