vara bungas: FI bāzētas domnīcas analīze par RU PMK iespējamo pielietojumu kaimiņvalstīs. Ne pārāk pārgudras domas, bet tieši tādēļ pārbaudāmas un ticamas. RU NATO valstīs izmantos PMK ka piedevu nevis “galveno ēdienu”. 3B gadījumā PMK darbības piesegumam jābūt legālam vai puslegālam attiecīgajās valstīs. Tādēļ vēlreiz vēršu uzmanību uz dažādiem neformāliem vai pusformāliem pro-RU veidojumiem kā vietējās “kačoku”, ķazaku”, “airsofta” vai “futbolistu” grupas, nemaz nerunājot par tādiem duļķainiem veidojumiem kā “Systema”
[..] What are the challenges that Russian PMCs pose to the EU and NATO and its member states?
Here, it makes sense to distinguish between risks emanating from PMC activities far beyond NATO
territory, and those that might arise from measures pursued within the member states’ territory
or the Alliance’s immediate neighbourhood.
In Africa and the MENA region, the EU and NATO should prepare for (more) activities by
Russian PMCs, particularly in those areas that are both conflict-torn and geopolitically and/or eco –
nomically of interest to Moscow. In these areas, PMCs serve as a door-opener for further mili-
tary, political and economic engagement by Russia. Here, Russian PMC activities – protect-
ing repressive, authoritarian regimes or warlords, and supporting war economies – might
exacerbate existing conflicts with negative indirect consequences for the EU and NATO, for example by complicating conflict resolution and state building or by triggering further migration flows.
Within the immediate neighbourhood of the EU and NATO, particularly the Western post-
Soviet states and the Balkans, Moscow could make use of PMCs – partially in coordination
with other proxy forces like Cossacks, proRussian martial arts clubs or organized crime
groups – to harass or oppress pro-Western forces, conduct subversive actions or engage
in military-ideological training (youth camps, paramilitary training). In times of crisis, PMCs
might fulfil military tasks along the same lines as the Ukrainian scenario – from seizing government
buildings and critical infrastructure to combat missions. Although EU and NATO members are aware
of the specific challenge of plausible deniability, the lack of clear evidence of Russian state involvement
might nevertheless complicate joint decision-making. Hence, PMCs could contribute to creating
new “protracted conflicts”, undermining EU and NATO engagement and democratic transfor-
mation processes in the region. In contrast to the post-Soviet space, military
missions by Russian PMCs on NATO or EU territory seem very unlikely.
Given the Western military and security service capabilities on their own territory, the logic of plausible deniability would be less effective while at the same time the risks of serious countermeasures would be much higher. Nevertheless, Russian PMCs might engage in limited subversive actions as a supportive function or as part of a combination, for example by conducting (cyber) attacks on critical infrastructure
and/or political institutions, or by pursuing false flag attacks in order to destabilize the political,
economic and societal cohesion of the target country and/or support pro-Russian forces there.
Within this context, the specific capabilities of several Russian PMCs and their financiers in the
realm of cybersecurity and disinformation have become a reason for concern. The same is true
of the ideological work of some Russian PMCs when applied to NATO or EU member states with
strong ethnic Russian minorities.
UPD1 Btw te vēl viena mazāk zināma RU PMK – “Schit”. Šāds nosaukums viennozīmīgi slikts mārketinga gājiens (shit job) . Toties Schit bāzes dislokācija Kubinkā ( blakus GDK speciālo uzdevumu 45. atsevišķā bde) liecina par zināmu elitārismu, atšķirībā no vagneriešiem, kas ir vienkārša “pehota”.