Dienas grauds


vara bungas: Rakstiņš par RU militārajām spējām britu skatījumā. Spilgtākie citāti zemāk, bet vērā ņemama galvenā doma, ko latviešu valodā var izteikt šādi: “Krievijas konvencionālās militārās spējas strauji sarūk attālinoties no tās robežām.” Tiešām RU nav ne tuvu US spēju projicēt (jūras) kājniekus jebkurā vietā pasaulē, tomēr Austrumeiropas līdzenumā RU SzS šobrīd nav valstu-konkurentu. Ja paskatāmies uz Donbasas piemēru, 200-300 km dziļums ir maksimālā robeža RU prokšiem, kas tālāk neiet, jo var sākties problēmas ar apgādi un ielenkumiem. Ja iet tālāk (kā SY ) RU karošana pārvēršas par dažu garnizonu aizsardzību un negausīgu apkārtnes bumbošanu. PSRS  Afganistānā karoja pavisam citādi, centās iegūt kontroli par provincēm un apvienot tās. Tas ļoti dārgi maksāja un diez vai RU var ko tādu atļauties atkārtot (personāla zaudējumu dēļ), ja runa ir par ekspansiju nevis iebrukuma atvairīšanu. Attiecīgi, RU spēkus ir jāizstiepj un jāgriež kā desu pa gabaliņam no viena gala. Vienlaikus nodrošinoties ar patvērumu  no mucbumbām.

“The fact that the Russians still have conscription means they can mobilise impressive numbers of reserves. Assuming 150 000 conscripts are trained every year, mobilising all the conscripts trained over the past decade would bring 1.5-million men back to the colours! And none of them would be older than 30. Of course, many would need refresher training, but would likely to be a matter of weeks, not months, and Russia is known to have large stocks of war equipment – tanks, other armoured vehicles, artillery and much more – held in store. The Russian steamroller is not dead, it is just sleeping.”

avots

Nu kā var nepieminēt EE?

“The one problem would be Kalibr missiles launched from Russian warships in the Baltic. And this justifies the British Army deployment in Estonia. As long as NATO holds the northwest coast of Estonia, the Russian Baltic fleet would be unable to undertake sustained operations, split between its forward operating base at Kaliningrad and its dockyards at St Petersburg and unable to move between the two. This suggests that Estonia should be the British Army’s main focus in Nato, a place where a small force can exercise great strategic effect.”

just done

16 domas par “Dienas grauds

  1. Ar dzīvu interesi gaidām krievu projekcijas izpausmes AFG. Ielaist talibanu problēmu vēl dziļāk Vidusāzijā – negribas, kā minēts, PSRS stilam rociņas par īsām – un Assada kuru stutēt nav (un domāju nebūs – nav tur alavītu analoga).

  2. Like I’ve said previously, the procurement of an anti-ship missile system (and mines) is part of a regional approach to the defence of the Baltics. It is clear that we need more joint capabilities, and the sooner the better. Next important step would be the procurement of long range artillery.

  3. Posting here because off-topic doesn’t work for me.

    Relating to the discussion about your new sports center.
    Estonia also needs a new sports complex in Tapa. So, for that purpose, the state, county and Defence Investment Center are planning a joint project which would be funded by private investors. Once built, the county and Defence Forces would purchase services for roughly 450 000 euros per year in the next 15 years. The project itself is estimated to cost 13 million euros. (could be more, could be less) This is a pretty unique way of building infrastructure for Estonia. Who knows if it is actually going to work…

    https://www.err.ee/1608093142/tapa-uue-spordikeskuse-ehitamiseks-otsitakse-erainvestoreid

  4. Just to add, before Kekava bypass project PPP has not been purposefully implemented yet (apart some not significant projects) not because of high corruption risks (as such, PPP, just as any other public investment project, do not entail some “specific” corruption risks) but rather due to the lack of demand and lack of suitable projects. In order to implement PPP, especially projects without end-user payments (Kekava bypass is based on the state availability payment), there need to be a strong business case whereas it pays off to entrust the project implementation risks to private partner. By an large, in schemes such as road PPP’s there are three main advantages: public sector retains its investment capacity, as the construction of the road is financed by private partner, road will be build quickly (as public sector starts to pay only when the road becomes available for users) and, finally, it can be expected to obtain high quality road as any divergence from previously set quality standards results in reduced availability payments.
    That being said, for me it is still not clear what could be the business case in doing the sports center (or, in LT case, poligon) with PPP method, as there seem to be no significant construction and/or maintenance risks to be transferred to private partner (hence it may not be beneficial to cover private sector borrowing rate), and in current climate all limitations are off and public sector is able to borrow money for very low or even zero rates.

  5. Ukraina pret Donbasu un Krimu ir izvēlējusies taktiski operatīvo plānu (stratēģiskais – atgūt Donbasu un Krimu) – demonstrēt dzīves līmeņa pārākumu un radīt neapmierinātību Donbasa un Krimas iedzīvotājos). Man liekas, ka gudri. Donbass un Krima – pagaidām okupētās teritorijas nav viendabīgi, tur milzt iekšējie konflikti.

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