vara bungas: Jautājums, kas un kur var izraisīt RU “credibility problem”? Ņemot vērā 3B etnisko sastāvu tā būtu LT dienvidu daļa vai Baltijas jūras akvatorija.
[..] The overarching concept is driven by the assumption that the initial period of war will be decisive because deflection, attrition, and disorganization will stop the U.S. military from executing its preferred way of war, and a U.S. failure to attain quick victory will decisively affect American political resolve. Although the Russian General Staff would love to impose a cost to theater access and maneuver, they expect a U.S. aerospace blitzkrieg which cannot be blocked at the outset. Their answer is to deflect, degrade, suppress, or preempt in order to functionally destroy the adversary’s ability to fight, and ultimately win the attrition exchange. In short, the Russian military expects that U.S. forces will arrive in theater, and that Russian strategic operations can successfully counter U.S. concepts of operations during the relevant conflict period or impose high enough costs to force a de-escalation. If not, there is always theater employment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, an area where Russia does not suffer credibility problems.[..]