vara bungas: Rasmusens un Jermaks izripināja UA nākotnes projektu. Kompaktu. Vērts iedziļināties. Tagad ZSU panākumus frontēs jāuzskata par obligātu priekšnosacījumu dokumenta sekmīgai virzībai, jo UA robežu konfigurācija netiek noteikta. Lai vai kā , bet šobrīd UA notur iniciatīvu un iet va bank visos līmeņos, politiskajā, informatīvajā, militārajā… RU atbildēs ar eskalāciju, vagnera zekiem un tiktokeriem.
VB ieskatā galvenais, ka šis dokuments vairākos aspektos var kļūt par melnrakstu NATO līguma 5.panta jaunajai redakcijai, jo esošā redakcija neglābjami novecojusi un vajadzības gadījumā nenodrošinās npārprotamu panta interpretāciju. Ir vēl jauninājumi attiecībā uz reakcijas (politisko lēmumu pieņemšanas ātrumu), kas arī nav mazsvarīgi. Jūtama NATO ex-ģen.sekretāra pieredzējusi roka.
Visādi citādi interesanti, ka kompakts īpaši uzsver teritoriālās aizsardzības, mob.rezerves un OMD nozīmi UA drošības struktūrā. Mūsu AM mainīja kursu ļoti savlaicīgi.
Kas vēl iekrita acīs:
- Both NATO and EU membership will significantly bolster Ukraine’s security in the long-term. However, Ukraine needs security guarantees now.
- The Compact will consist of a joint strategic partnership document co-signed by guarantor states and Ukraine (as well as bilateral agreements between Ukraine and guarantor states).
- The security guarantees will be positive; they lay out a range of commitments made by a group of guarantors, together with Ukraine. They need to be binding based on bilateral agreements, but brought together under a joint strategic partnership document – called the Kyiv Security Compact.
- The guarantees must not constrain Ukraine to limit the size or strength of its armed forces. Nor should they be drawn in exchange for a specific status, such as neutrality, or put other obligations or restraints on Ukraine.
- Ukraine needs the resources to maintain a significant force capable of withstanding the Russian Federation’s armed forces and paramilitaries.
- providing Ukraine with comprehensive defensive systems to protect key population centres and
access points by deploying air and maritime missile defence, cyber capabilities, advanced radar capabilities. Those systems – so called antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) – could incorporate a mix of home-based capabilities and foreign systems. In case of a threat of the use of force or aggression, they could be rapidly augmented by ear-marked systems provided by the key guarantors.
- Access to EU’s capability funding to re-build Ukraine’s defence industrial base on EU/NATO standards – and develop with EU member states new defensive capabilities.
- Modelled on countries with active conscription, Ukraine will need to maintain a large enough territorial defence force, including a reserve service that can be sporadically called for active duty.
- Guarantors can engage in binding commitments [..] In addition to a joint document, guarantors should make continuous and bilateral legal and political commitments to Ukraine.
- Security guarantors to use all elements of their national and collective power and take appropriate measures – which may include diplomatic, economic, and military means – to enable Ukraine to stop the aggression, restore its sovereignty, ensure its security, military edge, and capability to deter its enemies and defend itself by itself against any threat.
- Triggers should be based on a joint threat-assessment structure: extended security guarantees should be activated through a mechanism that would require a request from Ukraine to the guarantor states, following “an armed attack or an act of aggression.”
- Upon a request from Ukraine, guarantors shall gather for collective consultations within a very short amount of time (e.g. 24 hours) and decide on amplifying the guarantees on the basis of a coalition of the willing (e.g. 72 hours).
- International sanctions should be an additional layer of the overall set of security guarantees, in case of aggression.