vara bungas: Nekļūdīgu briesmu indikatoru var iegūt vienkārši sekojot kaimiņa-banķiera gaitām. Ja viņš pārdod māju un pērk biļeti vienā virzienā, ja viņš pastiprina žogu un uzliek 1.stāva logiem restes, tad valstī vai rajonā viss nav kārtībā ar drošību. Šī publika ir diezgan informēta un tai ir ko zaudēt. Skaties un kopē.
Ja jums nav kaimīna – banķiera … slikti. Nu, tad sekojiet SE drošības politikai un prasiet, lai pašmāju politiķi radoši kopē zviedru darbības, bez garas filozofēšanas par draudu “hipotētiskuma” pakāpi.
“By 24 July 2020, the Armed Forces must submit a supplementary budget base for 2021 and adjust its budget base according to the direction specified in the assignment,”
Sweden said it has approved the following projects:
* establishing a [new] division artillery battalion with fire-tube artillery.
* new regiment will be established in Östersund . The regiment will be responsible for training one to two local defense shooting battalions.
* Twelve new fire-tube artillery pieces will be procured
* Heavy coastal robot capability
* Preparatory work regarding the future combat aviation capability and the next generation of combat aviation .
* increase in basic training volumes. As with the Swedish Defense Forces’ budget base for 2021, 8,000 full-time undergraduates must be trained annually by 2025.
* country will modernize over a hundred tanks, acquire new warships, and upgrade mine clearance ship
VB: Zemāk SE drošības apsvērumi divu bijušo SE vēstnieku RU acīm – šodienas raksts Svenska Dagbladet (mašintulkojums, izcēlumi mani- VB)
Unacceptable risk if we do not secure the defense capability
The modern total defense agreed upon by the Defense Committee constitutes an absolute minimum for Sweden’s security and defense. The Riksdag must contribute the necessary funds, write the former ambassadors Tomas Bertelman and Sven Hirdman.
In September, the government will present the bill as a basis for a new long-term total defense decision from 2021. It is important for Sweden’s international credibility that decisions on our defense and security policy are made with as broad political agreement as possible. This is the reason why these decisions are being prepared in the parliamentary defense committee, which in two reports, “Resistance” and “Armed Forces”, has submitted proposals on Sweden’s future total defense. These reports express a broad-based, cross-party consensus on both the security policy environment that Sweden has to deal with, and how the Swedish defense must be developed in order to secure our freedom and independence in a world that is becoming increasingly complicated and risky. Conclusions and proposals form a carefully balanced whole that aims to create a credible war-fighting capability. Such a total defense would also significantly strengthen our ability to deal with peacetime crises, such as the pandemic crisis we are currently experiencing.
Since the Defense Committee submitted its final report “Värnkraft” in May 2019, new financing needs have emerged in the military defense, needs that the Defense Committee was not aware of when the reports were written. Significant parts of the financial contributions on which the Defense Committee was based have turned out to be mortgaged. This is about as much as half during the period 2021–2025 and more than a quarter in the following five-year period. In order for the whole that the Defense Committee agreed on to actually be implemented, additional contributions of a total of approximately SEK 50 billion will be required during the ten-year period 2021–2030.
It is impossible to turn a blind eye to the fact that there has been a structural underfunding of the defense for many years. Basically, this is due to a discrepancy between the goals the policy set for the defense, including orders for Swedish-produced materiel systems in short series, and how much money they were actually prepared to contribute. The additions that are now required are also about compensating for the consequences of the reduction in the defense budget since the 1990s, which led to more than 90 percent of the army being disbanded and the entire civil defense being disbanded.
The proposed defense spending should be put in a historical and international perspective. With an extra addition of SEK 50 billion, Sweden’s defense budget would reach approximately 1.7 percent of GDP in the second half of the 2020s. From the end of the Second World War until the beginning of the 1980s, the Armed Forces’ share of GDP was over 3 percent of GDP. It was not until 1998 that it fell below 2%, the level agreed by most European countries as a target for its defense spending. Over the past decade, Sweden’s defense budget has been around 1 percent. The Defense Committee’s proposal only means that we return to as large a share as we had in 2001.
When the future defense budgets are to be decided, however, it is essential that the government proceeds more than from percentages to actual resources in the form of capabilities, units and materiel that our defense needs according to the Armed Forces’ professional assessment to fulfill its task. Even if not everything can be acquired at once, the focus must be completely clear.
One could argue that the resources that the pandemic now requires mean that expensive investments to meet other threats to our society have to wait. But if there is one thing that the spring of 2020 has taught us, it is that unexpected threats can strike suddenly, and that the lack of preparedness can be devastating. As far as our backward defense is concerned, however, it is hardly an unexpected threat. Both the threat picture and the defense needs and the concrete proposals have been carefully analyzed, prepared and presented by a largely unanimous defense committee. Our security policy situation is more uncertain than in a long time, and a number of basic assumptions about the security system in Europe are being tested. Even with a change in the White House, the demands on Europe’s countries will take a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense. It is obvious that if we are not prepared to finance the defense that we ourselves say we need, we risk weakening cooperation with our partners and opening up to threats and pressure from opponents. A country that lacks a credible defense capability risks being perceived as a “soft target” and in a tighter situation ending up in a more vulnerable situation. It is a historical lesson of old date, but it needs to be reminded.
If a great power conflict were to break out in Europe, it would be devastating for Sweden. Europe has once again become a serious conflict zone with three critical areas where a great power conflict could break out: the North Calotte with northern Norway and the Kola Peninsula; southern Baltic region with Poland, the Baltics and Kaliningrad; southern Ukraine with the Black Sea coast. In these areas, there are task forces ready that can escalate a military conflict into a major confrontation. Our security policy, based on a credible and war-resistant national defense, should therefore focus on reducing the risks of a new great power war in Europe as far as possible and in cooperation with other countries.
The credibility of our defense affects how the states, which we hope will come to our aid if our defense proves to be insufficient, assess how meaningful it is to help us. Sweden’s security policy line includes building security in collaboration with others. Since we have no binding defense commitments, confidence in our capabilities becomes even more important to us. Ultimately, this trust depends on our partners perceiving that we take sufficient responsibility for our own safety and do not skimp on others.
Developments in the business environment have underlined the assessments made that an armed attack on Sweden cannot be ruled out in the event of a deterioration in development in Europe. In our part of the world, Sweden is late in bringing about significant reinforcements of the defense. The modern total defense agreed upon by the Defense Committee constitutes an absolute minimum for Sweden to be able to defend its own territory and guarantee the citizens’ security in the future, and to be a credible partner that contributes to stability in our immediate area.
It is our strong hope that all parliamentary parties will be able to gather around an agreement to contribute the – in a larger perspective, after all, quite limited – funds required to realize this total defense. Failure to do so would mean unacceptable risk-taking with security in our immediate area, and by extension with our own freedom.
former Ambassador to Russia and Chief of Staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee
former Ambassador to Russia and State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense