Lifts nestrādā


vara bungas: Interesanta tabula man te trāpījās meklējot informāciju par NATO strategic airlift spējām. Bēdīgs skats eiropiešu dāmas un kungi. Kontinetālajā daļā neviena C-17, A400M flote nedaudz izdaiļo bildi, bet kravnesība tam ir puse no C-17… Ar taktiskā līmeņa transportiem viss nedaudz cerīgāk, bet vienalga nekādas stratēģiskās autonomijas no US nesanāk.

Žoklis gandrīz salauza klaviatūru ieraugot tabulā LV NBS GS rīcībā 3 x C-27J, bet tad sapratu, ka autors sajauca LT ar LV (gadās) vai pieskaitīja LV īrētos Spartanus. Katram gadījumam pārbaudīju rakstā minētos skaitļus šeit (kopumā sakrīt, ņemot vērā, ka aktīvi ekspluatējamos lidaparātus vispār grūti skaitīt).

avots

Mums, Baltijā, svarīga māksla

33 domas par “Lifts nestrādā

  1. Pat ja lifts strādā…..ja izņem ārā ASV, ko tad mums tas lifts tur vispār varētu atvest šaizes gadījumā? Ne Vāciešiem ne Britiem ne Frančiem nav liekas kara tehnikas vai ieroču ko mums ”ziedot” palīdzībā pat ja būtu vēlēšanās un pieejams transports (ziemas jakas un konservu bundžas ar sardīnēm neskaitās). Vai nu Uncle Sam arsenāls, vai nekas.

  2. Un atkal, kas ar civilo rekrutēšanu?
    Айрболтик
    Airbus A220-300 32шт.
    seats 145 гол.
    Max take-off weight 67.6 tons
    Max payload 16.7 tons

    • Ar militāro pasažieru pārvadāšnu nav problēmu, to var arī transporta lidmašīna, bet pasažieru lidmašīnā nevar pārvadāt militārās kravas, ja tās nav sadalītas pa čemodāniem 🙂 . Drīzāk var nomāt transporta lidmašīnas no komersantiem, ko arī dara, kad ļoti vajag. Vēl ir kaut kādi pooling projekti, kad eiropieši sametas un uztur dažus transportiniekus kopīgai lietošanai, šķiet LV tur arī kaut ko maksāja.

    • Civilā flote no militārās atšķiras ar to, ka civilie krīzes gadījumā juridiski var sēdēt mājās, bet armijnieki lielākā daļa vismaz ierodas darba vietās. Tāpat Airbaltic lidenes pieder kaut kadām līzinga kompānijām, nevis Airbaltic tieši, un diezin vai līgumā ir punkts, ka vizināsim raķetes ar tām, kad ienāks prātā.

      • Ja ir mobilizācija, tad var arī mobilizēt. Līzinga kompānijai jau lielos vilcienos vienalga kas lido kā tik maksā. Cita lieta, ka apdrošināšana gandrīz noteikti nestrādās un ja kāda nogāzīsies, tad vajadzēs atmaksāt.

        • Pieļauju, ka reālu sūdu gadījumā tās lidmašīnas var aizlidot uz drošāku vietu, kur līzinga kantoris vienkārši pārziemos karu vai atdos ļotenes kādam citam civilajam operatoram, nevis ies riskēt ar bankrotējušu valsti.

  3. Arī Afganistānā (ieskaitot nupatējo evakuāciju) sabiedrotie taču pilnīgi atkarājās no ASV, neskatoties uz nenozīmīgo spēku daudzumu. SPH, IFV vai tanku vispār varēja atvest tikai ASV lidmašīnas.

  4. Tabulā redzama eiropas stratēģiskā autonomija – gaisa transporta spēja salīdzināma ar texas air national guard, bet IKP lielāks nekā ASV.

    • Eiropa nav pedējas desmitgadēs plānojusi karot, būtu dīvaini, ja cipari teiktu ko citu. Es pat teiktu vēl vairāk – Eiropa( ja neskaita tos, kam ir tas svarīgi izdzīvošanai – Baltieši, PL, GR) negatavojas karot arī turpmak.

      • Vēl jo vairāk, Eiropa galīgi netaisījās karot tālu no savām robežām, kur transporta lidmašīnas lielā skaitā vajadzīgas.

  5. I think personally, that naval and rail transport is more relevant to us. Rail would obviously be very vulnerable near Suwalki in an open conflict, so most of the heavier equipment would likely be transported via ferries. While airlift is quicker, it is also limited in capacity and very vulnerable in contested airspace. Logistically, the Baltic region has to be considered as an island – just like Taiwan.

      • Why would it matter? There is plenty of neutral waters, plus territorial waters of other countries. In fact, Nord Stream runs mostly through those neutral waters due to political reasons.

        • There is no such thing like neutral waters (EEZ) in case of armed conflict. Not for RU in any case. They would respect territorial waters of neutral counttries, but it depends on circumstances.

          • Why would Russia care about territorial waters in an armed conflict?
            I could understand legal difficulties when moving NATO warships through other countries territorial waters, but for Russia it would make absolutely no difference.

            • Practical considerations: if SE enters the war, it significantly worsens RU situation in the Baltic Sea. Therefore declared neutrality and respect for the borders may or may not be respected. It worked during WW2 even when SE admitted german military transit at the beginning of the war and UK bombers closer to the end of the war.

              .

              • If the conflict really becomes that hot (meaning regional involvement), then there is no real difference anymore. Russia would consider everybody hostile and everybody would consider Russia hostile, regardless of political or legal positions. We can argue over de jure implications, but they would not weigh too heavily on the practical aspects due to the things I mentioned earlier. NATO is free to move its troops through neutral and allied waters and nobody can stop it. So, no, I don’t think that in the context of a regional war, Swedish territorial waters would present a significant problem for NATO transit.
                What could and would probably pose a real threat is the emergence of electronic and cyber warfare. Not that I wish to diminish the danger of warships, but Russia has repeatedly demonstrated AIS spoofing in the region, and it could become a very significant tool for creating chaos in the Baltic Sea. If civilian ships have no reliable ways to navigate (through which a very large part of our goods travel), logistical chains could become extremely vulnerable. Same would go for air traffic. This is something we really need to start thinking about very soon because it is not a case of if, but when.
                https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/pavojinga-apgaule-del-rusijos-karo-laivu-prie-klaipedos-tokios-provokacijos-pries-lietuva-dar-nera-buve.d?id=88192363

                • Bastion has max range about 300 km, that is most important factor then possible EW threat, which can be easily circumvented with instrumental navigation. But I agree that in case of hot conflict there would not be considerable possibility to resupply 3B. Everything must be prepositioned. Yesterday.

                  • I would like to add, that it is not just about instrumental navigation, but also coordinating the movement of all the ships. If you have a lot of spoofed AIS signatures then it is quite possible that accidents start happening because ships won’t know which ship is real, which one is not, which one has a correct heading, which one to avoid etc.
                    This also creates the possibility of hiding Russian warhsips (or their cargo ferries) among civilian traffic because it is unclear what is what. Good luck shooting anti-ship missiles then…
                    Estonia is definitely going to need proper military traffic control with all the necessary radars and patrol assets, which can independently detect, identify and track all the ships in the Baltic Sea. Things are quietly moving in that direction, but not fast enough. We have a huge gap in that capability.

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