vara bungas: Ļoti svarīga intervija. Ģenerālmajors Roberts Skeils (Scales) ir unikāls ar to, ka pret viņu RU ir ierosināta krimināllieta par tiešo runu: “The only way the United States can have any effect in this region [Donbas ] and turn the tide is to start killing Russians — killing so many Russians that even Putin’s media can’t hide the fact that Russians are returning to the motherland in body bags“.
Ar zināmam korekcijām ģenerāļa intervijā pausto var atticināt arī uz NBS, tehnika un tehnoloģijas ir svarīgas, bet karavīri aptrūksies ātrāk. Karavīru daudzums noska stratēģiju, nevis stratēģija nosaka karavīru daudzumu. Think about it
[..] If the enemy is trying to win by killing our ground soldiers, meaning infantry, then we should never allow our infantry ever to engage in close combat in a fair fight. It’s bad that we do it, it’s bad that it happens at all, but when you factor in the strategic view, that this is a strategic imperative, it really changes it.[..]
[..] Number one, above all else, would be drones. Number two would be the use of robots or ground drones. Number three would be a soldier network, and number four would be a new suite of man-portable arms that could kill tanks, shoot down airplanes, and shoot the bad guys well outside the range of his weapons.
[..] If you want to build robustness in the Army, you build robustness in those close-combat units; you overpopulate the small units with rank. You figure out how many you need and you double that number.
What do you we always run out of first? Do we run out of ships? No. Do we run out of planes? No. Do we run out satellites? No. Do we run out of missiles? No. We run out of 11Bs ( kareivis kājnieks – VB). We always do. It’s that shortage of close-combat soldiers that drives the strategy instead of the strategy driving the number of close-combat soldiers. [..]
[..] The canary in the coal mine in our Army is our sergeants. An army doesn’t break because a computer operator in the Pentagon has a bad day. It breaks at the small-unit level. It breaks when those who do the dirty business of fighting or dying get worn down by overcommitment and casualties, and they break. When they break, the rest of the Army collapses around them.[..]
[..] The only danger of the all-volunteer Army is that we’re going to run out of, or exhaust, those who do the killing, but that’s not an institutional problem. It’s a problem of priorities and concern. [..]