vara bungas: Punkti, ko piedāvā CSIS tapuši ar CIP virsnieka ar 30+ gadu stāžu dalību. Ir sajūta, ka saraksts nav izsmeļošs un turpināms
[..] If deterrence fails and Russian forces invade Ukraine, the United States and its allies and partners should conduct several immediate steps:
- Implement severe economic and financial sanctions against Russia, including cutting Russian banks off from the global electronic payment messaging system known as SWIFT.
- Enact a Twenty-First Century Lend-Lease Act to provide Ukraine with war materiel at no cost. Priority items would include air defense, anti-tank, and anti-ship systems; electronic warfare and cyber defense systems; small arms and artillery ammunition; vehicle and aircraft spare parts; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; rations; medical support; and other needs of a military involved in sustained combat. This aid could occur through overt means with the help of U.S. military forces, including special operations, or it could be a covert action authorized by the U.S. president and led by the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Provide intelligence to allow Ukraine to disrupt Russian lines of communication and supply, as well as warning of airborne and amphibious attacks and locations of all major units.
- Offer humanitarian support to help Ukraine deal with refugees and internally displaced persons. This assistance may also need to be extended to NATO allies on Ukraine’s borders for refugees fleeing westward.
- Provide economic support, including energy, to Ukraine and NATO allies due to the expected disruption of Russian gas flows to Europe.
- Conduct public diplomacy and media broadcasts to Ukraine and globally, including in Russia, to portray accurately what is happening.
- Apply diplomatic pressure on Belarus to deny Russia access to its territory to attack Ukraine. This is critically important because Russian use of Belarus’ rail and road networks would threaten a strategic turning movement of Ukraine’s northern flank.
- Coordinate with nongovernmental organizations and the International Criminal Court to document all war crimes inflicted on the Ukrainian people and to demand redress once the war is over. What happened to the Syrian people should not happen again. [..]
VB: papildus tam
- Neafiliētu hakeru masīvs kiberuzbrukums RU valdības IS
- GLONASS sistēmas darbības traucēšana + apsvērt iespēju samazināt GPS precizitāti reģionā vienlaicīgi masveidā apgādājot UA pusi ar military grade GPS ierīcēm.
- Organizēt apmācības nometnes tiem UA pilsoņiem, kas nogādājot ģimenes drošībā ir gatavi atgriezties un karot dzimtenē.
- Visās ES ostās aizkavēt, palēnināt kravu tranzītu, kas ceļo uz RU
- Atbalstīt UA operācijas ar sabiedroto EW spējām (attiecīgi aprīkoti padomnieki)
- Pārtraukt vīzu izsniegšanu RU pilsoņiem
- Aktivizēt kontrpropagandu ru valodā
- Ieroču tiešās piegādes UA no NATO un ne-NATO valstīm
- Piesagdokumentu izgatavošana UA pagrīdei
Šis gan ir pareizs novērojums. UA ir jānoturās līdz martam-aprīlim, tad būs atelpa līdz maija beigām, ko nodrošina laika apstākļi un apvidus pārejamība.
[..] Weather: An invasion that begins in January or February would have the advantage of frozen ground to support the cross-country movement of a large mechanized force. It would also mean operating in conditions of freezing cold and limited visibility. January is usually the coldest and snowiest month of the year in Ukraine, averaging 8.5 hours of daylight during the month and increasing to 10 hours by February.8 This would put a premium on night fighting capabilities to keep an advance moving forward. Should fighting continue into March, mechanized forces would have to deal with the infamous Rasputitsa, or thaw. In October, Rasputitsa turns firm ground into mud. In March, the frozen steppes thaw, and the land again becomes at best a bog, and at worst a sea of mud. Winter weather is also less than optimal for reliable close air support operations.
Urban Combat: While much of the terrain east of the Dnepr River includes rural fields and forests, there are several major urban areas that a Russian mechanized force would have to either take or bypass and besiege. Kiev has almost 3 million inhabitants, Kharkiv has roughly 1.5 million, Odessa has 1 million, Dnipro has almost 1 million, Zaporizhia has 750,000, and even Mariupol has almost 500,000.9 If defended, these large urban areas could take considerable time and casualties to clear and occupy. In the First Chechen War, it took Russian forces from December 31, 1994, to February 9, 1995, to wrestle control of Grozny, then a city of less than 400,000, from a few thousand Chechen fighters.10 In the Second Chechen War, the siege of Grozny also took six weeks.
Therefore, the best course of action for Russian troops would be to bypass urban areas and mop them up later. However, Kharkiv is just over the border from Russia and is a major road and railroad junction. If Russian forces did not control Kharkiv, it would seriously diminish their logistical capability to support a central thrust toward the Dnepr River and beyond. Furthermore, Kiev poses a similar challenge and, as the nation’s capital, possesses great symbolic value for whichever side holds it. Russia may be unable to avoid sustained urban combat in several major metropolitan areas (and the resulting high casualties) if it attempts more than a punitive incursion into Ukraine. [..]