vara bungas: Ļoti svarīga lasāmviela visiem, kuri vēlas saprast kā un kādos apstākļos darbojas militārās izlūkošanas analītiķi izstrādājot brīdinājumus un rekomendācijas. Tas ir atbildīgs un grūts darbiņš, gandrīz kā politiķiem, kuriem šo grāmatu arī būtu jāliek zem spilvena.
Nesaprašānās starp brīdinājuma devējēiem un brīdinājuma saņēmējiem veido neadekvātu priekšstatu par apdraudējuma pakāpi, kas ir īpaši bīstami gadījumos, kad apdraudējums ir objektīvi mazticams (piemēram, “neviens neuzbruks NATO valstij”), tomēr, ja draudi realizējas, tad tā ir katastrofa. Vainīgie būs gan politiķi, gan analītiķi, vieni, ka nenovērtēja brīdinājumus, otrie, ka piekāpās. Zāles pret šo kaiti ir norādītas grāmatā, tā ir īpašo, marģinālo, nepopulāro un neprātīgo brīdinājumu uzklausīšana, izvērtēšana un paziņošana lēmējiem.
It is an axiom of warning that warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, and that he must know that he has been warned.
“[..] Nearly all inquiries into the presumed failures of intelligence or criticisms of its competence are focused on why forewarning was not provided that something was going to happen. Rarely does the policymaker or the congressional committee complain that intelligence failed to make an adequate assessment of enemy
capabilities, even when this in fact may have been the case. The criticism almost invariably is: “You did not tell me this was going to happen. We were not led to expect this and were surprised.’’ Or, “You mean for all the millions that were spent on collection, you were not able to tell us that this was likely to occur?’’
Protests that ofﬁcials had been warned of the possibility or that the capability had been recognized are not likely to be very satisfactory in these circumstances. [..]
Warning is not a fact, a tangible substance, a certainty, or a refutable hypothesis. It is not something which the finest collection system should be expected toproduce full-blown or something which can be delivered to the policymaker with the statement, “Here it is. We have it now. ” Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a perception, a belief. It is the product of reasoning or of logic, a hypothesis whose validity can be neither confirmed nor refuted until it is too late. [..]
Although the foregoing is probably generally accepted in theory—and person the warning problem have repeatedly cautioned intelligence officials and policymakers alike not to expect certainty in warning—there is often a tendency to forget this important point when the situation arises. Particularly because it is so important to make the right decision or right response in the face of threatened aggression, the military commander or policy level official more than ever wishes a judgment of certainty from the intelligence system—yes, the adversary is, or no, he is not planning to attack. The official may press the intelligence system to come to a positive judgment despite the inherent uncertainties in the situation, oron the other hand, demand a degree of “proof’’ which is absolutely unobtainable. [..]
A distinguished supervisor in the field of political intelligence observed many years ago that, no matter what went wrong, it was always the fault of intelligence.When disaster struck, the analyst might remind the policy official that he had been warned of the possibility or that it had been mentioned this might happen in several briefings in the past month. And he would reply, “Well, you did not say it often enough, or loud enough.’’
Tā kā esiet neatlaidīgi un skaļi 😉